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Abstract
Near the end of World War Two, a National Socialist 
resistance movement briefly flickered to life in Germany 
and its borderlands. Dedicated to delaying the advance 
of the victorious Allies and Soviets, this guerrilla 
movement, the Werwolf, succeeded in scattered acts of 
sabotage and violence, and also began to assume the 
character of a vengeful Nazi reaction against the German 
populace itself; collaborators and "defeatists" were 
assassinated, and crude posters warned the population 
that certain death was the penalty for failure to resist 
the enemy. Participation in "scorched earth" measures 
gave the movement an almost Luddite character.
In the final analysis, however, the Werwolf failed 
because of two basic weaknesses which undercut the 
movement. First, it lacked popular appeal, which doomed 
guerrillas and fanatic resisters to a difficult life on 
the margins of their own society? such an existence was 
simply not feasible in a country heavily occupied by 
enemy military forces. Second, the Werwolf was poorly 
organized, and showed all the signs of internal confusion 
that have been identified by the so-called 
"functionalist" school of German historiography. In fact,
confusion and barbarism became worse as the bonds of 
military success which had united the Reich began to 
loosen and unravel? the Werwolf can perhaps serve as the 
ultimate construct in the "functionalist" model of the 
Third Reich.
Although it failed, the Werwolf did have some 
permanent significance. While it is a classic example of 
guerrilla warfare gone wrong, the mere fact that it was 
active also caused a reaction among Germany*s enemies. 
The Western Allies altered their own military and 
political policies to allow for extermination of the 
Werwolf threat, and it is likely that immediate security 
considerations also influenced the direction of Soviet 
policies in Germany.
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Introduction: The Werwolf Movement as a Research Topic
The orthodox opinion on Nazi partisan warfare is 
that it was nonexistent, or was a myth produced by a 
last-minute Goebbels propaganda campaign; one historian 
even goes so far to claim that Germany ,fdid not produce 
a single saboteur, far less a resistance movement."1 
The corollary of this assumption is the belief that the 
German populace was obedient, subdued, and even apathetic 
during the so-called "Stunde Null" (or "zero hour") , when 
the Third Reich crumbled and control of Germany passed 
over to the victorious powers of the Grand Alliance. 
This impression was formed during the occupation period 
and continues to be widely accepted today. Undeniably, 
it is largely the truth, but it is not the entire truth, 
if only because the total breakdown and atomization of 
the Reich makes such generalizations over-simplified.
In fact, there was an active Nazi resistance 
campaign during the Stunde Null period, albeit a 
scattered and sporadic struggle which varied in regional 
intensity and failed to jolt the advancing Allied and 
Soviet armies. Lack of success, however, should not deny 
the Nazi Resistance Movement recognition as the same kind
of phenomena experienced in occupied Europe from 1940 to 
45, if on a lesser scale. Even the most celebrated anti- 
Nazi groups did not succeed in seriously undermining the 
presence of the occupying power until Allied and Soviet 
troops had already pushed back the frontiers of the Axis 
"New Order," and it should also be noted that Nazi 
guerrillas —  unlike the other European resistance 
movements —  lacked the impression of mass involvement 
that inevitably came with final triumph, when scores of 
opportunistic recruits sought at the last minute to align 
themselves with the winning side.
A careful examination of surviving evidence shows 
that contrary to conventional wisdom, there was in fact 
a string of Nazi terrorist incidents aimed at both the 
enemy powers and at German "collaborators" who worked 
with the occupiers in maintaining civil government. In 
the spring of 1945, bridges were destroyed by 
saboteurs,2 Allied and Soviet soldiers were murdered and 
their vehicles ambushed,3 public buildings were mined or 
bombed,4 and underground leaflets were widely used to 
threaten domestic opponents of the defeated Nazi 
regime.5 Even after conditions settled into the unhappy 
post-war routine established by the occupying powers,
minor sabotage continued, particulary such acts as the 
cutting of telephone lines,6 the erection of roadblocks 
and "decapitation wires,"7 vandalism of military 
vehicles,8 and attacks upon occupation troops, mainly 
sniping and bodily assaults,9 As late as 1946, several 
Allied denazification officials were the victims of 
mysterious Vehme-stvle killings, the most infamous case 
being the assassination of American sociologist Edward 
Hartshorne, who was ambushed on the Autobahn near Munich 
(28 August 1946).10 In a number of instances, bombing 
and arson attacks were carried out upon such targets as 
MG facilities,11 denazification courts,12 and Communist 
meeting halls.13
Most of this resistance was generated by right-wing 
individuals or small gangs acting in sporadic fashion, 
much like the violent practices of the earlier Nazi 
Kampfzeit. when spasmodic threats or acts of violence 
were undertaken on local Nazi initiative rather than as 
cogs in a larger and more impersonal terror machine. By 
1946-47, however, organized Nazi resistance groups had 
also developed in all four occupation zones, based mainly 
upon veterans of the SS, HJ, and SA who had reestablished 
contact and built-up widespread networks among their
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former comrades-in-arms.14 In retrospect, of course, 
the reality of such scattered resistance in a country 
which had been home to a radical and pervasive 
totalitarian movement makes much more intuitive sense 
than the claim that Nazi resistance was totally lacking; 
Nazi fanaticism, in fact, did not totally disappear in a 
puff of smoke.
This work, however, lacks the scope of an overall 
history of such anti-Allied resistance, but is 
essentially a more limited investigation of last-minute 
Nazi efforts to prime underground and guerrilla activity, 
which was done mainly through a series of desperate 
measures in the last eight months of the war. The
principal term associated with such efforts was
"Werwolf." although use of the expression quickly became 
so general —  a Luftwaffe kamikaze squadron, for
instance, was codenamed "Werwolf1,15 —  that it
eventually threatened to lose any specific sense of 
meaning.16 It is thus the task of this work to sort out 
the various aspects of this last ditch Werwolf 
resistance, and thereby provide some sense of coherence 
to the history of the movement.
As a means of providing such coherence through a
logical arrangement of chapters, "Werwolf11 and other key 
concepts shall first be put in an historical context, and 
an attempt will be made to identify a clear German 
tradition of partisan warfare. It will then be shown 
that the different functions of the Nazi Resistance 
Movement were split up among the various SS, Party, and 
Government agencies that proliferated during the time of 
the Third Reich. The basic Werwolf diversionary Gruppen 
were under the purview of the SS-Police establishment, 
which also maintained a loose suzerainty over an 
autonomous Hitler Juciend (HJ) partisan program. The 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) received supplementary 
tasks, such as organization of an intelligence service 
for the Werwolf, and the construction of foreign 
resistance groups running parallel to the German model, 
although the insipid performance of the main Werwolf 
organization in launching diversionary activities 
evidentially led the various RSHA offices to fill this 
gap. The Party, finally, was entrusted with political 
aspects of the Werwolf movement, which eventually 
resulted in the dissemination of nihilistic neo-Nazi 
doctrines which sprang from Goebbels1 fertile imagination 
and were spread mainly by means of radio propaganda. No
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aspect of the movement was intended primarily to 
influence events after the final capitulation of the 
Reich, although a few sub-sections did make last-minute 
plans for survival, usually without much effect.
Considering the breadth of such involvement by the 
main institutions of the Nazi state, it might be argued 
that although the Werwolf failed to lay a strong basis 
for organized resistance, this failure was not due to 
lack of effort. In fact, the Werwolf movement 
constituted one of the last major military and political 
initiatives of the Third Reich, and due to the stress and 
tension caused by the approaching conclusion of a lost 
war, it most vividly revealed the true nature of the Nazi 
regime. Seen in these terms, two points are immediately 
obvious: first, that the Nazi Reich was hardly a unified
totalitarian state, but was rather a feudal patchwork of 
rival fiefs and bureaucratic principalities, each usually 
in conflict with the others? and second, that the Nazi 
regime had slid a great deal in terms of mass support 
since the movement's golden days in the mid-1930s. 
Considered as a referendum on the New Order, the Werwolf 
revealed a regime which (by 1944) was isolated and out of 
touch with even the most basic desires of the German
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population.
The inquiring reader will wonder, of course, how 
such an important story has almost slipped through the 
cracks in written history. Much of the problem is 
related to sources, particularly the fact that there is 
no central collection of Werwolf documents. Most Werwolf 
records were purposefully destroyed during the German 
retreat, a process not unrelated to the fact that most 
Germans continued to regard guerrilla warfare as an 
illegal tactic and therefore feared that any surviving 
evidence could be used by the enemy to prosecute breeches 
of the rules of war. In any case, many of the most 
sensitive messages relative to Werwolf organizational 
matters were probably only verbally communicated: 
"Nothing written," it seems, was the watchword of the 
Werwolf organization. Because of this lack of extensive 
documentation and membership lists, it is difficult to 
produce a quantitative history, the present monograph 
being perforce narrative and largely impressionistic in 
content. It is similarly difficult to produce a class 
analysis of the Werwolf or Jaadverbande; therefore, this 
work concentrates mainly upon the organizational 
structure of such guerrilla groups.
The fact that it is possible to form a picture of 
the movement at all is due mainly to the work of the 
counter-intelligence agencies of the occupying powers, 
which gathered information on the movement in order to 
destroy it. Allied impressions of the movement were 
built largely upon interrogation records, which are a 
valuable source considering the fact that guerrilla 
movements have traditionally been loath to create a 
written record of incriminating details, and that 
partisan commanders are therefore unusually valuable 
sources of information precisely because so much material 
is reposited in their memories rather than on paper.17 
The problem, of course, is that the captured guerillas 
most willing to talk were usually those least committed 
to the movement, and also those most willing to tell 
their questioners what they wanted to hear. Less 
talkative captives either denied membership in the 
organization or swore that it was inactive, quite 
correctly fearing that their captors would show an 
adverse reaction as a result of open admissions of murder 
or sabotage directed against the occupying forces. For 
instance, the SS-Police official in command of the 
Rhenish Werwolf was extremely reluctant to talk even
about the assassination of a fellow German, the 
Oberburcrermeister of Aachen, and he only partially broke 
down on this matter after "intensive interrogation."18 
(And to the end, this official stubbornly refused to 
admit involvement in the assassination of a senior German 
officer, General Diether Korst, about which he was also 
questioned by British interrogators.)19 Based upon such 
cases, it is correct to assume that facts about the 
Werwolf revealed through interrogation probably 
constituted a bare minimum, particularly with regard to 
actual Werwolf operations. This source of information is 
further limited because the majority of American, 
British, and French counter-intelligence files are still 
not open to public inspection.
Interrogation reports were also influenced by the 
mind-set of the interrogators, who filtered all available 
information through the screen of their own perceptions 
and prejudices.20 Considering the generally warped view 
of all things German which existed in 1945; considering 
the image of National Socialism as a pure and inseparable 
extension of "German Nationalist philosophy"; and 
considering the inability of many Allied authorities to 
distinguish between different German age groups and
social classes in their relationship to Naziism, it is 
scarcely surprising that various Allied "experts” either 
overestimated or underestimated the movement, each 
according to his own particular biases. One popular 
theme was that the Germans were an inherently warlike 
race tied by a mystical bond to their Fuhrer, and that 
the latter would readily demand —  and receive —  die­
hard fanaticism, large scale underground warfare, and the 
deception of Allied authorities. When Allied officers 
first encountered unarmed German soldiers surrendering in 
great masses, for instance, there was a great temptation 
to disregard the claim of these men that they had 
destroyed their weapons, in favour of the more paranoid 
supposition that the defeated troops had given their arms 
to German civilians for use in partisan warfare.21 This 
type of stereotyping, however, could also point to the 
opposite conclusion, specifically on the grounds that 
guerrilla fighting required a degree of independent 
enterprise supposedly alien to the German character. ”1 
thought from the first,” said General Patton, "that the 
threat of 'werewolves' and murder was inconsequential 
because the German is incapable of individual initiative 
action. "22
It is also likely that the Allies never constructed 
a totally realistic model of the Werwolf, not only 
because their conclusions were influenced by difficulties 
in objective and accurate perception, but also because 
the dissemination of intelligence information was not 
particularly thorough. This problem indirectly resulted 
from the increasing professionalization of intelligence 
work during the inter-war years, which tended to separate 
the three basic intelligence functions of gathering, 
analyzing, and disseminating information.23 Problems in 
the diffusion of intelligence on the Werwolf is shown 
most clearly by the fact that various incidents of 
violent resistance are not uniformly reported in the 
different sources of information now available to the 
researcher, particularly Allied intelligence reports and 
summaries.24 Unit histories, for instance, contain 
abundant information which apparently never reached the 
central intelligence departments at SHAEF, the Army 
Groups, and the headquarters of the various occupation 
armies, and the head of SHAEF Counter-Intelligence, 
Colonel H.G. Sheen, is on record in mid-April 1945 
pleading with the Army Groups for an adequate flow of 
information on the Werwolf —  "it is urgently requested
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that your lower echelons be impressed with the importance 
of sending material back through you [to us] at the 
earliest practicable moment."25
Of course, collecting timely information from 
subordinate units was the kind of problem that inevitably 
faced every superior headquarters, but collecting 
information about guerrillas apparently posed a special 
difficulty because of the inherent hostility and disdain 
toward such forces within the professional military. 
R.F. Weigley rightly notes that "guerrilla warfare is so 
incongruous to the natural method and habits of a stable 
and well-to-do society that the American Army has tended 
to regard it as abnormal and to forget about it whenever 
possible."26 It is also apparent that the great initial 
concern shown by the Allies over the possibility of 
guerrilla warfare gradually began to dissipate as it 
became apparent that most instances of guerrilla and 
underground operations were uncoordinated and that the 
Werwolf had failed to lay a strong basis for any form of 
concerted action. This factor was particularly apparent 
in American and British intelligence digests, where 
attacks upon Allied troops and communication lines —  
both during the war and after —  were routinely denied
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importance because they were uncoordinated and therefore 
posed no long term threat to the occupation forces? for 
instance, one is surprised to find SHAEF calmly reporting 
that instances of sniping and sabotage in the Allied rear 
were usually the work of bands of by-passed German 
soldiers and not Werwolfe per se, which was apparently 
regarded as a good sign. After the massive bloodletting 
of a World War, sporadic incidents resulting in minor 
inconveniences and a handful of casualties seemingly did 
not inspire much worry.
Werwolf attacks upon Germans themselves warranted 
even less attention, particularly since Allied troops had 
difficulty envisioning the victims as martyrs. As Earl 
Ziemke notes (with regard to an assassinated 
Buraermeister), a great many Germans died in the spring 
of 1945, most of them in forgotten circumstances and most 
without many questions asked.27
On top of all these inhibiting factors, one must 
also note the censorship imposed by Allied 
authorities,which prohibited the contemporary press from 
making all but the most general observations about the 
Werwolf movement, and which thereby reinforced the 
dominant impression of German docility. The Twelfth Army
Group suggested in early April 1945 that press accounts 
of the fighting should avoid extensive reportage of 
Werwolf activity —  mainly on the grounds that any 
publicity would magnify the movement and win it new 
recruits —  and this policy was subsequently adopted by 
the relevant SHAEF censorship and public relations 
authorities.28 American, British, and French censorship 
strictures lasted as late as September 1945,29 and by 
the time that such measures were rescinded, the American 
press, at least, had lost interest in Germany and shifted 
its collective gaze elsewhere.30
Even less information filtered out of the Soviet 
Zone, although it is true that the Poles and Czechs 
released considerable information on alleged Werwolf 
outrages in an attempt to prove the continuing perfidity 
of Germanic populations in re-annexed areas (and thereby 
expedite the forced expulsion of such groups). This 
information from the East is of somewhat dubious 
reliability —  considering the fact that it obviously 
served the designs of Polish, Czech, and Soviet policy —  
but with regard to this question, it is also notable that 
information from Eastern Europe has usually been given 
enough credence to serve as evidence in war crimes cases
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tried in American courts. Even if the evidence from 
Eastern Europe is treated with due caution, however, one 
is still left with the impression that Werwolfe and other 
German resisters actually achieved much more than is 
generally acknowledged, and that even the data presented 
in the following pages constitutes only the tip of the 
iceberg.
Of course, historians have frequently overcome a 
scarcity of source material and still produced voluminous 
accounts of past events. With the Werwolf movement, 
however, there has been no strong motivation for original 
scholarship. In West Germany, the Werwolf does not fit 
easily into the semi-official Bundesreoublik line of 
history, which concentrates heavily upon the resistance 
against Hitler as a basis of legitimacy for the modern 
German state, and as a means of moral redemption for the 
German people. For many years, the only group of 
historians with a deep and abiding interest in the 
intricate workings of the Third Reich was the Institut 
fur Zeitaeschichte. which not incidentally published the 
only German research on the Werwolf until the 1980s. A 
seminal history has since been written by Arno Rose 
(1980), but it is still a significant comment on modern
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German historiography that there are only several German 
works on the Werwolf, whereas one could literally fill a 
library with books on the underground resistance against 
Hitler.
The East Germans and the Soviets, meanwhile, are 
traditionally shy about admitting any popular resistance 
to the triumph of Socialism. Soviet and East European 
historians have usually given primary attention to the 
survival of "fascist" industrial and military elites, 
which has in turn served as a convenient means of 
discrediting the Bundesreoublik. It is obviously
difficult to fit such a self-destructive impulse as the 
Werwolf into a general historiography which regards the 
Third Reich as a creature of German capitalism, although 
some attempt has been made in this direction: certain
Soviet and Czech sources, for instance, suggest that the 
Werwolf was established mainly to survive the defeat of 
the Reich,31 or that it was composed of Nazi politicians 
and industrialists who later received the patronage of 
the Western powers. ("The fascist 'werewolves'", said 
Izvestia in February 1949, "are becoming the allies and 
servants of Wall Street and the City.")32
It also seems likely that the usual Communist
portrayal of partisan fighting as a rallying of patriots 
dedicated to Soviet Socialism made it difficult to 
subsequently reverse the positive connotations of this 
type of fighting by focusing attention upon a 
specifically Nazi version of guerrilla warfare, even if 
it failed. The logical conclusions of a study of the 
Werwolf might seem —  in a totalitarian society —  to 
diminish the contrast between the forces of light (ie. 
Soviet Socialism) and those of darkness (ie. Hitlerite 
fascism). It is entirely possible, of course, that in 
the emerging era of Glasnost, with its more liberal 
policies of access to archival information, a Soviet 
study may yet be written which definitively examines 
Russian security problems in Germany and Eastern Europe 
during the first years of occupation by the Red Army.
Western historians have long laboured under the 
perception of uniform German docility which has held sway 
since 1945, although several British writers 
specialists in popular war narratives —  have discussed 
the Werwolf in considerable detail. Overall, however, it 
seems that inhibitions similar to those of the Germans 
and East Europeans also exist in the West. In Western 
Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, the popular view of the
anti-German wartime Resistance is still influenced not 
only by the lingering effects of 1940s propaganda, but 
also by the vogue of humanist existentialism which 
ushered forth as an intellectual product of the 
Resistance, and which identified an individual sense of 
morality and courage as the engine which had supposedly 
propelled a brave minority of resistants. This revival 
of humanism had little or no relation to National 
Socialism: in fact,it was generally felt —  and still is
—  that the absence of an inner sense of moral 
responsibility was one of the most notable lackings of 
the Nazi character, and one of the main factors which led 
Germany upon the road to ruin. Following this line of 
reasoning, one must conclude that National Socialists 
lacked a key ingredient essential to founding a strong 
resistance movement, particularly since, with the 
possible exception of the East, occupied Germany was not 
faced with a shadow half as black as that which she 
herself had cast upon her occupied territories and 
protectorates. French historian Jean Hugonnot, for 
instance, suggests that the German guerrilla movement 
"was a denial of the reality of history's teachings, in 
forgetting that an army of Resistance is fundamentally an
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army of free men, an army in the service of national 
independence and liberty? that is to say, the exact 
antithesis of this artificial maquis, this paper 
maquis..." Not surprisingly, he concludes that the 
Werwolf was a total failure.33
The main assumption of this brief review is 
certainly not that there has been an overt suppression of 
the facts, nor that there has been any nefarious plot to 
cover-up the Werwolf? rather, there has simply been a 
lack of interest governed by historiographical forces 
which focus the attention of historians in the first 
place. Thus the aim of this work is to disinter the 
story of the Werwolf, to explore the limits of its 
success, and to explain its ultimate failure. The goal 
is not an aggressive revisionism, but rather a 
stocktaking of forgotten men and incidents; the hope is 
that such an account will be read in conjunction with the 
existing literature to create a more balanced view.
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The Prehistory of the Werwolf: A Brief Review of
Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism in Germany
One of the most common fallacies regarding the 
Werwolf movement is that guerrilla warfare failed in 
Germany because certain deeply ingrained aspects of 
German "national character' did not favour such tactics, 
a misconception often repeated even by Germans 
themselves. The German people, for instance, have been 
regarded as too orderly, too steeped in a tradition of 
strict obedience to established authority, too chivalrous 
(in a hollow sense), and too lacking in individual 
initiative to resort to any sort of popular or partisan 
warfare.1 One German general noted that Germanic 
"common sense" did not permit acceptance of a tactic more 
appropriate to hot-blooded Latins and Slavs, and this 
sort of biased commentary has been given serious 
consideration by the British military writer Kenneth 
MacKsey, who claims that such "racial aspects" are 
significant and "worthy of further study."2
In truth, of course, Germany had a history of 
partisan warfare as full as that of most European 
countries —  "The German people," as Friedrich Engels 
noted, "are by no means lacking in revolutionary
tradition.1,3 It is also true, however, that the German 
mass culture which arose after 1871 cast a shadow upon 
this method of warfare. Unlike such countries as Greece 
or Italy, partisan warfare did not play a significant 
role in the saga of German national consolidation, mainly 
because the unification of the German state was 
orchestrated from above, by Bismar<sk and William I, and 
did not arise from a popular initiative; after all, the 
liberal-bourgeois nationalists had tried such a 
revolutionary course in 1848 and had failed. Bismarck and 
his contemporaries were happy to convert nationalism into 
a prop for the new Wilhelmine Empire, thus stealing the 
thunder of German liberals, but they were certainly not 
prepared to officially favour the doctrine of a "people's 
war" as well. War in the Bismar^^n view remained what 
it had long been in the eyes of European reactionaries 
and conservatives —  namely, a sole prerogative of the 
state and the professional army.
In fact, Prussia/Germany established itself during 
the Imperial period as the dominant political force in 
Europe and as an outwardly expanding power? opinion- 
makers in a country at such a stage of development tended 
to harbour some natural resentment against a type of
warfare which was a natural weapon of the weak, and which 
could only mean trouble for a dynamic nation which saw 
its destiny in the domination of considerable portions of 
the globe. This prejudice first arose as a result of 
Prussian/German experiences with French franc tireurs in 
1870-71 —  a breed of warrior who subsequently received 
short shrift in standard German accounts of the war4 —  
and it was further exasperated by problems with Belgian 
and French partisans in the First World War. Even during 
the period of the Weimar Republic —  when the weakened 
Reichswehr itself experimented with tactics of guerrilla 
warfare —  there was a major rally around the flag in 
reaction to Belgian and French claims regarding the 
illegality of a number of summary executions which had 
taken place in 1914, when enemy franc tireurs had fired 
upon advancing German troops.5 This kind of popular 
prejudice was further inflamed during the early years of 
World War Two, when Germany lay astride most of Europe, 
and by the time this situation was finally reversed in 
1944 —  and the Germans were forced to establish their 
own partisan movements —  the Nazi leadership was faced 
with the crusted accumulation of over seventy years of 
indoctrination, through which many Germans had come to
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consider themselves far above the level of "guerrilla 
banditry." Not surprisingly, Nazi ideologues and 
propagandists desperately searched for traditional 
sources of inspiration which could rouse a Volkskriea and 
erode the prejudices which had built up since 187l.6
In truth, of course, guerrilla warfare in Germany 
had a history beginning in ancient times, when the 
Teutonic tribes —  like many primitive peoples —  adopted 
tactics of diversion and stealth in facing a 
technologically and culturally superior enemy, in this 
case the Romans.7 However, the beginning of an
identifiably German tradition of popular warfare dates 
only from the Middle Ages, when the very idea of 
"regular" and "honourable" warfare itself came into being 
and thus marked the contrast between "regular" and 
"irregular" operations. This definition of "honourable" 
warfare and —  in a more general sense —  of "law and 
order" itself, was part of the value system which 
accompanied a series of social and military changes which 
occurred in Germanic Europe during the early Middle Ages: 
in sociological terms, the voluntary factor of clan 
solidarity as an associative element in military and 
political organization was gradually replaced by
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hierarchical authoritarianism?8 in military terms, 
infantry levies became distinctly secondary to heavily 
armed cavalry; and in sociopolitical terms, armed power 
was reserved largely for the knighthood and the peasantry 
was effectively disarmed.
Despite these crucial changes, however, it is 
important to note that the popular aspect of warfare 
never entirely disappeared. Particularly during the 
period after the 13th century —  when the central power 
of the Empire began its gradual decline —  the German 
peasantry was subject to the oppression of local princes 
or of foreign armies of occupation, which in turn 
resulted in the repeated occurrence of a "peasant's war", 
or Bauernkriea. as well as the emergence of a strong 
tradition of vigilantism.
Peasant revolts were mainly a conservative reaction 
against the arbitrariness of local princes or the 
rapaciousness of foreign armies, and such uprisings were 
actually constitutional under medieval German law: the
German people possessed ancient rights —  dating at least 
to the time of the Volkerwanderung —  which allowed for 
violent opposition to any form of tyranny which defied 
"the old law," ie., the "law of one's fathers," which
formed the customary code of rights, duties, and 
obligations. Some of the peasant rebellions in western 
Germany were coordinated by an underground movement 
called the Bundschuh. after the farmer's laced boot which 
frequently appeared on the banners of peasant rebels, and 
the more radical rebels sought to institute a sort of 
semi-republican political system based upon the autonomy 
and rights of local communities.9 The armed
Lumpenaesindel was also responsible for guerrilla-style 
raiding —  or "social banditry" —  in mountainous or 
heavily wooded areas, such as the Harz, the Thuringer 
Wald, or the forests bordering the Rhine Valley? even as 
late as the 18th century, the highwayman "Schinderhannes" 
achieved a renowned reputation in the Rhine-Main region 
by stealing from "the rich" (by which he meant Jews) and 
supposedly giving to "the poor."10
Particularly during the Thirty Years War —  which 
was an example par excellence of a war without limits —  
Germany and Austria were wracked by vicious fighting 
between peasant guerrillas on one side and various 
princes, mercenaries, and foreign occupation armies on 
the other.11 In the Harz, for instance, partisan bands 
received the support of the Danes and preyed upon the
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riches of local magnates, particularly the wealthy 
burghers of Goslar.12 Similar bands roamed the Liineberg 
Heath during the same period, attacking Swedish troops 
and generally seeking to protect their families and 
property; according to Hermann Lons, one of these bands 
adopted the name Wehrwolf. and chose as their terrorist 
emblem the so-called "Wolfsangel", which resembled an 
inverted letter "N".13
The classic example of such peasant forces was in 
the Alps, where natural and social conditions —  ie., 
tribal loyalties? a culture of continual unrest produced 
by cattle breeding; lack of means to maintain permanent 
troops? and a terrain which favoured light infantry over 
more mechanized and organized forms of warfare —  
conspired to produce an independently-minded armed 
peasantry and a highly martial culture. In this area, 
independent peasant republics actually took shape, and 
depended for their defence upon the militia system and a 
style of guerrilla warfare centering upon resistance 
echeloned in depth and supported by natural obstacles. 
After the 14th century, warfare in the Alps was based 
upon earthen or masonry barricades called "Letzi", and on 
the fighting which took place —  less at the Letzi
themselves —  than on a wide front both behind and in 
front of the barricades? typically, enemy forces were 
ambushed as they focused upon delaying units stationed at 
the Letzi.14 Such tactics became a kind of national 
strategy for the Swiss and eventually took shape in the 
form of the Swiss "National Redoubt," a system of 
mountainous fortifications which, in turn, lent itself to 
the idea of a Nazi "National Redoubt," also based in the 
Alps.
In general, Medieval Germany was marked by a strong 
tendency among individuals or communities to supersede 
ineffective government by means of voluntary association, 
and this tendency particularly characterized the Vehme, 
or secret courts of justice.15 Because of the 
Balkanization of the Reich and the absence of a strong 
central power, certain Westphalian courts in the 13th 
century adopted clandestine practices as a means of 
preserving justice in the face of local princes who were 
otherwise disposed to tamper with the normal execution of 
law. The proceedings of these courts were carried out in 
true cloak-and-dagger fashion, and free jurymen, or 
Freischofen —  who both decided the cases and carried out 
the verdicts —  established a secret fraternity among
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themselves. In the 14th century the Vehme courts were 
recognized by the Emperor, mainly as a means of 
counteracting the unbridled power of the regional lords, 
and the jurisdiction of the courts also expanded into 
other areas of Germany (1385).
As time passed, however, the Vehmeqerichte began to 
exercise their own authority in an increasingly arbitrary 
fashion: the accused, for instance, were often sentenced 
in absentia, and were subsequently considered marked men 
by the Freischofen. Such quarry were caught and hanged 
in the dark of night, and were usually marked by one of 
several mottos which showed that the victim had been a 
target of the Vehme. This kind of practice eventually 
aroused criticism not only from the local princes, but 
also from the rising burgher class, and finally from the 
Emperor, and in the late 15th century the power of the 
courts was broken, although they survived in much 
weakened form until the end of the Holy Roman Reich.16 
It is important for our purposes to note, however, that 
even as the courts declined they were remembered and 
romanticized in German popular culture, and such writers 
as Goethe and Kleist made the Vehme a standard prop in 
the new genre of Romaniiteratur.
The unifying element in such medieval movements was 
the basic desire to protect and honour "the old law," as 
well as the vague belief that the existing social and 
political order in Germany was unbalanced. However, with 
the decline of feudalism and the rise of the monarchial 
state, the ancient German right of popular resistance was 
overridden by new absolutist legal principles, such as 
the criminalization of resistance through ordi^a-^41^  
against "treason" and "sedition" (c. 1502-1532), or the 
revival of the ancient Roman doctrine of Lex Regia, which 
maintai ned that the people transferred sovereignty to the 
monarch in a social contract which was irrevocable.17 
Moreover, basic social prerogatives like maintaining 
civil security or waging war were once and for all taken 
out of the hands of such irregular bodies as Vehme courts 
or guerrilla bands, and rather were monopolized by the 
institution of the state.
In Prussia, which had emerged as the monarchial 
state par excellence and as the main North German 
principality, the term "Militz" was itself strictly 
forbidden, and there was no country-wide militia system 
after the early 18th century. It is true that men of the 
peasantry were drafted into the Army to augment its
mercenary core, but there was no attempt to motivate this 
peasant soldiery by patriotism or by anything else 
intended to appeal to the common man. Rather, the 
Fredericks presided over a type of military slave system, 
in which the men of the ranks were motivated solely by 
regimentation and the threat of corporal punishment? in 
turn, therefore, it was impossible to deploy manpower 
outside restrictive line formations —  ie., as 
reconnaissance patrols or skirmishing detachments —  
because of the reasonable expectation that the men of the 
ranks would desert amass once free of the immediate 
control of their officers.18 To the extent that it was 
necessary, military reconnaissance and patrol activity 
was performed by small elite units, such as Hussars and 
Feldiaaer (Field Rangers), whose discipline and loyalty 
was ensured by preferential treatment? the Feldiaoer. for 
instance, were recruited solely among foresters, who were 
promised jobs as huntsmen on royal and Junker estates in 
return for a term of loyal military service.19
In fact, this ossified hierarchical order was a 
fragile arrangement, which was clearly shown by the 
desperate appeals to "the people" which issued forth 
whenever the system was under great strain. Note, for
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instance, that during the Seven Years War, when much of 
Prussia was overrun, Frederick the Great reluctantly 
raised some twenty-three "Freibataillone11, which were 
units of armed peasants, foreigners, and POWs —  in 
effect militiamen or partisans —  under the command of a 
few qualified Army officers.20
The greatest crisis, however, came only in the wake 
of the French Revolution, when the revolutionary ideas 
which swept out of France were used to defeat the French 
Army, which also swept out of France and into Germany. 
In the early 19th century, a powerful coterie of reform- 
minded officers, including such memorable names as 
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Boyen, and Clausewitz, argued 
that Germany should be liberated from Napoleonic 
domination by reliance upon a patriotic "War of 
Liberation.11 The basic idea was to exploit the new 
spirit of German nationalism as a means of rousing mass 
involvement in a war against France, and also to abolish 
the extensive military exemptions that had previously 
protected the privileged classes from conscription —  the 
eventual goal was true mass army which would cut across 
class lines in the name of national unity. The reformers 
were also inspired by anti-French guerrilla wars in Spain
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and Russia, and by a peasant revolt in the Tyrol —  under 
the inspired leadership of Andrews Hofer —  as well as the 
simultaneous organization of a mass militia, or Landwehr, 
by the Austrian regime.21
Leading Prussian reformers were plotting as early as 
1806 to convert the traditional Bauernkrieq into a modern 
"people's war," and several precipitate rebellions were 
actually launched in 1809, perhaps the most significant 
being the abortive revolt of a five thousand man 
Freikoros under Major Ferdinand von Schill. The Prussian 
monarchy and ruling classes, however, remained 
understandably suspicious of a popular uprising by their 
subjects, even if it was directed at the French, and it 
was only after the massive French defeats in Russia in 
1812 that the call for a mass uprising became so tempting 
that it could no longer be rejected, even by the 
staunchest advocates of the Old Regime. The newly 
emancipated peasantry was swept into a new patriotic mass 
army or was called upon to join local bands of a partisan 
militia, the Landsturm. and thereby harass the Napoleonic 
armies along their lines of communication. A more formal 
militia, the Landwehr. attempted to appeal to the landed 
peasantry and the bourgeoisie, while independent
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volunteer detachments (Jagerkorps) called upon young men 
of noble birth.22 Guerrilla units contributed —  
somewhat marginally —  to the subsequent victories of the 
Prussians and their allies, and Romantic thinkers like 
Ernst Arndt gushed about a supposed revival of the 
associative spirit of ancient Teutonic tribal warfare.23
Of course, a significant question remained: namely,
how could the forces of Prussian autocracy stuff the 
genie of mass nationalism —  and its "associative" spirit 
—  back into its bottle? Although the German partisans 
of 1813 were "conservative" in the sense that they 
nominally fought for the status quo and were authorized 
in advance by the Prussian monarchy, the implicit 
relationship between partisan warfare, democratic 
nationalism, and revolution, was all but impossible to 
ignore. The mass of the population, after all, was given 
a chance to perceive its own unity apart from the person 
of the monarch, and in areas of disputed control, 
guerrillas were able to exercise a measure of power 
before the Old Order fully reestablished itself.24 
Moreover, units such as the Lutzowsche Freikorps 
recruited patriots from all over Germany —  not just from 
Prussia —  and they advanced into battle under the banner
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of "the Fatherland" rather than under the device of any 
regional monarch.25
In fact, however, the state worked to rapidly 
reinforce its authority and minimize any revolutionary 
implications arising from its military strategy: an
English liaison officer noted, for instance, that while 
the Landsturm was indeed a popular uprising, "it differs 
from that in Spain in that it has been firmly organized," 
and a Prussian contemporary put forth an even more 
fundamental observation, noting that the government was 
actually stifling spontaneous risings by imposing too 
many rules.26 Within several months of the Landsturm 
decree, Prussian guerrillas had sunk under the weight of 
bureaucratic ordinances which allowed them to assemble 
only with the express authority of local Prussian 
Military Governments, and since the French evacuated 
Prussian territory more quickly than expected, guerrilla 
levies were rapidly demobilized or used to fill the ranks 
of the Landwehr. The Landwehr, in turn, was up-graded 
into a full-fledged field army, and subsequently enjoyed 
a brief period as a first line combat force, equal in 
status to the regular Army and yet organized as a 
citizen's force on a militia basis. In 1819, however, it
was reduced in status to a special reserve for the 
regular Army, partly because of its own inadequacies, 
partly because noblemen and reactionary military officers 
feared the political tenor of a force which was dominated 
by the nationalistic and democratic middle classes. Even 
after this emasculation, tensions over the status of the 
Landwehr remained not far below the surface of Prussian 
politics for a half century, and in the 1860s the 
monarchy and Junkers further strengthened the regular 
Army at the expense of the Landwehr.27
The message that seems to have arisen from the War 
of Liberation —  at least for the Prussian military —  
was that guerrilla warfare was a useful tactic in times 
of desperation, a concept which, in fact, had already 
been advanced by some 18th century German theorists and 
was usually associated with the term "Kleinkriea" (or 
"small-scale warfare").28 Clausewitz, in his postwar 
writings, stressed partisan warfare in exactly this 
sense: as a defensive rising of "armed peasantry"
undertaken once the interior of the homeland was invaded, 
but closely coordinated by the state and conducted as a 
diversionary adjunct to regular military operations. In 
fact, he proclaimed that without direction by special
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detachments of the regular Army, "the local inhabitants 
will usually lack the confidence and initiative to take 
to arms." Clausewitz glossed over partisan warfare as a 
means of radical social or political change, and he also 
refused to consider it as a method in itself capable of 
achieving victory anywhere but in the vast expanses of 
Russia,29 a proposition which again deemphasized the 
revolutionary aspects of the Kleinkriea.
This specifically Prussian/German approach to 
partisan warfare was not provided with many opportunities 
for application during the century after the War of 
Liberation. It is true, however, that from 1814 to 1888, 
Prussia/Germany maintained the status of the Landsturm as 
a vague kind of final call-up in case the country was 
invaded, and supply depots for such last ditch minutemen 
were supposedly prepared. The best single attempt to 
define this ghost of the Landsturm was the so-called 
"Landsturm Law" of 1875, which was specifically intended 
to invoke the spirit of the 1813 decree and which 
described the Landsturm as a special Volksbeweaunq to be 
raised in case of enemy invasion and to be subject to 
possible wartime service as a pool of replacements for 
the Landwehr.30
In effect, however, very little attention was paid 
to the Landsturm because the main thrust of military 
planning was directed toward the emergency mobilization 
of as many front line troops as possible, the principal 
intent of which was to mount a successful preemptive 
attack in case of imminent danger. The reasons for this 
orientation of strategy are not difficult to determine: 
German unification, after all, was achieved by regular 
field armies operating under the command of the Prussian 
aristocracy, and the new German Empire thereafter became 
an economic and military powerhouse which soon developed 
a supposedly fail-safe method of "offensive defence" in 
the form of the Schlieffen Plan. Moreover, a shadow 
seemed to fall upon guerrilla warfare as both a tactic 
and as a strategy? as noted above, the only guerrillas 
which the Reich actually encountered during this period 
were those facing German troops, and for northern 
Europeans in general, partisan warfare seemed to fit 
neatly into the popular Spencerite view of war as a 
product of barbaric cultures existing at the fringes of 
Western civilization.31
The outbreak of World War One destroyed much of this 
Spencerite arrogance about the nature of war, and to some
extent revived the legitimacy of partisan warfare as a 
tactic. Of course, with the brief exception of the East 
Prussian campaign in 1914, the German High Command did 
not have to face the prospect of defending German 
national soil until the very end of the war, and even in 
this final hour they preferred an armistice —  supposedly 
on liberal Wilsonian terms —  rather than supporting the 
levee en masse being suggested by such men as Walther 
Rathenau, the wartime boss of the German economy.32 It 
is interesting to note, however, that in several cases 
where German military units were isolated by enemy 
forces, the supposedly staid and unimaginative Prussian 
officer corps successfully adopted itself to partisan 
warfare, albeit along the narrow tactical lines of a 
diversionary Kleinkriecr. There were several instances of 
such activity along the fluid lines of the Eastern front, 
but the classic example was in German East Africa, where 
Oberstleutnant Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck led his guerrilla 
column of several thousand Schutztruppe and Africans 
through a four year odyssey which ended only several 
weeks after the Armistice in Europe.33 (One of Lettow- 
Vorbeck1 s young officers, Theodor von Hippel, was so 
inspired by the Tanganyikan Campaign that he later
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designed, built, and led the so-called "Brandenburg" 
detachment, Germany's main commando unit during the early 
stages of World War Two.)34 In addition, German agents 
also attempted to spur guerrilla warfare in Poland, the 
Ukraine, Persia, and various points beyond.35
The immediate period after the Great War developed 
along lines very similar to the earlier period of defeat 
and humiliation from 1806 to 1813. As during the 
Napoleonic period, the regular Army was strictly limited 
in size, and this disability created a need for 
innovative tactics and methods. Under General Hans von 
Seeckt, the Reichswehr developed a doctrine of mobile 
warfare in order to offset Franco-Polish advantages in 
armour, artillery, and aircraft, and it also inculcated 
a reliance upon tactics of manoeuvre —  the eventual 
basis of Blitzkrieg warfare had thus been established, 
particularly after the full realization of opportunities 
for mechanized forces operating within such a doctrine of 
mobility.36 German officers schooled in this
environment developed a sense of independent initiative 
and flexibility generally greater than that of their 
eventual opponents in World War Two,37 and they hardly 
fit the usual stereotype of the starchy, intractable
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Prussian automaton, supposedly incapable of exercising 
the independent initiative necessary for guerrilla 
warfare.
In truth, guerrilla warfare formed an important 
element in the new strategy: Hauptmann Arthur Erhardt
argued that the increasing mechanization of war made 
supply lines an obvious target for partisans, 38 and the 
Reichswehr1s expert on "Eastern affairs," Oberstleutnant 
von Voss, noted that the Kleinkrieq was potentially of 
great value as long as it was "systematically organized." 
In actual practice, the Reichswehr helped form special 
partisan units which maintained resistance against the 
Allied powers in the Rhenish occupation zones, and —  
during the dark years of 1923 to 1925 —  in the Ruhr as 
well. These guerrillas formed the original nucleus of a 
nationwide partisan organization called the 
Feldi aqerdienst. which was under the purview of the 
regional military commands (Wehrkreise) until 1928, when 
it was transferred to the Grenzschutz. Guided partly by 
Swiss and Soviet influences, the Feldi aqerdienst was 
composed of one hundred man stay-behind companies 
(Kampfpatrouillen) which, in turn, were sub-divided into 
eight man Gruppe and intended to harass the enemy rear in
case of an invasion of Germany, particularly in the 
enemy-occupied and demilitarized zones in the Rhineland. 
Special Volksdeutsch units were also established for the 
execution of sabotage activity in the Sudentenland, the 
Memelgebeit, and the Polish-annexed borderlands, and the 
Feldi aqerdienst also trained and supplied foreign 
partisans, such a Ukrainian separatists and Hungarian 
revanchists, who offered any sort of conceivable 
opportunity for diverting the attentions of Germany's 
foes.39
After the Nazi Machterqreifuna in 1933, irregular 
warfare continued to play an important role in German 
strategy and tactics —  in fact, as David Thomas notes, 
the Wehrmacht was the first army to develop a systemic 
concept of the value of commando operations and to 
exploit such tactics on a large scale.40 Ideologically, 
the image of the partisan fit comfortably into the 
romantic National Socialist image of the individual 
warrior — ■ ie., an elite man of action and fanatic 
ideologue, rather than a modern soldier-as-manager. This 
was exactly the spirit used to deify the memory of Leo 
Schlageter, the one-time leader of a Nazi sabotage team in 
the Ruhr who was captured and executed by the French in
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1923. Schlagter subsequently became honoured as the so- 
called "first soldier of the Third Reich," and in 1933 
the new regime even unveiled a massive "Schlagter 
Monument" on the Golzheimer Heath.41
The German Left had also developed its own 
fascination with partisan warfare, and this was fused 
into the Weltanschauung of the Sturmabteilunq (SA), the 
Nazi Party's activist militia. It was the SA which spoke 
of organizing a "People's Army" and which established 
training camps for guerrilla fighters,42 all of which 
came to an abrupt stop when the militia was violently 
suppressed in 1934. The Army had convinced Hitler that 
talk of a "People's Army" and a "Second Revolution" were 
as dangerous to the dictator himself as to the Officer 
Corps and Big Business.
The Party's brief history also suggested a sympathy 
for irregular modes of warfare and for political 
violence. Many senior Party figures —  including Martin 
Bormann, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich —  had 
once been members of irregular military formations which 
had originally taken shape in 1918-19, as the rank-and- 
file of the Army disintegrated. During this time of 
chaos and decay, a few junior officers had retained the
services of elite formations of troops —  the most 
fanatic and brutal of a whole generation brutalized by 
war —  and to this core they had added a mixture of 
cadets and right-wing civilians. The final result was a 
variety of semi-private, nationalistic military units, 
which guarded the Eastern frontiers and in 1919 were used 
by the new Republican Government to defend the cities of 
the Reich against Communist insurrectionists.43 Similar 
bands had formed in a number of countries after World War 
One, particularly in nations which were threatened by 
anarchy or Communism, but in Germany such detachments 
adopted the specifically German appellation of 
"Freikorps," which seemed to link them to heroic deeds 
dating from the time of the Seven Year's War and the 
campaigns of liberation against Napoleon.
In 1920, the Freikorps turned against their 
erstwhile Republican masters and staged an abortive 
Putsch under the leadership of the Prussian civil servant 
Wolfgang Kapp. After having thus bared their fangs, the 
units were exploited to crush one further Communist 
uprising in the Ruhr, and were then ordered to disarm and 
dismantle. In effect, however, the Freikorps degenerated 
into a variety of minor militias, patriotic clubs, and
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underground conspiracies, some of which were used by the 
Army to form a secret reserve informally called the 
"Black Reichswehr.1,44 When the Poles or the Allied 
Powers became overly aggressive, such groups were 
employed for guerrilla warfare: Freikorps remnants, for
instance, waged partisan warfare in Upper Silesia against 
the Poles (1921) ,45 and were also active in the Ruhr 
against the French and Belgians.46
Other Freikorps fragments declared war upon the 
"inner enemy" and revived the medieval rituals of the 
Vehme. Politicians who dickered with "the enemy" became 
marked men for the murderers of this new Vehmeaericht: 
the Catholic politician Matthias Erzberger, who had 
negotiated the Armistice and had signed the Versailles 
Treaty, was gunned down in August 1921, and a year later 
he was followed to the grave by Walther Rathenau, the 
German-Jewish industrialist and statesman who as Foreign 
Minister had negotiated the Rapallo Pact with Soviet 
Russia. More than four hundred victims fell to the Vehme 
(according to figures compiled by E.J. Gumbel), and the 
German tradition of vigilantism thus reemerged in a most 
virulent form.47
After the mid-1920s, most of the fragmentary remains
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of the Freikorps were merged into the National 
Socialist Party, but a prime example of the type of 
organization which existed in quasi-legal form during the 
interim —  ie., after the suppression of the Freikorps 
but before the final rise of Naziism as a right-radical 
monolith —  was the Wehrwolf. This movement, under the 
leadership of Leutnant Peter von Heydebreck, adopted its 
name from Per Wehrwolf (1910) , Hermann Lons' best-selling 
historical romance about the guerrillas who roamed the 
Luneberg Heath during the Thirty Years War. The first 
"Wehrwolfe" were the dispersed remnants of Heydebreck's 
"Freiwilliae Jaaerschar." elements of which fled to the 
woods after the conclusion of major operations in Upper 
Silesia, and undertook terrorist activity until the fall 
of 1922. Within the next several years, the Bund 
Wehrwolf was also active in fomenting partisan warfare in 
the Ruhr, and even within the interior of the Reich it 
posed such a threat of destabilization that it was 
harassed and partially banned by the Prussian state 
authorities.48
Despite its prodigious energy, however, the Wehrwolf 
was a short-lived phenomena: a Reichswehr file (later
captured by Allied forces in 1945) shows that in the mid-
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1920s, whole regional sub-sections of the Wehrwolf went 
over to the NSDAP en bloc.49 Heydebreck, who was an old 
crony of Rohm, formed his own immediate following into 
the Upper Silesian SA and was later appointed regional SA 
commander in Pomerania (1933).50
It is interesting to note, however, that the 
National Socialists eventually developed mixed feelings 
toward the Wehrwolf and other Freikorps type groups. In 
practice, the Party adopted many of the worst 
characteristics of the postwar right-revolutionaries, 
such as their exaggerated appreciation for violence,51 
and their use of Vehme rituals in the disposition of 
political foes52 —  Peter Merkl, for instance, has noted 
the particular importance of the anti-French Resistance 
for the establishment of local Party cells in western 
Germany, and for the injection of a violent atmosphere 
into the movement as a whole.53 On the other hand, 
there was a strict limit to the sentimentalization of the 
Freikorps and the Wehrwolf during the Third Reich, mainly 
because the rowdyism and the vague revolutionary 
sentiments of the Freikorps were obvious forerunners of 
the same spirit within the discredited SA, and many of 
the Freikorosmanner and Wehrwolfe had actually been drawn
to this mutinous segment of the Party, or to the even 
more radical ranks of the breakaway "Black Front." 
Heydebreck himself was murdered in the Blood Purge of 
June 1934,54 and many other ex-Wehrwolfe —  lucky to be 
alive —  were relegated to minor positions within the 
Nazi bureaucracy: the one time Wehrwolf section chief in
Berlin, for instance, eventually turned up as a Wehrmacht 
sanitary sergeant in a military hospital in Warsaw.55 
The interwar Wehrwolf movement was rarely mentioned in 
propaganda calling for last ditch resistance in 1944-45, 
nor were former members of the Wehrwolf or the Freikorps 
specifically i n v o l v e d  m  the organization of new underground 
groups during this later period.56
After the Machterare\ (u ^  the Party had little 
further use for maintaining an underground terror against 
domestic opponents, since the regular police and 
bureaucracy were now employed for this purpose of 
enforcing a Nazi tenor upon society. However, Nazi 
methods of terror and intimidation were turned toward 
foreign policy, and in the process terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare was converted from a defensive tactic - 
- which it had been during the Weimar period —  into a 
weapon for the destabilization of various targets of
conquest. Military Intelligence (Abwehr) and various 
Party and SS apparatus were used to sponsor such 
subversive activities, and soon after the outbreak of war 
in 1939, Hauptmann von Hippel's special Abwehr unit, the 
"Brandenburg Formation," was organized as a specialist 
detachment for commando operations and partisan warfare. 
There were some momentary doubts within the Abwehr about 
such an exploitation of the Kleinkrieg —  Admiral 
Canaris, for instance, displayed a haughty regard for 
such "Bolshevist" techniques —  but these reservations 
were more than offset by the obvious desirability of 
maintaining special troops who could seize objectives 
coveted by the advancing German forces, such as key 
bridges, and who could also cause military and political 
chaos in the rear area of retreating enemy forces.57 
Volksdeutschen were especially favoured as "fifth 
columnists" and as recruits for the Brandenburg unit, 
although sponsorship of guerrilla warfare was certainly 
not confined exclusively to support for ethnic Germans.
The first external victim of Nazi destabilization 
techniques was Austria, where native Nazis launched a 
precipitate terror campaign and assassinated the pro- 
Italian Chancellor in 1934, in the process nearly
triggering an Italo-German conflict.58 A more cautious 
policy was adopted over the next three years, although in 
1937 full-scale Nazi provocations resumed,59 and in the 
spring of 1938 Austria fell without resistance into the 
lap of the Third Reich. The next target was 
Czechoslovakia, where a flSudetendeutsches Freikorps" 
helped lay the groundwork for the Munich Settlement,60 
followed in short order by Poland, where thousands of 
Volksdeutsch guerrillas —  some of them specially trained 
commandos (K-Truppe) —  helped facilitate the Blitzkrieg 
attack of September 1939.61 It was the veterans of 
these campaigns who formed the original nucleus of the 
Brandenburg Formation.
There was also minor skirmishing by Volksdeutsch 
fifth columnists in eastern Belgium during the assault 
upon the Low Countries in 194 0,62 but it was only with 
the reorientation of German attentions toward the East in 
1941 that efforts to exploit Volksdeutsch rebels once 
again reached a pitch: the attack upon Yugoslavia in
April 1941 was accompanied by guerrilla activity on the 
part of ethnic Germans in Slovenia and the Yugoslavian 
Banat,63 and the Soviets also claimed that constant 
distress was caused by the work of German saboteurs in
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the Volksdeutsch settlement areas along the Middle 
Volga.64
As briefly noted above, the Third Reich also made 
use of non-German ethnic minorities as a potential source 
of trouble for its enemies. A few Flemish saboteurs were 
sent into the Allied rear during the 1940 campaign in the 
West (Unternehmen Wespennest II), but once again, it was 
mainly in the East that such activities reached a 
significant magnitude and achieved considerable results. 
Continuing contacts between the Abwehr and Ukrainian 
separatist groups such as the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (OUN) were used to ignite small scale 
rebellions in eastern Poland during 1939,65 and in 1941 
pro-German Ustasche elements in northern Yugoslavia were 
also able to aid the German advance.66 The Soviet 
Union, in particular, seemed a vast and tumultuous field 
for subversive activity, and even before the German 
invasion in the summer of 1941, the Soviet borderlands 
were plagued by fifth column activity.67 Once the 
Wehrmacht stormed across the frontier, pro-German 
commandos led uprisings and guerrilla warfare in the 
Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic States,68 and the 
same strategy was applied once again in 1942, when the
focus of German efforts shifted to southern Russia. 
Although the once exuberant separatists in the western 
Soviet Union were already souring upon the exploitative 
and brutal nature of the German occupation regime, there 
was a chance to harvest a new yield of discontent in such 
areas as Kalmykia,69 and during the 1942 campaign 
military occupation authorities made some effort to 
establish a more liberal regime in areas that were 
actually overrun. In the Caucacus, hundreds of Abwehr 
and SS commandos were infiltrated or parachuted into the 
Soviet rear, in the process diverting several divisions 
of Red Army and security troops, whose presence was 
necessary in order to contain this sideshow.70
After the Eastern Front solidified in 1942, the 
Germans stepped up subversive warfare and doubled the 
number of saboteurs air-dropped into the Soviet rear, 
with another substantial increase following again in 
1943. The Abwehr decided that long range reconnaissance 
and sabotage missions could achieve success, and Abwehr 
front reconnaissance groups (Frontaufklarunoen —  FAK) 
began heavy recruitment and training activity among Red 
Army POWs and Russian workers, many of whom were 
eventually sent behind Soviet lines.71 A parallel
program for parachuting pro-German guerrillas into the 
Soviet rear was also organized by the Sicherdienst- 
Ausland (SD), which was the sixth bureau (Amt) of the 
Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), the SS security 
directorate formed in 1939. This SS program, called 
Unternehmen Zeppelin, established links with the FAK 
units and also with the intelligence services of the 
various "national liberation committees," which had been 
set up in Germany as a focus for ethnic nationalism in 
unoccupied areas of the USSR. From 1942 to 1945, several 
thousand Zeppelin commandos were trained and several 
hundred were infiltrated or air-dropped into the Soviet 
rear.72
Naturally, there was a congenital rivalry between 
the two main players in the field of irregular operations 
—  the Abwehr on one side and the SS on the other —  and 
this rivalry intensified as time passed and Germany's 
situation worsened. The Abwehr was the losing side in 
this confrontation, largely because its senior echelon 
was heavily staffed by conservative Junkers who tended to 
hold anti-Nazi opinions and were dedicated to the 
overthrow of the Hitler regime. The Brandenburgers, for 
instance, were regarded as a shock troop of the anti-Nazi
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opposition, and the SS no doubt breathed a sigh of relief 
as the unit was gradually converted into a regular line 
formation, in which only a few training staffs retained 
a specialized interest in commando activity; to a large 
extent, the Brandenburger's special functions were taken 
over by the FAK detachments during the last half of the 
war.73 Finally, in February 1944, the Abwehr itself was 
subordinated to the RSHA with most of its functions 
passing to the control of the SD-Ausland and the Gestapo, 
and later in the same year, the FAK units were also 
transferred to RSHA oversight, being placed under the 
control of the Militarisches Amt. a new SS organization 
intended to succeed the Abwehr.74
The RSHA, meanwhile, had also developed its own 
independent commando organization (apart from Unternehmen 
Zeppelin). The Fuhrer, it seems, had a short memory 
regarding the exploits of the Brandenburgers, and in 1942 
he raged about the need for a German unit which could 
fully match the accomplishments of the British Commandos. 
Hitler’s pique suited Himmler, who wanted his own special 
force to match that of Canaris, and the final result was 
the "Friedenthal Special Formation," led by
Hauptsturmfiihrer Otto Skorzeny of the Waffen-SS.75 This
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unit formed a nursery for some of the eventual partisan 
groups which took shape during the 1944-45 period, and it 
also launched Skorzeny upon a path which eventually made 
him the dominant figure in almost all German irregular 
operations.
The Friedenthal Formation, however, was the last 
German commando unit conceived as part of the offensive 
strategy of irregular warfare that had guided German 
efforts in this field for the previous decade —  ie., the 
idea that guerrilla operations were intended to soften 
enemy defences as part of an overall military (and 
political) offensive. After 1943, almost all German 
efforts in this area were defensively oriented, and were 
intended as a means not of augmenting German advances, of 
which there were very few, but of disrupting the advance 
of the enemy. At this point, German tacticians and 
policy-makers fell back upon the Clausewitzian theory of 
defensive partisan warfare, and it is here that our main 
story begins.
Before proceeding further, however, it is worth 
reiterating two primary conclusions which arise from this 
brief survey and which bear directly upon the story of 
the partisan movement in 1944-45. First, it is clear
that Germans were not culturally or racially ill equipped 
to participate in a guerrilla struggle? in fact, the 
ancient Germanic concern for "old law" —  evident in such 
phenomena as the Bauernkrieq and the Vehme —  composed a 
tradition which smoothly evolved into the doctrine of a 
modern, nationalistic Volkskriea. However, it would also 
be fair to conclude that late 19th and 20th century 
German culture had encouraged a mass prejudice against 
partisan warfare per se, simply because German troops 
were so often faced with such a menace.
Secondly, German tacticians and strategists 
developed a doctrine of guerrilla warfare which both 
accommodated the prejudices of their culture and also fit 
the generally autocratic nature of the Prussian/German 
state. In short, their tenets of guerrilla warfare were 
limited in scope because of the Prussian fear —  notable 
as early as 1813 —  that disaster would arise from any 
wholesale subjugation of the prerogatives of the state to 
the desires of the mobilized masses. The Prussian/German 
concept of partisan warfare thus evolved as a narrow 
doctrine of mere diversionary activity, tightly 
controlled from above and closely coordinated with the 
operations of a regular field army. It is true that
after the Great War, when the National Socialist Party 
emerged as mass movement, this new party was opposed in 
many ways to the restrictive Prussian tradition and was 
somewhat more accommodating to a leftist-popular view of 
partisan warfare. It is also true, however, that the 
segment of the Party which most favoured a "People's 
War," namely the SA, was discredited early in the Nazi 
era, and that during the course of the Third Reich, the 
traditional Prussian strain of thought ran deep enough to 
influence almost all official considerations of guerrilla 
warfare, including the planning and organizational 
preparations of 1944-45.
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Unternehmen Werwolf: The SS/HJ Diversionary
Organization
By 1944, with military crises unfolding in both East 
and West, Germany was once again forced by its own 
weakness to return to a strategy in which defensive 
guerrilla warfare played a major role. As the previous 
chapter suggests, this is a repeated theme in German 
history, and the country's military leaders had 
previously pursued such a course both during the period 
of Napoleonic domination from 1807-1813, and again during 
the era of the Versailles Diktat. Presumably, the basic 
strategy was not to win the war by guerrilla operations, 
but merely to turn the tide, delaying the enemy long 
enough to allow for a political settlement favourable to 
Germany. To Hitler and company, the break-up of the 
Grand Alliance seemed to shimmer clearly on the horizon.
Such a strategy was elementally flawed not only by 
a failure to comprehend the universal opprobrium which 
the Nazi regime had brought upon itself —  and which 
provided the necessary mortar to cover the cracks in the 
enemy alliance —  but also by basic internal weaknesses. 
One of the main problems, for instance, was the declining 
lack of a popular basis for the New Order, even within
the German heartland itself, where the Hitler regime 
edged toward becoming a dictatorship based almost 
entirely upon terror rather than upon mass support. Nazi 
promises of a just peace were still accepted at face 
value only by a few blinded devotees of the movement? 
most Germans had lost faith in the Party, and although 
they were too physically and morally exhausted to turn 
against it, they were also too tired —  and too disabused 
of notions of glory —  to burn their homes; or snipe at 
the enemy? or valiantly enroll in the ranks of the mass 
militia.1 The establishment of Nazi guerrilla movements 
meant that the state itself had risked national suicide 
by entering upon a path fraught with danger? the people 
refused to follow and the social contract was thus 
threatened. Gradually, as the final collapse loomed 
increasingly near, the Werwolf became something akin to 
a means of revenge which the fanatics pitted against 
their own people as well as against the enemy.
Another problem which immediately emerged was the 
behind-the-scenes disorganization associated with almost 
every aspect of the Nazi state, and which has been 
variously regarded as either an unintentional result of 
Hitler"s sloppy management style, or as a deliberate
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Hitlerian tactic meant to incite factionalism and thus 
increase the Fuhrer * s ascendent power and prestige. 
Whatever the case, loyalty in the Third Reich was 
transformed into a sort of medieval fealty, and the 
raging confusion encouraged Nazi leaders to construct 
personal bases of power by reserving from the common pool 
whatever resources they had managed to acquire. Thus the 
Nazi system of administration was factionalized rather 
than totalitarian, and the concept of a monolithic 
commonwealth existed only in propaganda.2 Moreover, this 
system of feudal anarchy actually increased as the war 
reached a crises stage —  violent charges and 
recriminations tended to fly with even greater abandon 
between the chief Nazi satraps —  and this atmosphere 
naturally characterized the guerrilla program, which was 
perhaps the last initiative of the fading Reich worth a 
bureaucratic battle. "The inner chaos", as a British 
intelligence report noted, "was never better exemplified 
than in the Werewolf movement."3
Discussions about the need for a Nazi guerrilla 
organization actually began in 1943 and early 1944, and 
tended to center around a number of immediate precedents 
from German history: we know, for instance, that the
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1813 Landsturm decree was unearthed and circulated? that 
evaluations of the Feldi aaerdienst were withdrawn from 
the military archives in Potsdam and also circulated? and 
that relevant passages from Clausewitz were examined in 
detail.4 All these sources of inspiration implied a 
traditional Prussian-style guerrilla movement which would 
cooperate with the regular Army in a policy of diversion 
and delayance, although certain SS leaders were also 
inspired by several of the more visionary underground 
movements which proliferated during World War Two. In 
fact, a special top secret SS unit was formed in order to 
study these movements in detail, and specialists from 
this unit were sent to observe the Warsaw Rising in 1944, 
particularly since the Armiia Kraiowa (AK) was considered 
a revolutionary movement par excellence.5
The actual SS guerrilla organization was formed in 
September 1944,6 and was perhaps influenced in its exact 
shape by a memorandum submitted by Obergrupoenfuhrer 
Richard Hildebrand, a senior SS-Police official on the 
Eastern Front.7 The new organization was called the 
Werwolf.8 a term borrowed directly from Hermann Lons, and 
which fit well into the primitive superstitions and 
Volkish obsessions of the SS.
One of the most basic problems with the new movement 
was that it was not placed under the purview of the 
military —  upon which suspicions of treason had fallen - 
- but was under the SS, and even within this sphere it 
was not associated with the Waffen-SS. Rather, the 
Werwolf was placed under the control of Himmler's own 
regional police inspectors, the Hohereh SS- und 
Polizeifiihrer (HSSPF) , although a number of subsidiary 
functions were also set aside for the RSHA. Thus, not 
only was the diversionary organization cut off from a 
military chain of command —  which would have seemed its 
most natural and expedient home9 —  but the effective 
division of the program between two agencies within the 
SS also created a coolness, if not an actual rivalry, 
between these organizations. It seems, in fact, that the 
main RSHA chiefs, Obergruppenfuhrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner 
and Walter Schellenburg, set out from the beginning to 
disable the main body of the movement, which remained 
outside their control.10
Another of the most delimitating features of the new 
movement, evident from the Hildebrandt memorandum onward, 
was that it was never seen as anything more than a mere 
diversionary organization meant to function in Germany's
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border lands, at least not until the last dark days of 
the war. Any intimation that the armed forces might fail 
to protect the frontiers of the Reich smacked of 
"defeatism" —  at least in the Nazi Weltanschauung —  and 
this led the SS guerrillas to proceed upon the assumption 
that their group was solely a pre-defeat organization, 
and that its potential zone of operations was limited to 
the few areas already occupied by the enemy or 
immediately threatened. This confusion of morale with 
common sense meant that no preparations were made for 
resistance in the interior until well into 1945.11
Conceived within this narrow Clausewitzian mandate, 
SS partisans were regarded primarily as a means of 
harassing enemy lines of communication, particularly rail 
lines. They were also charged with committing impromptu 
acts of political and economic sabotage; killing 
collaborators; encouraging the population in boycotts and 
passive resistance; spreading propaganda; infiltrating 
enemy MG offices; and collecting intelligence on enemy 
means of supply and transportation routes.12 Captured 
documents show that Werwolfe were also regarded as the 
core of future guerrilla bands and local resistance 
movements, since it was expected that Wehrmacht
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stragglers and disaffected Nazi civilians in the enemy 
rear would naturally coalesce around such a nucleus.13
These duties were to be carried out by Gruppen, or 
small cells of four to six men, which in turn were 
grouped into Sektors (alternately called Zuge, or 
platoons), consisting of six to ten cells? six to eight 
Sektors formed an Abschnitt. Cell members were equipped 
with small arms, hand grenades, Panzerfauste. and a wide 
array of Nioolit and Donarit plastic explosives, often 
contained in a kit resembling a lunch box. Each Werwolf 
carried fifteen to twenty pounds of explosive material, 
plus footmines and unexploded American incendiary sticks, 
of which the Germans had collected a total stock of 
approximately two hundred and fifty thousand. American 
and British weapons were obtained through parachute drops 
in Holland, by which the Allies had hoped to equip Dutch 
patriots, but which actually fell into the hands of the 
SS.14 Werwolfe were issued with military uniforms, but 
were given free latitude to dress in civilian clothes in 
11 emergency cases."15
Werwolf Gruppen were provided with hidden ammunition 
caches,16 and various agencies of the German Government 
and military also did some detailed studies about the use
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of natural caves as large-scale secret supply dumps.17 
Left behind enemy lines, the Gruppen were based in hidden 
bunkers, or "galleries", which were intended as living 
quarters and command posts. In the southern and central 
Rhineland, most galleries consisted of camouflaged caves, 
unused mineshafts, air raid shelters or derelict 
factories, but further north, the dense woods of the 
Reichswald afforded an opportunity for the construction 
of custom-made bunkers. About thirty such installations 
were dug by Ruhr miners loaned from the Hibernia mining 
concern, apparently under the purview of the Beauftraater 
fur den Westwallbau (Director of West Wall Construction) . 
The main means of communication with German lines was by 
wireless transmitter or line crossers, although there was 
also a nebulous plan to link the bunkers by an 
underground telephone net in the Rhineland operated by 
Reichspost technicians.18
To oversee the Werwolf. Himmler appointed a 
"personal representative" who was given the title of 
"General Inspekteur fur Spezialabwehr." Unfortunately 
for the Nazis, the SS-Police official appointed to this 
post was Oberaruppenfiihrer Hans Prutzmann, a charter 
member of the Schutzstaffel aristocracy whose undeniable
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wit and intelligence was more than offset by his vast 
conceit and by a notable lack of attention to business, 
Prutzmann was also a legendry adventurer and spendthrift 
who had brutally acquired an immense rural estate near 
Zhitomir during the heyday of German colonial 
exploitation in the Ukraine. During the early stages of 
Unternehmen Werwolf. Prutzmann emerges in the historical 
record as a blustery figure who bragged that his 
organization would bring about "a radical improvement in 
Germany's military situation," and who delighted in 
showing-off secret sabotage equipment to impressionable 
associates and acquaintances.19
A native of East Prussia, Prutzmann was physically 
a handsome man who had celebrated his forty-third 
birthday shortly before his posting. Like several other 
senior SS leaders, his most notable physical 
characteristic was a facial scar suffered during a sword 
duel. Prutzmann was an agricultural accountant by 
profession, but after joining the SS in 1930, he rose 
rapidly through its ranks to become Inspector-General of 
the Waffen-SS and Liaison Officer with the Wehrmacht. 
After the outbreak of war, he was stationed as HSSPF in 
Hamburg, whereafter he was transferred to the same post
122
in Konigsberg and thence on to a dual posting as HSSPF of 
both the Ukraine and Southern Russia. After two and half 
years in the East, where he commanded an Einsatzaruppe —  
with all the savagery that implies —  he temporarily 
replaced Oberaruppenfiihrer Wolff as HSSPF in northern 
Italy, and was thereafter transferred back to his dual 
posting on the Eastern Front. During these assignments, 
Prutzmann had accumulated a nearly unrivalled knowledge 
of guerrilla warfare, and had actually negotiated with 
the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) to bring it into 
alliance with Germany. This experience —  plus his 
background in East Prussia —  stood him in good stead to 
serve as the SS partisan chief, particularly since 
Werwolf units were first deployed on the Eastern Front.20
It should also be noted that the German evacuation 
of the USSR meant that Prutzmann's old posts as an HSSPF 
in that country had become redundant, and that in October 
1944 —  after he had been re-assigned to the Werwolf —  
the SS Persona 1 -Hauptamt requested permission to announce 
that Prutzmann had been relieved of his former duties.21 
In November, he officially replaced General Glaise- 
Horstenau as German Plenipotentiary-General in Croatia,22 
but this appointment was probably for the purpose of
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public and Allied consumption? the Werwolf, after all, 
was a top-secret undertaking, and Prutzmann was expected 
to turn up somewhere.
The construction of the SS guerrilla inspectorate 
began with the formation of a central staff —  Dienstelle 
Prutzmann —  which was first based at Petz near Berlin, 
and later transferred to Rheinsburg.- There was no danger 
of Prutzmann and company being tied to a home base, 
however, since the ostentatious General-Inspekteur soon 
equipped himself with a private train on which he could 
travel throughout Germany? at various sidings, special 
telephone cables were installed bearing direct lines to 
different parts of the country.
Prutzmann's staff of two hundred was organized like 
that of a military corps and was led by Standartenfiihrer 
Karl Tschiersky, who had experience running Unternehmen 
Zeppelin, but had also run afoul of the infamous RSHA 
commando chief Otto Skorzeny —  their personal animosity 
thereafter became part of the generally frosty relations 
between the Werwolf and the RSHA. Tschiersky was 
replaced in March 1945 by Briqadefuhrer Oplander, an 
official on the staff of Karl Frank in Bohemia-Moravia, 
whose services Prutzmann had specifically requested. The
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main staff members were SA-Brioadefuhrer Siebel, in 
charge of training and technical administration 
(Inspectorate "I") ; Standartenfiihrer D'Alguen, an SS 
publicist who had run Operation "Skorpion", the diffusion 
of "Russian Liberation” propaganda on the Eastern Front; 
Standartenfiihrer Kotthaus, in charge of personnel 
matters; and Frau Maisch, who led a female component of 
Werwolf which was formed in early 1945 and eventually 
composed ten percent of the whole. In the spring of 
1945, a regular military officer, Generalleutnant Juppe, 
was also appointed as Prutzmann*s "deputy.1,23
In addition to the central Werwolf Dienstelle. there 
was a "Zentrale fur geheime Spezialzerstorunasmittel" —  
which gathered sabotage material —  plus a special 
guerrilla signals center hidden in the Harz Mountains.24 
However, the most important sub-section of Dienstelle 
Priitzmann was the semi-autonomous Hitler Juaend Command 
under Oberbannfiihrer Klos, a 35 year-old HJ leader from 
Usingen who was equipped with the official title of "HJ 
Beauftraater der Reichs-Jugendfuhrung". In the fall of 
1944, Klos had been appointed by the HJ chief, Arthur 
Axmann, as the head of an independent partisan 
organization —  in fact, he was even given a mandate to
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educate the entire HJ for guerrilla activities —  but at 
the turn of 1944/45 he and his staff were transferred to 
Dienstelle Prutzmann in the wake of a joint HJ-Werwolf 
planning conference at Potsdam. A circular in January 
1945 informed SS-Police officials that HJ guerrilla 
Gruppen and individual agents were forthwith under their 
tactical direction.
Even after this HJ-Werwolf amalgamation, however, HJ 
guerrillas retained much of their independence —  Klos, 
for instance, maintained a separate training battalion, 
titled "Albert Leo S chi agates", as well as a separate 
system of training schools, about which organizers in the 
mainstream organization knew very little. Not
surprisingly, Werwolf officers complained bitterly about 
the lack of cooperation between the two wings of the 
movement, and one SS-Police general was even led to 
believe that the SS effort to annex the HJ program had 
failed.25
The HJ organization in the Rhineland was run as a 
practically independent fief by its chief, 
Hauptbannfiirher Memminger, and many HJ officials involved 
in the scheme remained under the impression that the 
program was still run solely by Axmann, and was entirely
a HJ affair.26 A number of HJ guerrilla groups were 
active in western Germany,27 by far the most important of 
these being Unterhehmen "Kurfurst Balduin," which was run 
totally independent of the Werwolf by Hauptsturmfiihrer 
Rolf Karbach, the former HJ-Oberaebeitsfiihrer of the 
Mosselle region. Karbach drew recruits from the 
Wehrmacht. the Waffen-SS. and the HJ (including the 
former Luxemburger Volksiugend), and he eventually 
succeeded in collecting over seven hundred men, which he 
sub-divided into twelve Gruppen and eight "Special 
Troops," plus a headquarters staff based at Bingen. Such 
Gruppen. in fact, ranked among the most successful of all 
German partisans, and succeeded in destroying several 
stretches of railway track in the Hunsriick forest, as 
well as demolishing a captured munitions plant and an 
American fuel dump. Karbach's very success, however, 
contributed to his eventual dismissal as a guerrilla 
chief: local Party and SS-Police officials became
jealous of the achievements of "Kurfiirst Balduin," and 
after a smear campaign against Karbach, he was 
transferred to the Reichsiugendfuhrung and his 
organization was formally brought under the main Werwolf 
chain of command.28
Aside from the autonomous HJ sub-section, which was 
an anomaly, the Werwolf was regionally organized 
according to the boundaries of the Wehrmacht1s home 
defence regions and within these districts it was 
controlled by the Hohereh SS- und Polizeifiihrer. who 
locally represented Himmler in his capacity as Chief of 
German Police. Under a system first devised for the 
borderland HSSPF and then extended to the remainder of 
the Reich, each HSSPF was ordered by Himmler to appoint 
a special representative to control the local 
recruitment, training and deployment of guerrillas; thus 
was devised the position of "Werwolf Beauftragter", which 
was later designated as "Kommandeur fur Soezialabwehr11. 
Prutzmann preferred that Army officers serve in these 
local posts, since he wished to build his essentially 
civilian organization around a military core.29 
Associated bodies, such as the Party, the HJ, and the SA, 
were also supposed to appoint their own regional "Werwolf 
Beauftragter" to maintain contact with the SS movement, 
although it is unlikely that all these representatives 
were ever actually appointed.30
Because the Werwolf movement was based upon the 
HSSPF command structure, its organizational character was
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shaped by the role of the HSSPF within the dual chain of 
command existent within the SS. The office of the HSSPF 
had originally been created during the late 1930s as a 
means of breaking the monopoly of command channels 
established by the senior commands of the various offices 
within Himmler's SS-Police empire, particularly the 
Waffen-SS and the Sicherheitspolizei. The highly
centralized chain-of-command within these organizations 
had led to a stifling parochialism which made local 
cooperation between two or more branches of the overall 
SS organization difficult to achieve —  thus Himmler 
introduced the HSSPF as a means of preventing the 
constituent parts of his empire from falling apart, and 
he particularly used the channel as a means of by-passing 
the SS central offices, especially the RSHA, in order to 
carry out "special tasks."31
Because the HSSPF had a measure of authority over 
local offices of the regular police, the RSHA, and the 
Waffen-SS. such officials had the ability (at least in 
theory) to draw together the various resources regarded 
by Himmler as necessary for the success of his partisan 
units. Moreover, many of the HSSPF had personal 
experience in the occupied Eastern territories, and like
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Prutzmann, they were supposed to have accumulated a 
specialized knowledge of partisan warfare. The important 
thing to note, however, is that the original raison 
d'etre of the HSSPF was the centralized regional 
direction of all the branches of an overall organization 
—  as opposed to centralized direction in Berlin of 
individual SS and Police agencies —  and that this 
pattern of horizontal rather than vertical organization 
was naturally bequeathed to Unternehmen Werwolf. 
Prutzmann, for his part, was formally attached to the SS- 
Hauotamt32. but was otherwise directly subordinate to 
Himmler, meaning that Dienstelle Prutzmann was the only 
intermediate command channel between Himmler and the 
HSSPF (in their capacity as regional Werwolf organizers).
This system of regionalization had definite 
advantages: for instance it allowed for a degree of
local improvisation rarely evident in "totalitarian” 
states, and was suitable for a period when the geographic 
unity of the Reich was collapsing under the strain of 
Anglo-American air attacks. On the other hand, the 
system's great weakness was that HSSPF officials —  by 
their very nature —  were isolated from regular command 
channels and therefore stood upon a weak bureaucratic
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foundation. Because they lacked their own resources of 
men and material, they were effective only when called 
upon by the Reichsfiihrer to perform a "special task": 
only in this event did the flow of business switch from 
the routine channels to the special channel running from 
Himmler via the HSSPF to the local RSHA commanders, the 
Befehlshaber des Sicherheitsoolizei (BdS) . When "special 
tasks" extended over a considerable period, such as 
Unternehman Werwolf, the RSHA and other SS-Police 
agencies could raise considerable roadblocks to 
protracted demands on their resources. Thus, the HSSPF 
was essentially an outsider, often at conflict with the 
RSHA, the Waffen-SS, and the Party,33 and this problem 
was transferred directly to the Werwolf organization 
superimposed upon the HSSPF system of command.
For better or worse, this system was first applied 
in the German borderland regions and then gradually 
spread inward. On the Eastern Front, Werwolf units were 
first launched during the fall of 1944 in Prutzmann*s old 
fief of East Prussia, which was also an early testing 
ground for the mass militia, or Volkssturm. Because the 
HSSPF in Konigsberg fell ill about the time that Werwolf 
was launched, Prutzmann returned to personally serve as
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Acting-HSSPF and so remained on hand for the rest of 
1944,34 thus giving East Prussia a special status within 
the overall organization. Prutzmann*s idea of basing 
Werwolfe in camouflaged bunkers, or "galleries", seems to 
have been originally based upon the suitability of such 
structures in the deep East Prussian forests,35 and the 
dominant role played by veterans of the Eastern Front 
during the formative stages of the Werwolf —  ie. 
Hildebrandt, Prutzmann, Siebel, Tschiersky, D'Alquen —  
generally gives the impression that the organization was 
originally poised mainly in an eastward direction.
By 1945, Werwolf units were deployed along the 
length of the Eastern Front, and the Soviets noted that 
a considerable number of stay-behind saboteurs were being 
overrun by the rapid advances resulting from the Winter 
Offensive in Poland and eastern Germany.36 Captured 
cities were plagued by snipers and arsonists,37 and in 
February and March the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS launched 
a desperate attempt to disrupt Soviet supply lines and 
thereby break-up the impending Soviet assault upon 
Berlin.38 Even after the fall of the Reich capital 
itself, the city experienced a wave of terrorism similar 
to that which had occurred in cities further to the
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east,39 and it is possible that Werwolf assassins were 
responsible for the death in mid-June of General-Polkov ni k 
N.E. Berzarin, who was one of the first Soviet commanders 
to storm into the capital and who was subsequently- 
appointed as the city's commandant.40 Soviet and Polish 
Communist sources report that Werwolfe and "Green 
Partisans" remained active throughout 1945-46 in occupied 
eastern Germany,41 and although some of these claims were 
undoubtedly exaggerated in order to provide an excuse for 
anti-German razzias in areas of the Reich annexed by 
Poland,42 there is also some independent evidence that 
German partisans were actually active.43
Although operations in the West never equalled the 
intensity evident in the eastern German provinces, the 
western marches were certainly not forgotten. In 
September Prutzmann and his adjutant toured Wehrkreis VI 
—  Westphalia and the northern Rhineland —  and 
instructed the local HSSPF, Oberaruppenfiihrer 
Gutenberger, to form a Wehrkreis guerrilla organization. 
Similar arrangements were soon thereafter made with 
Oberaruppenfuhrers Stroop and Hofmann, who controlled 
respectively Wehrkreis XII —  the Eifel, the Palafinate, 
the Saar, southwestern Hesse and Lorraine —  and
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Wehrkreis V —  Baden, Wurttemberg, and Alsace. Each 
HSSPF was told to assemble a small staff to control the 
new organization, and to appoint a W-Beauftragter 
(respectively Standartenfiihrer Raddatz. Hauotsturmfiihrer 
Gunther, and Obersturmfuhrer Muller). Three Waffen-SS 
officers were also dispatched in order to select 
volunteers for "Bataillon West.”44
These Wehrkreis-based organizations directed 
extensive preparations for guerrilla fighting in the 
Rhineland, but without much final effect: the local
population was so opposed to such operations, and the 
Werwolfe themselves so demoralized, that when the Werwolf 
galleries were overrun by the Allies, the guerrillas 
meekly surrendered themselves or fled into the 
surrounding countryside with the intention of drifting 
back into civilian life.45 Among the original western 
ranges of the Werwolf, only the Schwarzwald produced 
signs of considerable guerrilla fighting, perhaps because 
it was more suited geographically than areas west of the 
Rhine, and perhaps because the French were comparatively 
weaker than the other occupying powers.46
Although Unternehmen Werwolf was subsequently 
extended into the inner Wehrkreise. it was never as well
organized as in the original borderland regions, mainly 
because Prutzmann dallied on such organizational matters 
in order to spare the thought of Allied or Soviet 
penetrations into the German heartland; procrastination, 
it seems, is indeed the thief of time. In Weimar, for 
instance, Skorzeny inspected the local Werwolf group in 
March 1945 and found it suffering from a variety of ills: 
some of the partisans were conscripted; arms and 
ammunition were in short supply; there was no provision 
to contact higher echelons by radio; and the guerrillas 
only had a vague conception of their assignment.47 In 
many areas, local Party and Police officials supposed to 
form the core of the organization often found themselves 
opposed to it in both practice and in principle, 
particularly in Hamburg, Vienna, and Leipzig.48 In 
Austria, Allied intelligence officers later concluded 
that "those charged with [Werwolf] activities did little 
more than talk, and tried, for the sake of their own 
safety, to give the impression that the orders were being 
obeyed".49
Particular mention must be made of three regions in 
the interior which were distinguished by special efforts, 
particularly by Prutzmann's personal intervention in
overriding the prerogative of the local HSSPF to choose 
their own Werwolf commanders. Perhaps the most important 
of these areas was the southeast section of Wehrkreis XI, 
namely the Harz region, which had traditionally comprised 
a refuge for German guerrillas and which loomed large in 
the sort of Teutonic pagan mysticism held so dear within 
the SS. In the spring of 1945, brief preparations were 
made in order to convert the Harz into a Werwolf Festuno: 
the HJ-Gebei t s f iihrer in Mansfeld, for instance, formed HJ 
recruits into a six hundred man "Kampfaruppe Ostharz." 
which was led by disabled Waffen-SS NCOs from local 
military hospitals. An intense Kleinkrieq engulfed the 
area when it was surrounded by American forces in mid- 
April 1945, and although the pocket was formally mopped 
up by 21 April, sabotage attacks and guerrilla warfare 
continued to flare up for at least another month. The 
Americans responded with fierce aerial bombing attacks 
and "prompt and effective reprisal measures" against the 
local population, as well as the deployment of Polish 
counter-guerrillas, who reportedly tossed grenades into 
every nook and cranny in the mountains. The main Werwolf 
Kampfgruppe was almost completely liquidated,50 although 
it is interesting to note that even after the Red Army
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occupied the eastern Harz in the summer of 1945, Soviet 
troops continued to run a certain risk of ambush and 
local mayors were warned about the possibility of further 
reprisals.51
In two other areas deemed sufficiently important, 
Prutzmann chose his own officials who took orders 
directly from him rather than from the regional HSSPF. 
One of these cases was Wehrkreis XIII —  Franconia —
which in the Nazi view required an extra measure of
guerrilla activity to befit its reputation as the 
spiritual center of Naziism. The local HSSPF, Benno
Martin, was ordered in February 1945 to appoint a W-
Beauftraater. but Martin stood true to the Nazi code of
unwarranted optimism —  believing the Allies would never 
reach his Wehrkreis —  and therefore delayed the posting 
until early April. Although a local SS-Police official 
was finally appointed, Prutzmann immediately intervened 
and replaced the local choice with Dr. Hans Weibgen, a 
fanatic Nazi answerable directly to Dienstelle Prutzmann. 
Weibgen quickly imported some of his own people into the 
embattled region, including two SS officers from Berlin, 
who were supposed to prepare the Nuremberg Gestapo for 
"the coming Freedom Movement".52
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Nazi fanatics subsequently made a more determined 
effort to defend the cities and towns of Franconia than 
perhaps any other area in central Germany, and the 
Wehrkreis military commander, Weissenberger, opened up 
the region's armouries to Werwolf partisans, reportedly 
allowing large stocks of equipment to be withdrawn. 
Civilians were cajoled into bearing arms, and the 
civilian levee-en-masse proceeded with far more vigour 
than in any other area, which in turn made the Allied 
crossings of the Main River more difficult than the 
earlier crossings of the Rhine. In cities such as
Asschaffenburg, Wurzburg, Neustadt, and Nuremberg, large 
numbers of franc tireurs fought the Allied advance with 
fanatic ferocity, usually unmarked by armbands 
identifying them as combatants.53
A third area of particular concern for the Werwolf 
was the Alpine region of Tyrol-Voralberg, particularly 
after March 1945, when Hitler reportedly ordered 
Prutzmann to prepare the Werwolf for a long fight and, if 
necessary, to retreat into the Austrian Alps in order to 
join the SS for a last stand.54 The W-Beauftraoter in 
the area (Wehrkreis XVIII) was Hauptmann Anton Mair, but 
the Tyrol-Voralberg was independently controlled by
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Sturmbannfiihrer Kurreck, who, like Tschiersky, was 
transferred to Werwolf from Unternehmen Zeppelin. 
Kurreck was appointed in late 1944, and although attached 
to the staff of Gauleiter Hofer, he was responsible 
directly to Dienstelle Prutzmann. Mair also reported 
directly to Prutzmann after his HSSPF, Oberqruppenfuhrer 
Rosener, showed signs in April 1945 of wanting to abandon 
the Werwolf project.55
Although Tyrol-Voralberg was the heart of the so- 
called "Alpine Redoubt", the northern and northeastern 
approaches to the area —  namely Wehrkreise XVII 
(Northern Austria) and VII (Southern Bavaria) —  received 
lesser attention. Preparations in the former were begun 
in January 1945, under HSSPF Schimana and W-Beauftraater 
Fahrion,57 and in the latter only in late March 1945, 
under HSSPF von Eberstein and W-Beauftragter Wagner. 
These extremely tardy preparations on the northern edge 
of the Redoubt suggest that the Nazis were surprised by 
the rate of the Allied thrust into Central Germany, and 
because of this delay neither von Eberstein nor Wagner 
had much hope for the success of the organization in the 
Bavarian Alps. In fact, the period of time from Wagner's 
appointment (13 April) until the day when he fled from
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office in the face of the American advance (28 April) was 
a mere two weeks.
After appointing Wagner, von Eberstein had hoped to 
have ridden himself of the whole distasteful Werwolf 
matter, but he was disconcerted to find that he would not 
be allowed to fade away in true soldierly fashion, thus 
avoiding the scrutiny of the advancing Allied forces. 
Because of American drives which had nearly sundered the 
Reich in two by mid-April, most central Reich offices 
were split into autonomous northern and southern 
sections, and the unenthusiastic von Eberstein —  on the 
strength of his reputation as an "alter Kampfer" —  found 
himself chosen as plenipotentiary for the entire southern 
component of Unternehmen Werwolf. When Briqadefiihrer 
Siebel arrived with news of this unwanted promotion on 20 
April, von Eberstein was aghast and refused to accept the 
order unless it was put into written form, something 
which Siebel could not immediately produce. By the time 
that Siebel got back to von Eberstein —  who by now had 
been chased out of Munich and set up headquarters in a 
town on the Sternbergersee —  his name had been withdrawn 
for the appointment. Siebel himself had taken the post, 
and in view of the obvious recalcitrance of von Eberstein
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and his staff, the fanatical Weibgen was given a wider 
sphere of responsibility as Franconian W-Beauftraqter. 
taking further areas of Bavaria under his control.58
Before fully considering these final days, however, 
the narrative must first return to the more general 
problems contributing to this ultimate collapse —  
problems which lay at least partly in the inadequacy of 
the Werwolf1s bureaucratic foundation. A Wehrmacht 
document noted, for instance, that "The Werwolf has no 
provisionment organization nor will one be built...",59 
so it was clear that the organization was totally 
dependent in such matters upon the Army, the Waffen- 
SS, and such RSHA sabotage groups as the Jaqdverbande and 
the Frontaufklarung units. Transportation was supposedly 
provided by the HSSPF's own "K-Staffel". or Motor Pool.60
Obviously, this system depended essentially upon the 
goodwill of quartermasters among the agencies involved, 
and it therefore quickly broke down. By the final year 
of the war, the various German armed forces each faced 
such severe shortages that they were unlikely to 
willingly pass on supplies to a nebulous partisan 
organization. Skorzeny's Jaqdverbande. for instance, 
were struggling to bring about their own activization,
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and at this formative stage were hardly likely to offer 
enthusiastic support to their rival. Skorzeny told his 
Supply Officer that Prutzmann's representatives could be 
given 10% to 20% of Jaadverbande stocks, but in no 
circumstances would J aadverbande interests be jeopardized 
to maintain an adequate flow of supply to the Werwolf. 
All difficulties were supposed to be reported to 
Skorzeny*s headquarters at Friedenthal, and eventually 
complaints arrived from each Jaqdverband unit regarding 
"exorbitant demands" by Werwolf organizers. Skorzeny 
categorically refused each such request.61
The regional HSSPF frequently complained about lack 
of supplies, even in the critical Alpine Redoubt, 
although a concerted effort was made to send weapons, 
food and treasure into this region, where it was 
subsequently hidden in secret caches and caves.62 Allied 
intelligence reports noted that Werwolf supplies were "in 
many areas completely inadequate", and that if the SS 
partisans had hoped to operate effectively, they would 
have been forced to depend largely on supplies salvaged 
from abandoned Wehrmacht ordinance depots or stolen from 
the enemy.63 Prutzmann*s only limited success in this 
field was attained by following Skorzeny's advice to get
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supplies directly from local munitions plants, a method 
which at least ran on a first-come first-serve basis64 
and thereby eliminated the severe difficulties of long­
distance transportation.65 There is also some evidence 
that the army and the Armaments Ministry attempted to 
hinder the delivery of supplies to the Werwolf66 —  
presumably in an attempt to defang the organization —  
although it is not known how much this obstructionist 
manoeuvre was actually responsible for Werwolf shortages.
The recruitment and training system was a similar 
hodgepodge, euphemistically described as the "snowball 
system" because the movement was supposed to grow as it 
gained momentum.67 Because the Werwolf lacked exclusive 
rights to any specific pool of personnel, it once again 
ended up with the left-overs sent to it by other 
agencies. Originally, this recruitment hodgepodge 
consisted of three basic mustering channels:
One —  the Waffen-SS: The Werbkommissionen (Recruiting
Commissions) of the SS-Hauotamt toured local offices of 
the HJ, the SA, and various other Party agencies, from 
which volunteers were obtained and then examined by a 
Musterunas-Kommission. Party chiefs in the borderland 
Gaue were also instructed to provide a list of
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recommended volunteers to the local HSSPF —  the recruits 
thereafter being called-up through the Waffen-SS 
Eraanzunastelle (Recruiting Office) —  and some Waffen-SS 
divisions apparently set up special Entlassunqstelle^ 
(Demobilization Centers), where SS volunteers were 
equipped with phoney demobilization papers and civilian 
clothes, then secretly posted to underground service 
against the enemy occupation forces.68 The problem with 
this system was that there was no incentive to send 
first-rate people to the Werwolf: thus the Waffen-SS
naturally kept the best young men for its own units,69 
while the Gauleiter also reserved suitable recruits for 
the Party's own system of local defence, namely the 
Volkssturm.70
Two —  The Army: In the autumn of 1944, a number of
men were released by the Army for partisan training, and 
a limited number of soldiers were also provided by the 
Divisions and Corps in the borderland districts, and by 
the Heereswaffenschulen (Army Weapons Schools) . The most 
valuable military recruits were those with technical 
qualifications, such as radio operators, although most 
Army personnel attached to the Werwolf had only recently 
been inducted, and were passed-on to Werwolf training
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schools immediately after basic training.71
Three —  The RSHA: This medium of recruitment ran
through the regional BdS, who controlled local offices of 
the Gestaoo. the SD, and the Kripo. and who was 
subordinate to the HSSPF under the "special tasks" chain 
of command running downward from Himmler. The first BdS 
appeal for Werwolf recruits was issued at Diisseldorf in 
mid-September 1944, and called for "old Party members" 
willing to undergo a demolitions course and thereafter 
cause damage in the enemy rear. Unlike the other two 
recruitment channels, this one had considerable success, 
mainly because the kind of Gestapo and SD men thus 
attracted to the Werwolf banner were often so hopelessly 
compromised that the idea of surrender was unbearable: 
the Werwolf thus became something of an alternate means 
of committing suicide. The SD, in particular found its 
offices in eastern Germany drained by such BdS 
recruitment campaigns for the Werwolf and other last- 
minute defence measures. Once recruited, such elements 
frequently tended to organize themselves as a group apart 
from recruits who had been stampeded into the 
organization, and apparently regarded themselves as the 
cream of the Werwolf crop.72
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It must also be recalled that the HJ also controlled 
its own semi-autonomous wing of the organization, which 
in turn had its own system of recruitment, based mainly 
upon lists submitted by the local HJ-Bannfuhrers.73
This scatter-shot method of recruitment generally 
did not produce good results. The number of recruits, in 
the first place, was simply insufficient, and total 
membership in the organization probably never exceeded 
several thousand guerrillas.74 In fact, Prutzmann and 
Siebel both complained vigorously about the lack of 
partisan trainees —  particularly those who were already 
skilled radio operators or scouts —  and SS recruiters 
were occasionally heard to tell Army officers that the 
enlistment of volunteers was extremely difficult.75 
Recruiters, therefore, resorted to such expediencies as 
conscription, particularly of older recruits,76 and the 
tricking of would-be volunteers by providing a 
purposefully vague or fallacious description of the 
activities that Werwolfe would be called upon to 
perform.77 These practices naturally led to problems when 
the conscripts and deluded volunteers found out what was 
really expected of them, such as penetrating enemy lines 
in civilian clothes, or accepting poison suicide ampules
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to swallow in case of impending capture. Many of the 
recruits subsequently deserted or refused to undergo 
training, and when Himmler reacted by threatening drop­
outs with a concentration camp sentence,78 morale in the 
organization was hardly encouraged.79
Recruits, both willing and unwilling, were trained 
by Wehrmacht. Waffen-SS and Jacrverband officers, usually 
veterans of anti-partisan warfare in Russia and the 
Balkans, although a largely abortive effort was also made 
to recruit former Feldiager as instructors in guerrilla 
techniques. Not surprisingly, instruction was conducted 
at HJ and Waffen-SS schools, and Skorzeny was also forced 
to share his Jagdverband training camps at Friedenthal, 
Neustrelitz, Kileschnowitz, and Kloster Tiefenthal (near 
Wiesbaden). The entire program was coordinated with the 
SS Chef der Bandenkamofverbande. and Sturmbannfuhrer 
Erhardt, on this staff, was frequently in liaison with 
Dienstelle Prutzmann and with the Abteilung 
Ausbildungswesen (Training Section) of OKH.
The courses given under this regime were based on 
translations of Soviet guerrilla training manuals, 
although in January 1945 a comprehensive German manual 
was printed under the title "Werwolf: Winke fur
Jaadeinheiten" ("Tips for Hunting Units"). Courses were 
given in sabotage, Morse, wireless transmission, terrain 
reconnaissance, and assassination technigues, plus all 
the usual regimens of drill, athletics and speed 
marching. Female agents were specially trained to act as 
spies while serving as clerks and secretaries in MG 
offices, while others were shown how to seduce and murder 
Allied soldiers. Each recruit was deprived of ID papers, 
not only to prevent identification by the Allies in case 
of capture, but also to deprive him of his past and 
accentuate his total surrender to the aims of the SS 
organization; in place of his own name and life history, 
the recruit received a new identity, complete with 
Waffen-SS paybook and dogtags. Each new pupil was also 
required to sign a pledge which —  unlike the military 
pledge to Hitler —  was not directed toward an individual 
bound by his mortality, but to the organization itself, 
and to the principle of national resistance.80
Despite the fact that training was tough, it was 
also very short, ranging anywhere from five days to five 
weeks. Considering all the topics covered, even the 
longest of these courses was extremely crammed, and the 
Allies decided —  upon the basis of preliminary contact
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with the Werwolf —  that guerrilla training had been 
"hurried and superficial".81 Prutzmann was naturally 
cognizant of this fact, and on several occasions he 
complained to Skorzeny that the instruction given by 
Jaadverband officers was insufficient in detail, but the 
commando chief replied that given time limits and the 
pressure on Jaadverband personnel for other duties, more 
complete courses were impossible to provide.82
It must also be noted that the Jaadverbande usually 
taught only Gruppen leaders, and that the instruction 
received by the rank-and-file was probably even less 
thorough. FAK officers who visited a Werwolf unit near 
Stettin in March 1945, for instance, noted that there was 
a considerable lack of trained instructors, and that as 
a result, extra strain was put upon officers leading the 
Werwolf Gruppen behind Soviet lines. At the Sudeten town 
of Kaaden, a Flak defence guard half-finished a training 
course for a band of young girls before she even realized 
—  to her horror —  that she was training a Werwolf 
unit.83
Since these myriad difficulties in training —  not 
to mention recruitment and supply —  were at least partly 
caused by the Werwolf's lack of a firm bureaucratic base,
it soon became obvious that the organization could not 
properly establish itself without the patronage of a 
well-grounded military or para-military agency which 
could hold its own amid a desperate struggle for 
resources. Himmler, with his eye for bureaucratic 
detail, seemed to have grasped this underlying factor, 
and during a meeting of SS security chiefs in November 
1944 he actually offered control of the Werwolf to 
Skorzeny, a proposition which would have kept the Werwolf 
firmly within the SS orbit. Priitzmann, who was present, 
reportedly lowered his head and uncomfortably shuffled 
his papers, but Skorzeny respectfully refused the 
assignment , saying he already had more than enough work 
to fill his time.84 It is apparent that Skorzeny thought 
that the Werwolf was an inefficient and unnecessary 
duplication of his own Jaadverband program85 —  into 
which he had invested much time and effort —  and it is 
thus possible that he also believed that the latter would 
eventually replace the Werwolfe, being converted into a 
domestic guerrilla organization.
While Skorzeny did not take control of the Werwolf, 
he did negotiate a number of agreements with Priitzmann 
which ensured FAK participation in the deployment of
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Werwolf Gruppen. FAK units were told to provide the 
Werwolf with training officers and give limited access to 
FAK supplies —  particularly on the Eastern Front — for 
which they were reciprocally given partial operational 
control of Werwolf activity.86
Similar agreements were negotiated between Priitzmann 
and the military High Command on the Eastern Front (OKH), 
mainly along the same pattern of diminished Werwolf 
autonomy in return for material considerations. While 
senior level cooperation had already been agreed upon in 
1944 —  with a line running from OKH to the SS-Hauptamt87 
—  by early 1945 the need for much closer collaboration 
between the armed forces and the guerrillas was obvious: 
the Werwolf was accumulating abundant information of 
tactical importance, and in a period when the military 
was rapidly expanding its own capability for partisan 
warfare against the Red Army, the Werwolf was already in 
a position to perform many such special missions; the 
Army, on the other hand, could offer the ill-equipped 
guerrillas both supply and transport. Such factors of 
mutual need had already drawn together the Army and the 
RSHA's Russian partisan organization, Unternehmen 
Zeppelin, and the same effect now worked upon the Army
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and the Werwolf.
Thus, it was decided in early February that the 
Werwolf would place a permanent liaison officer at the 
various Army unit headquarters along the Eastern Front in 
order to ensure closer participation by Army Group 
intelligence officers in the deployment of Werwolf 
Gruppen, and to increase the cross-flow of information 
about the enemy. OKH in return issued an order (6 
February) empowering intelligence officers in northeast 
Germany to meet Werwolf's need for provisions, and 
"regulated" other German groups operating in the enemy 
rear —  SS-J agdverbande. FAK units, and SS- 
Stre i fkommandos —  as a consequence of the Werwolf- 
Wehrmacht arrangement.88 The OKH Abteilung 
Ausbildungswesen also requested that the same order be 
distributed via OKW to Army commands in Western Europe.89
Not only was the military beginning to influence 
Werwolf deployment, but the Army also gained an important 
function in the guerrilla organization's recruitment and 
training processes. The OKH Abteilung Ausbildunaswesen 
had always taken healthy interest in these matters,90 
particularly the enthusiastic Training Sub-Section of the 
"Sapper and Fortifications Staff": surviving
documentation shows, for instance, that during 1944, the 
possibilities of guerrilla warfare were extensively 
discussed by the faculty at Pionier-Schule I at Dessau- 
Rosslau, and that the eventual results of these 
discussions was a ten page memorandum called "Kleinkriecr 
in Our Own Country," which was circulated amongst various 
senior staffs of the Wehrmacht.91 By the beginning of 
1945, the Training Sub-Section had begun assigning 
engineer troops for Werwolf operations, and a number of 
these men were run through a special Werwolf training 
course at Hoxter and eventually transferred to the 
control of Dienstelle Priitzmann in March 1945.92 In 
conjunction with the Army's effort to strengthen its 
capabilities for partisan warfare on the Eastern Front, 
a particular effort was made in February to scour the 
Wehrkreise in search of engineer training troops willing 
to enlist in eight man guerrilla Gruppen to be trained at 
Hoxter and then deployed in the East.93
As well, the Army in early 1945 suggested a new 
Werwolf mustering channel almost entirely in military 
hands. Desperate for men, Dienstelle Priitzmann agreed to 
send out a widely circulated order directing that 
military recruits for the Werwolf be trained at the
Abteilung Ausbildunqswesen*s own special training 
facilities, the Heereschulen. Although different 
versions of the order were disseminated, it generally- 
explained that new military recruits were needed in order 
"to speed up the establishment of the Werwolf 
Organization", and that such men were to take part in a 
spring Werwolf training program at Heersechule II, which 
was located at Turkenburg in the Carpathian Mountains of 
western Slovakia. It was specified that personnel 
considered for the course should have at least a second- 
class Iron Cross, and must be non-Catholic; moreover, 
recruits were to come from communities or rural areas 
only on the eastern and western fringes of the Reich 
which were already occupied or immediately threatened by 
the enemy. "Special emphasis" was placed on the East, 
and surviving documents show that at least one unit was 
specifically asked for a man "whose hometown is in 
Russian-occupied territory".
The final results were mildly impressive; although 
some units either refused the order or disobeyed it, 
approximately 3 00 men passed through the two week course, 
two complete cycles of which were conducted before the 
Soviets overran western Slovakia. It is possible that
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additional military recruits were trained at Heereschule 
I, near Wismar,94 and it is also known that by the last 
month of the war Wehrmacht officers were being directly 
seconded to the Werwolf with no intermediary training.95 
The faculty of Heereschule II was itself withdrawn into 
the Bohmerwald and converted into a Werwolf company 
codenamed Kampfgruppe "Paul", after the name of its 
commander, Oberst Paul Kruger. The specialized expertise 
of the officers and men of this unit made it potentially 
the most effective and dangerous Werwolf guerrilla group 
in Germany, although it was still broken up with 
comparative ease in May 1945 after one of its members 
defected to the Allies.96
It might be argued, incidentally, that the military 
as a whole degenerated into a partisan force during the 
last four months of the war. This process began in the 
East, where the disastrous collapse caused by the Soviet 
Winter Offensive forced the eastern field armies to 
resort to any expedient capable of slowing the pace of 
the Soviet advance. Army Groups "Centre" and "Vistula" 
formed guerrilla raiding units to function in the Soviet 
rear, and they also organized so-called Panzer 
J aqdkommandos. which were supposed to function
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independently along enemy flanks and lines of 
communication in order to disrupt the advance of armoured 
spearheads.97 Several German sources reported in 
February 1945 that extensive partisan warfare had broken 
out behind the Soviet front in eastern Germany, and there 
was apparently some attempt to exploit bands of German 
stragglers in the Soviet rear in conjunction with the 
abortive Arnswald Counter-Offensive.98
The same kind of measures were undertaken in the 
West after Allied spearheads began to cut deep into 
central Germany in late March 1945, and in this case it 
is possible to outline the development of the guerrilla 
strategy in even greater detail because of the existence 
of extensive documentation. We know, for instance, that 
Generaloberst Jodi instructed the western field armies on 
29 March that Allied tank spearheads could only be 
defeated by cutting their rearward communication with 
supply bases,99 and that this order was followed by 
directives to individual German units which repeatedly 
hammered home the necessity of raiding activity and 
guerrilla warfare.100 Moreover, German troops by-passed 
by the Allies and trapped in the Allied rear were also 
directed to join the Werwolf and convert to Kleinkriea
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operations:101 such orders, for instance, were conveyed 
to the 6th SS Mountain Division —  which was stranded in 
the Taunus region in late March102 —  as well as to other 
remains of Army Group "B" which were overrun in the Ruhr 
some two weeks later.103
In such conditions, the creation and deployment of 
special forces was also greatly accelerated: Army
intelligence officers, for instance, were ordered to 
employ bands of volunteer soldiers for attacks on Allied 
supply lines and staffs?104 Luftwaffe signals troops on 
the Frisian coast were instructed to form stay-behind 
reconnaissance teams;105 the remains of Kampfgruppe "von 
der Heydte," a paratroop skirmishing unit deployed in the 
Ardennes, was formed into a Werwolf-stvle organization;106 
and Panzer Jaadeinheiten became synonymous with Werwolf 
units —  in fact, six Panzeriaqd companies in north 
Germany were formally subjugated to Dienstelle Priitzmann 
in mid-April.107 The Allies actually encountered some 
Army and Waffen-SS diversionary units during the last 
month of the war —  for instance, in the Teutobergerwald, 
the Sauerland, the Odenwald, and Altmark —  and in a few 
cases, Allied troops had to be recalled from the front in 
order to extinguish guerrilla flare-ups based around such
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groups.108
One of the main propellants behind this increasing 
military interest in the Kleinkrieq was General Reinhard 
Gehlen, head of the OKH intelligence section, Fremde 
Heere Ost (FHO). Gehlen's main task was the collection 
of intelligence, although he realized by the winter of 
1944-45 that in the desperate straits in which Germany 
and her allies now found themselves, large-scale 
intelligence operations in the Soviet rear could only be 
motivated by inculcating a sense of pride in direct anti­
communist guerrilla resistance among the operatives. 
Thus, FHO began to take intensive interest in the theory 
of partisan warfare109 and in early 1945, Gehlen ordered 
preparation of a study investigating the construction of 
an anti-Soviet underground using the Armiia Kraiowa as a 
structural model. On 9 February, Hauptmann Friedrich 
Poppenberger submitted a preliminary paper which 
suggested an expanded Werwolf incorporating all existing 
German commando groups, and based mainly upon sixty man 
military Einsatz units which would operate from secret 
hide-outs in the Soviet rear. Gehlen, however, decided 
that such a program must be preceded by the organization 
of a pure intelligence-gathering network, and to suit
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this purpose he sent out a call for a thousand Wehrmacht 
volunteers to put themselves at the disposal of FAK units 
102 and 103 as line-crossers.110
Despite the fact that the final AK study apparently 
questioned the effectiveness of a long-term resistance 
movement, Gehlen pushed forward with the partisan scheme, 
particularly after he had been relieved from command at 
FHO for challenging the Fiihrer1 s genius with 
embarrassingly accurate intelligence reports on the 
strength of the Red Army. Gehlen, however, had such 
strong influence at FHO that he was able to keep alive a 
Machiavellian plan to transfer the massive files of the 
staff westwards, where he hoped they would provide a 
convenient gift with which to introduce himself to the 
Americans, and in this same regard he viewed the 
provision of an existing anti-Soviet guerrilla 
underground as an added advantage. With these factors in 
mind, Gehlen got in touch with his friend in the RSHA, 
Schellenburg, who in turn used the resources of 
Unternehmen Zeppelin to conduct a parallel study of the 
AK.
In early April, Schellenburg laid some of these 
plans for guerrilla warfare before Himmler, but the
Reichsfiihrer reacted with a standard Nazi recital of 
taboos on the possibility of post-capitulation partisan 
warfare, calling the scheme "defeatist”. One can imagine 
that Himmler immediately recognized that the Gehlen plan 
introduced large-scale military and RSHA influence into 
the Werwolf, simultaneously removing his own direct 
control channel via the HSSPFs, and that he was adverse 
to any such shrinkage of his prerogatives, even despite 
such incremental factors as greater efficiency? the 
Gehlen plan, after all, threatened to recreate the 
Werwolf within the military and Secret Service spheres, 
where it should have been placed from the beginning. In 
any case, Schellenburg immediately withdrew the plan,111 
although the Poles have since charged that OKH actually 
initiated at least part of the program, particularly the
infiltration of military partisans into Polish-annexed
112 areas.1
Even without the full implementation of the Gehlen 
plan, Dienstelle Priitzmann still felt an almost 
inevitable bureaucratic tug which eventually settled the 
Werwolf within the most natural command channels —  in 
fact, Priitzmann and his staff became largely superfluous 
to the entire process of fielding Werwolf Gruppen. The
Dienstelle1s intelligence division tried to remain 
relevant by issuing bi-monthly intelligence briefs for 
the service of those agencies directly controlling 
Werwolf deployment, but there was little else they could 
do to involve themselves in the process. Siebel's 
deputy, Oberstleutnant Sulle, complained to a local 
Werwolf organizer in April that as a command center, 
Dienstelle Priitzmann had become paralysed —  it could no 
longer even keep track of its Werwolf Gruppen because 
communications throughout Germany had become badly 
disrupted, and because the few remaining wireless 
stations were so overworked that they could only rarely 
be used. Thus, in effect, the Gruppen remained only 
nominally under Priitzmann's authority —  after February 
1945, they had quickly slid under the control of the Army 
Group intelligence officers and the FAKs. Moreover, 
under the new regime, the nature of their work altered? 
senior military authorities began to insist, for 
instance, that Werwolf guerrillas be used to carry out 
reconnaissance assignments, a purpose for which they were 
not originally intended, and a French report noted that 
by March 1945, Gruppen on the Eastern Front were no 
longer being dispersed in the usual Werwolf fashion, but
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were concentrated so that the Army could quickly direct 
them to new tasks when their services were required.113
With straightforward partisan warfare thus slipping 
out from under his control, Priitzmann gradually turned to 
more eclectic pursuits, such as the possibility of mass- 
murder by poison, a tactic which Winston Churchill once 
called "the difference between treachery and war."115 The 
RSHA had already begun the production of poisons for food 
and alcohol in the fall of 1944, and in October a 
conference on the matter was actually held at an SS- 
Police research center in Berlin called the 
Kriminaltechnisches Institut (KTI) . Priitzmann apparently 
took an immediate interest in the matter —  particularly 
since the KTI was already a source for poison suicide 
ampules for the use of Werwolfe themselves —  and the 
entire project was soon turned over to the purview of 
Department IVb of Dienstelle Priitzmann. along with large 
quantities of poisons. By early 1945, tests on the 
injection of lethal dozes of methyl into alcohol had been 
carried out —  this had already been decided upon during 
the October Conference as the best means of poisoning 
liquor —  and further tests on more exotic chemicals were 
underway.116 Knowledge of such poisoning methods was
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widely disseminated among potential Nazi resisters, and 
special squads were soon dispatched along both the 
Western and Eastern Fronts, the task of which was to 
poison liquor and food likely to be consumed by Allied 
and Soviet troops.117 Unfortunately, this was probably 
the most successful of all Werwolf programs —  at least 
in terms of a body count —  and its effect lingered well 
into the postwar period. Hundreds of Allied soldiers 
were thus killed —  particularly by methyl alcohol in 
liquor118 —  and in eastern Europe casualties among Soviet 
troops certainly ran even higher.119
It is also notable that Allied forces discovered 
German underground caches of poison gas and other 
chemical warfare substances, and also secret pilot plants 
which seemed designed to begin the further production of 
such material after enemy occupation. I. G. Farben had 
produced these stocks of poison gas, as well as a highly 
flammable liquid called N-Stoff —  which burst into 
flames upon contact and emitted noxious fumes —  and near 
the end of the war, the Armaments Ministry had come under 
pressure to transfer such substances to the Werwolf and 
its sister group, the Freikoros Adolf Hitler. In a post 
war interview, Albert Speer apparently told British
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interrogators that Werwolf and Friekorps officials were 
forwarded from his agency to the Wehrmacht Ordinance 
Department (Heereswaffenamt) , which supplied the deadly 
material.120 There is no evidence, of course, that these 
stocks were actually used by the Werwolf or any other 
military group, and the only known case where chemical 
weapons were deliberately sent into a threatened area —  
ie. offensively placed —  was in East Prussia during the 
Soviet drive in January 1945.121
The Werwolf was also involved with such seamy 
activities as assassination and intimidation by threat of 
violence. In October 1944, Himmler enacted a decree 
which forbade unevacuated civil officials in enemy 
territory to perform "any service to the enemy" —  
although the provision of essential administrative and 
welfare services for the remaining population was 
permitted —  and this decree was supplemented by secret 
orders to the HSSPF West, Gutenberger, authorizing "our 
organization behind the American Front to execute death 
sentences upon traitors".122 Nazi hierarchs subsequently 
began singling out officials in the occupied territories 
who had incurred their displeasure and were thus made the 
object of special Vehme assassination teams. Some of
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these conspiracies failed to reach the point of 
fruition,123 but in a number of cases in late March and 
April 1945, local civil officials within Allied-occupied 
territory were in fact liquidated by Werwolf assassins.124 
The first isolated attacks upon female "collaborators" —  
the girlfriends of Allied troops —  also occurred during 
the final month of the war,125 although this form of 
resistance only reached a significant level during the 
fall of 1945, when Allied non-fraternization bans were 
rescinded.126
The most important of the Vehme missions 
"Operation Carnival" —  was undertaken in the west 
German city of Aachen, which had been the first major 
community to fall into Allied hands. The hapless target 
was the Oberburgermeister. Franz Oppenhof, who was 
fingered by both Himmler and Goebbels as the first 
intended victim for the long arm of Nazi justice. The 
task was first detailed to the Jaadverbande. which 
refused it on the grounds that it was a domestic Reich 
matter and was therefore the proper concern of the 
Werwolf. With the dirty work thus returned to his 
sphere, Priitzmann delegated the job to the W-Beauftragter 
of Wehrkreis VI, Raddatz, who in turn presided over the
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training of a five member team under Untersturmfuhrer 
Wentzel, a veteran of the Skorzeny organization. 
However, like everything else in the Werwolf, the 
Oppenhof assassination was undertaken reluctantly, and 
Gutenburger succeeded in repeatedly postponing the 
operation —  which was originally intended to proceed 
through the frontline infiltration of Wentzel*s unit —  
until Priitzmann finally forced the matter by convincing 
the Luftwaffe to provide a captured B-17 for a parachute 
drop.127
On 2 0 March, Wentzel's team was dropped into a 
wooded borderland region in the southeast Netherlands, 
and was almost immediately detected by a Dutch border 
guard, who was killed in the subsequent skirmish. Within 
five days the group had made its way to the outskirts of 
Aachen, where they quickly found Oppenhof's home and 
subsequently murdered the unfortunate mayor with a pistol 
shot to the head. Four days later, DNB announced that 
Oppenhof had been tried by a "Court of Honour" and 
sentenced to death.128
The effect of this outrage upon public opinion —  
combined with the news of other similar killings —  was 
immediately noticeable. Even in Aachen, it had been
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difficult to find a suitable candidate brave enough to 
accept the mayoralty, and after Oppenhof's killing, the 
task became even harder, both in Rhenish towns that had 
been occupied for some time, and in newly occupied 
communities in central Germany.129 Moreover, in Nazi-held 
territory, civic officials who were preparing for the 
Allied advance also became alarmed about Werwolf 
activities? in Stuttgart, Oberburgermeister Strolin wrote 
to the local HSSPF, Hofmann, claiming that a continuation 
of city government was provided for in Himmler's 1944 
directive, and that clear guidelines were needed 
regarding the propriety of performing administrative 
tasks in occupied areas. It was bad enough, Strolin 
noted, that civic officials might bear the brunt of 
Allied reprisals against the "Freedom Movement", without 
these same officials being the target of the movement 
itself.130
Officials like Strolin had good reason for worry,131 
particularly since even in Nazi-held territory, the 
Werwolf functioned as a strong-arm unit for advocates of 
Hitler's "scorched earth" resistance? the direct and 
indirect connivance of the collapsing regime in such 
activity thus gave the Werwolfe an aspect not unlike the
167
"death squads" later characteristic of right-wing 
terrorism in Latin America. Werwolfe were instructed 
that "traitors" were fair game even in areas not yet 
occupied by the enemy,132 and in certain regions the 
"Werwolf" theme became a virtual license for the 
extrajudicial suppression of dissidents by the Party: 
for instance, a French report noted that in southwest 
Germany, the Schwenningen Werwolf was quickly transformed 
into the personal instrument of the local Kreisleiter. 
who used it to manhandle political opponents.133
This expanded role for the Werwolf resulted directly 
from the disastrous collapse of morale and the obvious 
lack of any capacity for further national resistance —  
obvious even among the middle and lower strata of the 
Party which formed the usual bulwark of the regime —  and 
it also formed the logical culmination of the general SS 
drive against "traitors," a campaign which had burned hot 
since the 20 July Putsch attempt. A tendency toward 
authoritarian vigilantism —  even within Party ranks —  
became evident in August 1944, when Bormann suspended the 
proceedings of Party courts in favour of summary 
judgements by competent political leaders.134 This was 
followed by drum-head court martials within the military,
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and by a HJ memorandum in late February 1945 which 
recommended that wavering officials be shot, even, if 
necessary, by their subordinates, a suggestion which 
Bormann found so uplifting that he circulated it among 
his Gauleiters.135 Finally came extralegal "Flag Orders," 
which stipulated that anyone flying white flags was 
subject to immediate execution.136 National Socialism, as 
Sebastian Heffner notes, had finally turned upon the 
Germans themselves as its final victim: if the
population would not faithfully participate in a true 
"people's war," then it must be punished in a final 
flurry of destruction.137
Werwolfe naturally thrived within such a climate, 
and in April 1945 they were found freely smearing town 
walls with such fearsome sayings as "Beware traitor, the 
Werwolf watches" —  or "Whoever deserts the Fuhrer will 
be hanged as a traitor".138 Vehme units went on a killing 
spree, executing deserters, political unreliables, and 
mayors or civil servants who had the gall to prepare for 
the continuation of civil life with a modicum of 
destruction —  all were shot or hung and their bodies 
tagged with Werwolf warning notes.139 In western Germany, 
priests were special targets because of the suspicion
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that many of them would preach a doctrine of Christian 
conciliation with the victors; "There will be," said 
Goebbels, "a good field of activity for our terror groups 
here."140
Finally, the frenzy began to feed even upon the 
Party itself ( a fate which seems a rather common 
affliction of revolutionary movements throughout 
history). Werwolfe hunted down Party officials who fled 
their posts in the face of danger,141 and they also loomed 
behind local Party leaders who considered minimizing the 
destructiveness of the collapse —  no less a figure than 
Franz Hofer, the political chief of the Alpine 
Redoubt,was threatened with Werwolf retaliation after he 
publicly called for the cancellation of defence measures 
for Innsbruck.142 Major Party dissidents, such as the 
Armaments Minister, Albert Speer, and the Gauleiter of 
Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, were forced to build personal 
guard units as a defence against Nazi terrorists. "The 
Wehrwolf's activities", Speer later told the Allies, 
"were directed against people like him more than against 
the Americans".143
Nazi terrorists were also needed to augment the 
Wehrmacht. which stubbornly balked at carrying out
Hitler*s infamous "scorched earth" decrees. On 19 March, 
the Gauleiters were given partial responsibility for the 
destruction of industrial and economic enterprises of 
likely use to the enemy, and Priitzmann dutifully visited 
German industrialists to discuss the uncomfortable 
possibility of placing saboteurs within factories to make 
sure that they were destroyed before the arrival of the 
Allies or the Soviets.144 Special Volkssturm and Werwolf 
"Sprengtruppe" were actually trained and deployed,145 and 
these saboteurs occasionally became involved in melees 
with outraged workers who angrily defended the nation's 
industries and its economic infrastructure.146 Economic 
installations which were not destroyed prior to the enemy 
advance were sometimes prepared for demolition by stay- 
behind agents,147 and the Werwolf was also involved in the 
mining of buildings likely to be used as billets or 
headquarters by the enemy, and which could subsequently 
be detonated by time-delay fuses or by saboteurs.148
One might rightly conclude from this unfortunate 
attack upon the nation's economy, that the raw anti­
industrialism long inherent within Naziism had finally 
been unbound, and that the "Sorenqtruppe" were modern-day 
Luddites ordered to undo the Industrial Revolution. It
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is particularly ironic that while Nazi propagandists were 
berating the Americans for the infamous "Morgenthau 
Plan," which suggested the deindustrialization of the 
Reich, the Government and Party had simultaneously 
assigned Nazi hoodlums to carry out exactly the same 
measures•
In the final analysis, however, such terrorism 
produced fear and confusion, but it could not induce the 
spirit of national resistance which had failed to emanate 
spontaneously from the natural well-springs of German 
feeling. In fact, Werwolf intimidation only increased 
public hatred of an already discredited regime: 
assassination of civic officials, for instance, caused 
not only fear but also resentment —  "The Ludendorffr lose 
our wars," said one observer, "while the Erzbergers lose 
their lives."149 In a few instances, HJ diversionist 
bands were even forcibly disbanded or run out of town by 
local officials,150 and in one case a regional Werwolf 
chief was assassinated by members of a local antifa.151 
Moreover, public opinion was probably influenced by the 
fact that the Catholic church finally arrayed itself in 
full force against National Socialism and condemned the 
Werwolf as a brutal and useless coda to six years of
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war.152
Despite the efforts of the Werwolf to enforce the 
spirit of resistance in everyone else, the organization's 
own morale was disastrous, and steadily became worse as 
the moment of final collapse drew nearer.153 Priitzmann 
himself led the way: by the spring of 1945 his vanity had 
disappeared and his mood wavered wildly between an over- 
expressive confidence and desperate drunken nights in 
which he contemplated suicide.154 Moreover, he was well 
on the path toward becoming Germany's version of the 
Yugoslav Chetnik leader Costa Pecenac —  ie. the 
commander of an "official" guerrilla movement who was 
more interested in collaboration with the occupation 
forces than in wholesale resistance. Not only was 
Priitzmann associated with Himmler's last minute attempts 
to negotiate with the Western Powers, but he also 
established his own independent effort to achieve a 
general armistice with the West,155 thereby attempting to 
remove the Werwolf's raison d'etre in western Germany and 
reorient it solely toward the East.
This story began in mid-March 1945 and played itself 
out in Priitzmann's old fief of Hamburg, where the Werwolf 
chief had once served as HSSPF. Priitzmann presumably had
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good contacts in the area, and during this period he 
resumed close relations with Gauleiter Kaufmann —  a key 
German official in favour of capitulation to Germany's 
Western enemies —  and also hinted that he shared 
Kaufmann's dour appraisal of the overall strategic 
situation. Three weeks later, Priitzmann arrived in 
Hamburg with important news: Himmler, he said, had
agreed to cancel Werwolf's guerrilla operations in 
western Germany, converting it into an agency with which 
to spread the idea of accommodation with the West. From 
this point onward, said Priitzmann, the Werwolf would work 
for an armistice with the Western Powers and for the 
continued defence of Reich frontiers in the East? the 
final aim would be an anti-Bolshevik union of Europe 
designed to protect its "age-old cultural values".156
How should this bold initiative be interpreted? 
Several salient facts do in fact suggest that such an 
alteration of the Werwolf was at least under 
consideration at the most senior levels of the SS: 
first, a draft SS plan (3 April 1945), later found 
amongst the OKW archives, discussed in detail a 
restructuring of the "Freedom Movement" as a broad neo- 
Nazi front which would strive not only toward liberation
from foreign rule, but also toward a reformed National 
Socialism purged of the corruption of the Party 
bureaucracy and freed from the arrogance of power 
politics at both home and abroad —  the final goal of 
this document was to fit Germany into an egalitarian 
European Union;157 second, Himmler in late April told the 
head of the Luftwaffe's special services squadron that 
his main intent was to achieve a "special peace" with the 
Western Powers and to subsequently form an anti-Communist 
"Freikorps" in Mecklenburg and Holstein;158 and third, 
Himmler spoke on several occasions concerning his doubts 
about the Werwolf and the plan to organize a Werwolf 
redoubt in the Alps.159 Given these facts, however, clear 
and unambiguous documentary evidence also shows that the 
Werwolf was still fully functional in the West throughout 
April 1945,160 and that any scheme to change its status 
was therefore never fully implemented. At most, the plan 
seems nebulous and provisional —  more of a trial balloon 
than a solid decision.
Priitzmann's tendency to push this vague intention as 
a firmly established fact reveals —  in truth —  an 
intense desire to ingratiate himself with the rebellious 
Party element at Hamburg, perhaps in the hope of getting
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one foot into the camp of the dissidents, while leaving 
the other in the camp of the die-hard resisters. In any 
case, the local HJ-Werwolf chief was soon won over to 
this new definition of Werwolf activity, although the 
overall W-Beauftraqter. Standartenfiihrer Knoll, was a 
Nazi fanatic who remained loyally bound to the cause of 
last ditch resistance and even made arrangements for 
post-capitulation activity.161
After Prtitzmann made his startling announcement 
about the Werwolf1s supposed new course, Kaufmann 
announced his own plan to act independently in ensuring 
that the population of northwest Germany was not 
butchered in a useless attempt to defend the area. 
Although Priitzmann worried about the danger of openly 
expressing such views, he admitted thorough agreement 
with the proposal, and by the end of the month he had 
answered the Gauleiter1s call to help in arranging a 
truce on the Northwest Front. At the time of Hitler's 
death, both men were attempting to contact the Danish 
Resistance in the hope of using it as an intermediary 
through which to negotiate with the British.162 
Priitzmann's last message to his Werwolf followers 
instructed that "unnecessary loses" be avoided,
176
particularly among young Werwolfe.163
The formal end for the Werwolf came as a result of 
the reassertion of military dominance within the dying 
Reich after the self-destruction of Hitler and Goebbels 
within Berlin. The centre of power thereafter devolved 
upon OKW, located first at Plon and then at Flensburg, 
and military men became the leading figures in the new 
constellation of political and military power, most 
particularly Grand Admiral Donitz, the new Chief of 
State, and Generaloberst Kesselring, who commanded 
plenipotentiary powers in the now cut-off regions of 
south Germany.
In view of this development, a few additional words 
must be said about the background of military-Werwolf 
relations: although the High Command had been
comfortable with the Werwolf as a tightly controlled 
network of units suitable for reconnaissance and 
diversion, most military men —  irrespective of rank —  
were opposed to the kind of ideological and political 
nature which the Werwolf movement assumed near the end of 
the war (and about which more will be said later) . 
Moreover, many German soldiers believed that in the post­
capitulation period, Werwolf activity would degenerate
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into the uncontained chaos of fanatic banditry, based 
largely upon a core of irresponsible SS and Party 
desperados and almost totally devoid of public support. 
In this scenario, the guerrillas could scarcely bring 
about the victory that the mighty Wehrmacht had failed to 
achieve, but rather, would merely hinder reconstruction 
and provoke massive enemy reprisals upon the already 
battered German populace. In any case, such activity was 
well outside the proper bounds of the traditional 
Clausewitzian military ethic.164
It is true that there was some Army sympathy for the 
cause of German guerrillas in Soviet-occupied regions —  
where there appeared little left to lose165 —  and it was 
on the Eastern Front that there were several isolated 
cases where junior officers resolved to ignore defeat and 
fight on as partisans, quite independent of the senior 
staffs of their formations.166 Even in the East, however, 
there was a strong strain of military conservatism, which 
was combined with a fear that fanatic Werwolf propaganda 
would only make Soviet savagry even worse: several
units, in fact, were overtly forbidden to participate in 
the construction of the Werwolf.167 By the end of the 
war, such doubts about partisan warfare were almost
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openly expressed: an Armed Forces radio broadcast on 19
April bitterly condemned the theory and practice of 
German guerrilla warfare,168 while simultaneously the 
generals defending Berlin connived with Speer in a plot - 
- which, incidentally, was never executed —  to seize the 
main Werwolf radio transmitter and thereafter broadcast 
a daring speech by Speer abolishing the movement and 
cancelling the "scorched earth decrees".169
It is thus no surprise that once the military became 
the authority of last resort, it showed little further 
tolerance for any Werwolf activity, particulary since it 
might get in the way of reaching a modus vivendi with the 
West. On May 5, the day after the proclamation of a 
regional armistice in northwest Europe, two instances of 
such Werwolf activity came to light, the most significant 
of which was evidence of a plot to deploy airborne 
saboteurs in the enemy rear. Unknown to OKW, Command 
West of the Luftwaffe had in mid-April organized its own 
Werwolf units which were based mainly in the Alpine 
Redoubt and intended to land sabotage teams in enemy- 
occupied areas by means of light aircraft. Although 
thirty to forty aircraft manned by such agents were 
actually dispatched, the crews apparently committed few
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effective acts of sabotage, and one such unit, 
Sonderkommando Totenkopf. had already begun to 
disintegrate in late April after exhausting its limited 
supplies of men and material.170 The Allies, however, had 
meanwhile become acquainted with this enterprise through 
"Ultra" intercepts and interrogations of captured airmen, 
and an angry Allied demand for the final cessation of the 
operation was sent to OKW headquarters at Flensburg.
Immediately after reception of this message, Donitz 
sent urgent orders to Luftflotte Reich, prohibiting any 
further Werwolf activity, and he also called into his 
presence the melancholy figure of Prutzmann, who had in 
the meantime effectively abandoned his leadership of the 
Werwolf, but now pretended to the status of "liaison 
officer" between Himmler and the new Head of State. 
Donitz had no desire to liaise with the discredited 
Himmler, who had been unceremoniously dropped from the 
Cabinet, but he addressed Prutzmann in his old role of 
Insoekteur fur Soezial Abwehr. in effect telling him that 
the Werwolf was forthwith forbidden to function because 
the end of Wehrmacht resistance had rendered it 
superfluous.171
Several hours after the revelations about an aerial
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Werwolf. OKW also received a sharp note from Field 
Marshal Montgomery, claiming that 21st Army Group had 
monitored a vitriolic speech delivered over Wilhelmshaven 
Sender —  one of the few German radio stations still 
broadcasting —  which called for rebellion and resistance 
against the capitulation agreement. Yet another OKW 
telegram was sent out, this time to Wilhemshaven, 
ordering an investigation and authorizing "drastic 
measures" against the Party functionary who had delivered 
the offensive speech.172 On the evening of 5 May, Donitz 
held a meeting with the Gauleiter from the Wilhelmshaven 
area (Gau Weser-Ems) , and after again stressing the need 
for a prohibition of Werwolf activity,173 he arranged for 
a public announcement to this same effect to be broadcast 
over the wavelength of Deutschlandsender. then based at 
Flensburg. At midnight, the station announced that the 
"scorched earth" decrees were cancelled, and an hour 
later, Germans were asked to abstain from "illegal" 
underground activity in either the Werwolf or its sister 
organizations, although it is notable that the movement 
was not formally dissolved nor did the prohibition 
against Werwolf activity apply to Soviet-occupied 
territory.174
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On the following day, Kesselring instructed 
Oberaruppenfuhrer Hausser —  the ablest and most popular 
of SS generals —  to prevent any guerrilla warfare in the 
Alps by disgruntled SS units, and several days later the 
General Staff of Army Group "G” warned that any incipient 
efforts to construct a Freikorps would constitute a 
fruitless endangerment to the German people.175
Thereafter, the Wehrmacht freely provided the Allies with 
available information on the Werwolf.176 and in areas 
where the defeated Army was given temporary
responsibilities for policing and the implementation of 
control measures, they scrupulously worked to prevent 
sabotage and civilian or military unrest.177
As for the overlords of the Werwolf, their eventual 
fate was not a happy story. Himmler refused the advice 
of his adjutants, who encouraged him to absolve the SS of 
their oaths of loyalty and formally dissolve the Werwolf, 
but he rather became totally fixated upon his own fate. 
He wandered north Germany for several weeks incognito,
and when captured by the British on 23 May, he bit upon
one of the poison suicide ampules that had been so widely 
distributed within the Werwolf organization. He died 
within several minutes.
182
Prutzmann, meanwhile, had witnessed Himmler's 
maudlin farewell speech on 5 May and then toyed with the 
idea of escaping in a U-Boat or an airplane, although in 
actuality he was soon captured by the British and 
immediately sent to a detention camp. He initially tried 
to convince British interrogators that in November 1944 
he had been replaced by Brigadefiihrer Siebel as General 
Insoekteur fur Soezialabwehr. but when this lie failed to 
lead the British astray, he visited the latrine and —  
like Himmler —  departed the world by means of a suicide 
ampule.178 Both Prutzmann and Himmler, it was rumoured, 
had given up on attempts to deal with the Allies and were 
on their way southward toward the supposed Werwolf 
Redoubt in the Alps.179
While Prutzmann had originally headed north to 
Schleswig-Holstein, his headquarters staff, under the 
command of Siebel, had retreated south toward the Alpine 
Redoubt. However, not only did the Dienstelle travel in 
a different geographical direction than its chief, it was 
also on a different path philosophically —  most notably 
in the sense that these officers remained much more 
devoted than Prutzmann to the idea of last ditch 
resistance and diversionary activity. In fact, while on
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the way to the Redoubt, Prutzmann's aides developed a 
bold strategy for postwar Werwolf operations: the main
intent —  remarkably similar to the later formulations of 
Guevera, Debray, and Marighela —  was to harass the 
occupation forces, cause reprisals, and thereby create a 
mutual hatred between the population and the occupation 
forces. It was foreseen that such a program would 
eventually create the conditions for a political revival 
of National Socialism and also lay the ground work for a 
rebellion in case of a major armed conflict between East 
and West.180
In truth, however, the Dienstelle1s fate was 
somewhat less grandiose and important than these plans 
suggested: after reaching Maishofen, the headquarterss
staff was formed into a seventy-five man Werwolf 
Kommando. and this unit was subsequently instructed to 
destroy a V-2 facility near Garmisch-Partenkirchen which 
had been captured by the Americans. The unit was shot up 
and dispersed by American forces while on its way to 
carry out this ill-fated mission.181
The regional sections of the Werwolf collapsed in a 
number of ways. Many of the HSSPFs emulated their leader 
by negotiating surrender,182 while a number of local
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organizations unofficially dissolved or were formally 
terminated; a particularly notable example was the 
abolition of the Styrian Werwolf by Gauleiter Oberreither 
on 4 May, which shows that such disintegration sometimes 
occurred even in areas about to fall to the Red Army.183 
The only notable last stand occurred in the Segeberg 
Forest in Schleswig-Holstein, where a desperate band of 
three hundred SS men and Werwolfe was determined to pay 
a final homage to the god of battles. This concentration 
was dispersed only several days after the final 
Armistice, when British forces sealed off the area and 
OKW used troops of the 8th Parachute Division to sweep 
the forest.184
In a few cases, some of the most fanatic Werwolf 
chiefs made preliminary plans for postwar activity,185 and 
it is true that a few cells sputtered into the post­
capitulation period, even despite Donitz1 cessation 
order.186 Occupation authorities, for instance, obtained 
the minutes of a secret meeting of Werwolf "Unteraruppe 
Vila, Section 4e", where it was decided that local 
Werwolf agents should pose as anti-Nazis and otherwise 
make every conceivable effort to win the confidence of 
Allied Military Government and security officers.187
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There is also some evidence that certain Werwolfe in 
eastern Europe tried to keep their Gruppen intact in the 
hope that they could play a role in any hostile Allied 
advance against the Soviets: for instance, five Werwolfe
captured by the Czechs at Znojemsku told their captors 
that they were waiting for American airdrops of arms and 
equipment, and that they expected to aid the advancing 
American forces both by guerrilla activity, and by 
subsequent service as a police agency after the Americans 
had arrived.188 Thus, while the British and Americans 
were sanguine about Werwolf capabilities and had already 
written off the organization by the mid-summer of 1945,189 
the Soviets and their East European allies retained an 
active interest in the Werwolf well into the 1950s.190
One major Werwolf element which does not fit easily 
into this picture of breakdown and disintegration was the 
HJ sub-section, which retained a sense of coherence and 
organizational identity lasting well into 1946. This was 
chiefly due to the fact that the HJ chief, Axmann, was 
the only senior Nazi leader who prepared a detailed 
scheme for the final phase of the war when most —  or all 
—  of Germany would be occupied. This "Axmann Plan" was 
partially executed in April 1945, when the
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Reichsiuaendfuhrunq was shifted to the Bavarian Alps and 
an endeavour was made to preserve the "essence of the 
nation" by attempting the transfer of thirty-five 
thousand HJ partisans to the inaccessible hill country of 
southern Germany, particularly the Alps, the Bohmerwald, 
and the Schwarzwald. Senior HJ couriers were sent out to 
the four corners of the Reich with orders for local HJ 
staffs to retreat southwards, or, if this was impossible, 
to go underground and await the development of a 
favourable environment for underground work. Leaflets 
circulated under the purview of the RAD chief, Ley, 
advised Werwolfe that extended survival in the Bohmerwald 
and other remote areas was possible, and that the Soviets 
and Americans could thus still be opposed.
In fact, an unknown number of HJ guerrillas actually 
reached the southern mountains, where they were directed 
to carry out partisan activity and prepare for the out­
break of war between the Western Powers and the Soviet 
Union.191 Local HJ resources in the Alps were also 
exploited: the faculty and students of the main HJ elite
school (Junkerschule) at Bad Tolz, for instance, 
retreated into the Alps to form a two hundred and fifty 
man guerrilla unit,192 while further east, HJ-Werwolf
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detachments were organized and attached to 6th SS Panzer 
Army for operations against the Russians.193 Axmann 
himself remained in Berlin to direct HJ activity in the 
besieged capital, but after Hitler's death he infiltrated 
the Soviet ring around the city and fled to secret hide­
outs in Bohemia and southern Germany, whence he remained 
in contact with his followers.194
The real mark of genius in the Axmann Plan was its 
provision for a continuing and self-replenishing source 
of funds for Werwolf activity. Along with appointing a 
leader for the politico-military wing of the Alpine 
Werwolf. Hauptbannfiihrer Franke, Axmann also transferred 
over a million Reichsmarks to his economic advisor, 
Oberbannfuhrer Willi Heidemann, and he too was sent to 
the Alps as head of an independent economic section of 
the movement. Heidemann was given orders to divorce 
himself from casual contacts with active Werwolfe. but to 
build a legal business enterprise in close association 
with AMG ■—  which was exactly the course he followed. 
Heidemann based himself in Bad Tolz and in late April 
made a sound investment by buying Tessmann and Sons, a 
transportation company with offices in Dresden and 
Liibeck. Not only did this eventually provide a constant
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flow of funds for the desperados in the mountains, but 
the very nature of the company improved Werwolf 
communications and its dealings in food and coal gave it 
close contacts with General Patton's lax AMG regime in 
Bavaria. During the course of the summer, Heidemann 
proved himself an adept businessman, and by the end of 
1945 he had bought five additional companies and expanded 
throughout the American and British Zones and into 
Austria —  fear of the Deuxieme Bureau, notably, kept him 
out of the French Zone. Moreover, HJ and Werwolf 
elements in the British Zone had spontaneously 
reorganized during the same period, and by the autumn of 
1945 they were in contact with the Heidemann combine, 
although he could give them no promise of immediate 
funding.195
The most notable aspect of these developments, 
however, was that the survival of the movement was not 
accompanied by a continuing commitment to the typical 
Werwolf program of sabotage and assassination. Heidemann 
believed that his rapid business success would be 
threatened by the oppressive Allied police activity which 
Werwolf operations would surely provoke, and on this 
basis he quickly turned against such activity, which he
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derided as "fire and thunder methods". Rather, he 
devoted himself to the more lofty and long term goal of 
the Axmann Plan —  ie., the preservation of the "national 
substance", which he hoped to achieve by building his 
combine into a major economic force in the new Germany, 
capable of influencing politics and serving as a core for 
Nazi ideological torch bearers (Ideentraoer).
The politico-military side of the movement had 
similar ideals, although it is possible they retained a 
greater commitment to the principle of direct action, and 
that this caused tension with the economic wing under 
Heidemann.196 It seems likely, for instance, that a group 
loosely connected with the movement in the British Zone 
operated in conjunction with such violent youth gangs as 
the Edelweiss Piraten. and that they committed sabotage 
in the Soviet Zone —  eg. the alleged derailment of a 
train near Magackwig in November 1945.197
Of course, the HJ-Werwolf was such a large 
conspiracy that it soon came to the attention of the 
Allied counter-intelligence services, who thereafter made 
an effort to infiltrate it with undercover agents. By 
late 1945, the Allies had obtained membership lists —  a 
compilation of a thousand names associated with the
southern group and fifteen hundred with the northern —  
and on this basis a complex counter-intelligence mission 
was run during the winter of 1945-46. Code named 
"Operation Nursery", this series of raids netted almost 
the entire HJ-Werwolf leadership, beginning with Axmann 
in December, followed by Heidemann in January and the 
heads of the British Zone conspiracy in February. Over 
eight hundred of the subordinate members were swept up in 
a large-scale razzia in late March, and at scattered 
points there were gun battles between Allied troops and 
hunted Werwolfe.198 A few cells survived the Nursery 
raids —  most notably a Schleswig group built around an 
HJ leadership group evacuated from East Prussia199 —  but 
in several months, these too were rolled up by the 
occupation authorities. Thus ended the last important 
manifestation of activity based upon the original Werwolf 
organization, and therefore the last flicker of the Third 
Reich.
Despite this semi-successful postwar remnant, it 
must be reiterated that most of the Werwolf was 
unprepared for the postwar period and therefore 
experienced a general collapse. On the other hand —  
given that the organization was provided with a strict
pre-capitulation mandate —  . its performance perhaps 
should not be judged upon its eventual break-down, since 
the Werwolf was never intended to operate in a post­
capitulation environment. Considered in light of its 
assigned task of harassing the enemy rear, while the 
Wehrmacht was still in the field, the Werwolf achieved 
mixed results. It is true that enemy lines of 
communication were occasionally sabotaged, and that the 
Soviets and Western Allies were occasionally forced to 
draw men from the front to deal with disruptions in the 
rear:200 the Red Army, in particular, had to allocate 
considerable numbers of men for guard duty wherever 
worthwhile industrial or military targets were captured 
intact, and they were also forced to form ten to twenty 
man 11 Suchkommandos1 for the purpose of hunting down 
German guerrillas.201 On the other hand, the Werwolf 
never succeeded in Prutzmann1 s aim of promoting a so- 
called "radical improvement" in Germany’s military 
fortunes, and it might rightly be argued that much of the 
disruption in the rear of the invading armies was 
actually caused by straggler bands having little or no 
connection with the Prutzmann agency.
It is thus impossible not to conclude that the
Werwolf was poorly organized, and that most of the 
limited successes in German guerrilla warfare were gained 
despite the organization rather than because of it. The 
most basic organizational mistakes were the lack of an 
extensive mandate? the lack of a competent leader; and an 
insufficient bureaucratic foundation, the last of these 
problems being the worst because it left the Werwolf 
unprepared to survive amid the savage battle for 
resources which had arisen by 1944-45. In retrospect, it 
appears that Himmler had placed the organization under a 
command channel in which he had an opportunity for 
personal interventions, but that unlike Churchill with 
his Commandos, or John Kennedy with his Green Berets, the 
Reichsfuhrer failed to pay the special attention required 
to ensure the full fledged success of such a group. In 
a war-weary nation short of resources, time, and manpower 
—  and subject to physical disintegration from the 
effects of falling bombs and invading enemy armies —  
such problems were insurmountable.
But could it have been otherwise? The nature of the 
Hitler dictatorship drove it toward bureaucratic 
confusion, while at the same time, a people dragged 
through six years of debilitating effort could hardly
have been expected to support further destruction, 
particularly not self-destruction. In any case, such 
elaborate advance efforts to prepare for guerrilla 
fighting were doomed not only by the condition of the 
German Reich and its people, but were perhaps ill- 
conceived in the first place. The British had 
experienced considerable difficulties with the same 
matter in 194 0, and in the cases of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union, standing plans for guerrilla activity in 
the rear of an invading army had made little impact on 
the actual course of partisan warfare. An apt example in 
the German context was the geographic configuration of 
guerrilla activity within the collapsing Reich: although
the Werwolf was better prepared for partisan warfare in 
the Rhineland, it was the area between the Rhine and the 
Elbe which became more of a problem for Allied forces, 
mainly because stragglers and bands of HJ were able to 
exploit suitable terrain features, and because the 
populace tended to be more hostile than in areas further 
west.202
Aside from preparing arms caches and supply dumps, 
it might be argued that a retreating power can do little 
to encourage a kind of activity that must, by its very
nature, emanate from popular sources (although it can be 
organized subsequently). Sabotage leaders, writes one 
authority, "are less chiefs in the military sense than 
they are chiefs of popular tribes. They must be men who 
have arisen from the people...By gaining distinction 
among their fellows, they gain the individual confidence 
of their followers."203 This is not to argue that 
guerrilla activity cannot be encouraged —  SOE style —  
but that elaborate bureaucracies intended to "seed" 
partisan warfare are of little use.
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The RSHA and the Werwolf
It will be recalled that when the Werwolf was formed 
in September 1944, part of the partisan program was 
reserved for the RSHA. After convening a meeting of 
senior SS leaders in mid-September, Himmler circulated 
his own version of the SOE "Charter" of 1940, stating 
that Amt VI of the RSHA was responsible for the 
organization and leadership of foreign resistance 
movements built upon pro-German elements in threatened or 
evacuated territories.1 A later memorandum (dated 12 
November 1944) made clear that Amt VI was also expected 
to establish links with existing anti-Soviet groups on 
the Eastern Front —  particularly in Poland, the Ukraine, 
Lithuania, and the Soviet interior —  and that the FAKs 
and Army Group intelligence offices had already 
established contact with such organizations as the 
Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA).2 In January 1945, FHO 
"deception units" were transferred to RSHA control, and 
General Gehlen was told that Amt VI was forthwith in 
charge of all behind-the-lines operations on the Eastern 
Front.3
The Werwolf, on the other hand, was strictly limited
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to activity within the Reich, although Werwolf Gruppen 
and HJ sabotage teams functioned in such fringe areas as 
Alsace-Lorraine,4 Eupen-Malmedy,5 southeastern Holland,6 
Danish Schleswig,7 the South Tyrol,8 northern Slovenia,9 
Bohemia,10 and the western Hungarian enclave of Sopron.11 
As originally conceived, however, the dividing line 
between the two agencies was quite clear: the Werwolf
functioned within the boundaries of the Greater Reich, 
while the Amt VI guerrilla program held sway in foreign 
territories.
The main figure within the RSHA charged with this 
new organizational responsibility was the Viennese 
terrorist Otto Skorzeny, who was considerably more 
efficient than his counterpart at the head of the 
Werwolf. Born in 1908, Skorzeny had joined the Austrian 
Nazi Party in 1930 and the Waffen-SS a decade later, 
although he soon found himself at odds with the 
traditional regimentation and disciplinarism of the 
German Armed Forces. Although he was invalided at the 
end of 1942 while suffering from gallstones, this 
apparent career set-back was in fact a stroke of destiny, 
since it left Skorzeny on hand in Berlin at a time when 
Hitler was pressing for a German equivalent to the
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British commando corps. Skorzeny's name was put forward 
by a university acquaintance, and in April 1943 he was 
charged with the organization of a new SD-Ausland 
sabotage unit, the so-called "Friedenthal Formation." 
His reputation soon skyrocketed because of the famous 
Mussolini rescue operation at Gran Sasso —  although most 
of the planning was done by SS and Luftwaffe paratroops - 
- and this new stature was further elevated by his loyal 
and efficient behaviour during the July 20 th coup 
attempt.12 Thus, when the Nazi leadership sought to 
organize a major guerrilla warfare program in evacuated 
territories, they naturally turned to this apparent man 
of wonders, particularly since he had already tried his 
hand at such matters by the dispatch of commandos to 
Iran.13
Thus equipped with a directive to set Europe ablaze, 
Skorzeny and his faithful deputies, Sturmbannfuhrers Radi 
and von Folkersam, began the task of creating a German 
equivalent to SOE.14 In fact, the Brandenburg Division 
had already allotted some of its foreign language 
speakers to the fulfilment of such a scheme, and during 
the summer of 1944 they had created the skeletal basis 
for a number of regionally based Streifkoros —  i.e.,
stay-behind parties which were intended to prepare the 
populations of evacuated territories for guerrilla 
resistance and facilitate the operation of Brandenburg 
raiding detachments to be sent from German-held 
territory.15 After the dissolution of the Abwehr. these 
skeletal Streifkoros were annexed by Skorzeny and formed 
into the four regional battalions of the SS-Jaadverbande 
(Hunting Units) —  Ost (which covered the Soviet Union 
and Poland) ? Nordwest (northern Europe) ? Siidwest (western 
Europe)? and Siidost (the Balkans, Slovakia and Hungary). 
The SS-Friedenthal Formation was converted into a central 
core unit, Jaadverband Mitte. which formed a Praetorian 
Guard for the commando chief. The Skorzeny organization 
also included a special SS paratroop battalion? a Vienna 
headquarters for sabotage in the Balkans (Dienstelle 
2000)? plus a special air force organization called 
Kampfaeschwader 200, which remained under formal 
Luftwaffe oversight but controlled special squadrons 
which serviced the Jaadverbande. using Heinkels and 
captured enemy aircraft to drop German saboteurs behind 
enemy lines.16
The actual working components of the Jacrverbande 
were platoon-size "Jaadkommandos11. which in turn were
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grouped into sub-regional companies called Jaqdeinsatz 
(eg. Jaqdeinsatz Italien. Jaqdeinsatz Bulqarien. 
Jaqdeinsatz Balticum. etc.). Each Jaqdverband consisted 
of three to eight commando companies and a central staff, 
while Mitte was composed of three infantry companies plus 
an armoured reconnaissance unit. Although Skorzeny 
received permission to recruit as many as five thousand 
men, only Mitte had achieved its full complement by the 
end of 1944, while the four regional battalions were 
approximately seventy percent complete.17 Judging from 
available figures, it seems that individual J aqdverband 
size ranged from four hundred to six hundred men.18
Organizationally, the Jaqdverbande were obviously in 
a stronger position than the Werwolf due to the fact that 
the regional components were not merely loosely 
subordinate to an Inspectorate, but were directly 
responsible to Skorzeny, who, in turn, had direct access 
to Hitler. Moreover, the Jaqdverbande benefitted from 
inclusion within the RSHA and inherited access to the 
same sources of supply and manpower available to its 
predecessors, the SS-Friedenthal Formation and the 
Brandenburg Division. Obviously, these advantages 
weakened toward the spring of 1945 —  when supplies ran
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short and communications broke down19 —  but these final 
blows were at least caused by the progress of the war and 
not by the kind of bureaucratic folly that had 
artificially weakened the Werwolf.
It is also important to note that Skorzeny's units 
were composed of better human material than the ranks of 
inexperienced, insincere, or desperate individuals who 
were forced into the Werwolf. Rather, many members of 
the J aqdverbande were bequeathed by its parent 
organizations, and having been recruited at the high 
water mark of the Wehrmacht' s success, they were 
expressions of German victory rather than German defeat. 
Although it is true that a considerable percentage of 
these men were non-German soldiers of fortune, their pro- 
Nazi political convictions were supported by strong 
psychological factors, such as the pride of belonging to 
elite units and an ethos of military professionalism.
The J aqdverbande also possessed some tactical 
advantages over the Werwolf, such as the greater size and 
mobility of its raiding parties, whereas the Werwolf 
Gruppen were small and were usually tied to their behind- 
the-lines bunkers.20 J aqdverbande raiding groups were 
platoon-size detachments which infiltrated enemy
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territory —  often dressed in civilian clothes or enemy 
uniforms —  and camped in wooded areas for a period as 
long as four weeks. Each Trupp was divided into four 
six-man squads which worked independently, unless 
concentrated upon a major target, and which usually 
operated upon the basis of intelligence provided by local 
collaborators.21 KG 200 also facilitated such work, 
dropping over six hundred commandos into the enemy rear 
during the last eight months of the war,22 some of them 
anti-Soviet provocateurs dressed in American uniforms.23 
Such activity gives the lie to several published works 
which imply that Skorzeny's force was underemployed? 
rather, it is probable that many such missions are 
unrecorded because the men thus deployed met their fate 
in isolated pockets of resistance and therefore did not 
return to tell the tale.24 In any case, it is notable 
that Allied Intelligence noted a rise in sabotage 
problems as soon as the Jaqdverbande were activated.25
Aside from raiding parties, the main Jaqdverband-FAK 
activity was to establish training camps for foreign 
guerrillas, and the laying of supply dumps for such 
groups active in enemy territory? the FAKs, for instance 
laid literally thousands of supply caches in both western
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and eastern Europe.26 As with all developments in German 
guerrilla warfare, however, the process of supporting 
foreign partisans was made acutely uncomfortable by 
inter-departmental rivalries, in this case between the 
new Jaadverbande. which were full of Nazi fire and fury, 
and the fading FAKs, which still retained some of the 
spirit of the Abwehr. FAK officers tended to regard 
their Amt VI counterparts as dilettantes and 
apparatchniks who lacked any understanding of partisan 
warfare, and therefore deserved to be frozen out of 
various programs and manoeuvres? in France, for instance, 
FAK officers blithely refused Jaadverband Sudwest the use 
of any of one thousand sabotage dumps which had been laid 
before the German retreat.
In the East, former Abwehr officers felt that the 
RSHA had long contributed to the deliberate alienation of 
independent nationalist groups —  such as UPA and the AK 
—  which the Abwehr had hoped to convert to a pro-German 
course. In fact, there were a number of instances on the 
Eastern Front where the military and Abwehr armed groups 
that the SS was simultaneously hunting. The most open 
confrontation occurred in Latvia in late 1944, when the 
Waffen-SS and Jaadverband Ost apparently inspired a
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clumsy German attempt to forcibly "levy" members of a 
semi-independent Latvian partisan group —  the "Kurelis" 
organization —  which had already established a close 
working relationship with FAK 212. In the process, the 
entire Latvian guerrilla program was ruined, and German 
relations with Latvian nationalists in general were 
thrown into an uproar which lasted until the end of the
27war .'
In western Europe, however, the guerrilla program 
suffered from even worse problems than organizational 
infighting, since the entire effort was based upon the 
fallacious assumption that pro-German collaborators 
actually possessed a broad appeal, or at least that such 
an appeal would develop once the various provisional 
democratic regimes proved incapable of stopping Communism 
or maintaining order. French and Italian commandos were 
diligently trained for sabotage activities in the Allied 
rear, but they were usually quickly captured once 
airdropped or infiltrated through the front lines, a 
repeated process which eventually led Allied intelligence 
agencies to wonder why the RSHA even bothered with the 
effort.28 Of course, there were some isolated successes: 
in France, a few "White Maquis" groups were reinforced by
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air-dropped German weapons and paratroopers, and they 
maintained an elusive presence in various southern 
mountain chains? while in Italy, German agents were 
credited with helping to provoke the anti-conscription 
uprising which rocked Sicily in the winter of 1944-45.29 
There was also some suspicion by Allied authorities that 
French and Belgian commandos were given special orders to 
create diversions in order to support the Ardennes and 
Alsace counter-offensives in late 1944.30
It was in the East, however, that efforts to spur 
guerrilla warfare paid truly handsome dividends, even 
despite the lack of amity between the German control 
organizations supporting such activity. A German report, 
for instance, noted that no less than six hundred anti- 
Soviet guerrilla attacks had been launched in the western 
Soviet Union during the second half of 1944, and another 
intelligence report in February 1945 noted that Soviet 
lines of communication were so harassed and disrupted 
that the Red Army was experiencing difficulty in 
resupplying Soviet forces at the front.31 All along the 
length of the battleline, J aqdverbande and FAK units 
trained anti-communist commandos who were then sent —  or 
left —  in the enemy rear,32 specifically in the
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Ukraine,33 Byelorussia,34 Poland,35 the Baltic States,36 
Hungary,37 Rumania,38 Bulgaria,39 Greece,40 Croatia,41 and 
Serbia?42 in fact, the whole operation was so successful 
and had such a unity of theme and purpose that General 
Gehlen even suggested coordinating the pro-German 
guerrilla groups under an umbrella organization called 
the "Secret Federation of Green Partisans."43 As in the 
West, there is also evidence that the Germans hoped to 
augment a major counter-offensive —  this one in the Lake 
Balaton region of Hungary —  not only with guerrilla 
warfare, but with full scale uprisings in several Soviet- 
occupied countries.44
Special mention should be made of the attempt to use 
German stragglers and Volksdeutsch civilians stranded 
behind Soviet lines in Eastern Europe, a project also 
under the direction of Skorzeny. According to German 
intelligence reports, thousands of German stragglers and 
Volksdeutschen were trapped in the Soviet rear during 
1943-44, and such elements gradually transformed into 
guerrilla groups or joined existing nationalist bands, 
particulary UPA.45 To exploit this resource, Skorzeny 
organized small Jaadverband paratroop teams which dropped 
into the Soviet hinterland, either to help these groups
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conduct guerrilla warfare or lead them back to German 
lines.46
The single most intensive effort was directed toward 
Transylvania and the Rumanian Banat, with their 
substantial German-speaking minorities. Volksdeutsch 
refugees from these areas were trained for partisan 
warfare and parachuted back into the Soviet rear, 
including such senior Nazi officials as Andreas Schmidt, 
the Rumanian Volkscrruppenf uhrer. Together with German 
stragglers and Rumanian fascists, these commandos 
succeeded in causing considerable disruption along Soviet 
lines of communication: supply trains were reportedly
ambushed? Soviet troops were waylaid or poisoned with 
toxic plum brandy; and the Red Army headquarters in 
Brasov was blown up (28 February 1945). Schmidt and his 
associates ran loose behind Soviet lines until they were 
gradually rounded up by Soviet and Rumanian security 
agencies in 1945? Schmidt himself was wounded in an air 
crash and captured by the Rumanians, who, in turn, 
quickly handed him over to the Russians.47
In early 1945, R-Aufaaben. or stay-behind resistance 
tasks, were also delegated to both the Jaadverbande and 
the FAKs, the "R-Plan" stipulating that whole
Jaqdkommandos and sub-regional companies be left in the 
enemy rear, preferably within the territory of the 
Greater Reich: the codeword for such operations, not 
incidentally, was "Werwolf.” Cut-off in the enemy 
hinterland, the commando units were supposed to continue 
aid to pro-German resistance movements in adjacent 
countries and also to cooperate closely with the 
Priitzmann organization. Along the central section of the 
Eastern Front, for instance, much of the Bohemian 
"Werwolf11 was in fact formed from military reconnaissance 
units attached to Army Group "Mitte." and Jagdverband 
Sudost also attempted to establish secret underground 
hideouts in eastern Austria and Moravia before its orders 
were hastily changed in April because of the unexpected 
magnitude of the Soviet advance.48 Sudost then retreated 
into the Alps where it was supposed to play a role in an 
expanded version of the R-Aufqabe called Schutzkorps 
Alpenland. of which more will be said later.
While Skorzeny's commando units were undertaking so- 
called "Werwolf" activities, the domestic agencies of the 
RSHA were also beginning to seep into the formal sphere 
of Unternehmen Werwolf. At the time of the Werwolf1 s 
formation in September 1944, it became clear that the
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placement of stay-behind espionage agents would be 
necessary in order to form an intelligence network to 
service the Werwolf and other German commando groups. In 
some cases, these stay-behind missions inevitably 
developed a more active aspect than mere observation, as 
intelligence agents received independent instructions to 
engage in sabotage and subversion.
Organizationally, the domestic secret police section 
of the RSHA was sub-divided between two Amts, the SD- 
Inland or Amt III, and the Gestapo, or Amt IV. The 
former was designed to survey public opinion and carry 
out the surveillance of opposition groups, which 
supposedly served the intelligence needs of the Gestapo 
and the Criminal Police, or Kripo. The Gestapo. on the 
other hand, was the executive arm of the secret police, 
which initiated more limited investigations and arrested 
security suspects. The SD-Inland was a Party 
organization and was financed from Party funds, which 
made it virtually independent of normal RSHA control. 
The Gestapo was a state organization which consisted of 
a centralized conglomeration of the political police 
departments formed by the various Lander during the 
Weimar era.
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As the most intellectual and self-important of the 
German police agencies, the SD in particular had 
difficulty envisioning the continuation of life in any 
area of the occupied Reich without itself constantly 
monitoring such workings of society. At first, plans for 
the continuation of such surveillance were confined to 
occupied areas of the Rhineland; no similar schemes were 
laid for eastern territories occupied by the Soviets, 
since the SD took the view that the Russians would 
depopulate the eastern provinces by expulsion of the 
population to Siberia.49
In September 1944, when the Werwolf was formed, 
there was also considerable pressure for the continuation 
of SD activities in occupied areas? apparently this 
pressure came both from above —  Goebbels, Bormann, 
Hitler, and Himmler —  and from below, namely the various 
Amt III Gruppenleiters. The SD Amtschef, Gruppenfiihrer 
Otto Ohlendorf, discussed the matter with Himmler and 
Schellenberg, each of whom agreed that an information 
service would have to be maintained in occupied areas of 
the Reich. Thereafter, Ohlendorf dispatched
Obersturmbannfuhrer Rolf Hoppner on a tour of the SD 
Abschnitte in Strasbourg, Metz, Koblenz, Cologne and
268
Dusseldorf, which were the areas most threatened with 
enemy occupation. Hoppner's task was to outline the 
scheme and question the Abschnitte about their technical 
requirements for signals communications. on his return 
journey to Berlin, Hoppner also spoke to the 
Abschnittsleiters of Dortmund and Bielefeld, but they 
each felt that the organization of stay-behind networks 
in their cities was superfluous, since Allied penetration 
to this depth would spell the loss of the Ruhr and the 
consequent end of the war.
The western Abschnitte were faced with considerable 
problems in their given tasks. For one thing, their best 
agents and informers were constantly being drawn into the 
military, the Volkssturm, alarm-units, or a rival SD 
intelligence service called the Bundschuh. However, it 
was felt that a small but possibly adequate number of 
personnel was available, especially if pro-Nazi Alsatians 
and Lorrainers were employed. An even worse problem 
concerned the unpreparedness of SD agents for work in 
enemy territory? in Germany, after all, they had 
communicated their findings by means of telegraph, 
teleprinter or courier service, and therefore lacked the 
slightest experience in the operation of radio
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transmitting equipment. Ohlendorf instructed the 
Abschnitte to proceed with the training of personnel, 
while he negotiated with Schellenberg for the provision 
of both radio equipment and operators. Amt VI was able 
to provide the former but not the latter, and there 
matters rested until the loss of Metz and Strasbourg, the 
first large cities within the projected sphere of 
operations.
The subsequent troubles experienced by the western 
Abschnitte were perhaps typified by the fate of 
Unternehmen Zucrvogel. the projected SD stay-behind 
network in Metz. The plans for Zuqvoqel were developed 
in September 1944, shortly after Ohlendorf had issued 
orders for a western German information service, and they 
were placed in the hands of Haupsturmbannfuhrer Dupin. 
Throughout the fall, little progress was made because of 
the shortage of either radio equipment or technicians to 
instruct SD men in radio procedure. Late in the year, 
Dupin travelled to Berlin to meet Sturmbannfiihrer Siepen, 
Director of the Havel Institute and the competent signals 
authority for Amt VI. Siepen told his guest that because 
of the lack of time in which to train SD radio operators, 
the only possible method of connection would be short
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range transmissions between agents and aircraft flying 
overhead. This shifted the crux of the problem toward 
getting aircraft, a matter which was naturally referred 
to KG 200. This was as far as the plan proceeded; KG 200 
was desperately overworked during this period and could 
not spare the aircraft required for the transmission of 
information back to unoccupied territory.50
Despite such problems the SD continued its attempt 
to organize local information networks in threatened 
areas, even after the Rhine was forged —  as late as mid- 
April, Ohlendorf instructed one of his section chiefs to 
establish a behind-the-lines information service in 
Saxony.51 All available evidence indicates that these 
networks rarely functioned properly, if indeed, they 
developed beyond the planning stage. "Shortage of W/T 
sets hampers the work of stay-behind agents", said a 
SHAEF report, "and though their network produces some 
information it is much less than the Germans intended".52
The more basic matter of organizing an SD resistance 
network to survive the total defeat of Germany was so 
sensitive that, as Hoppner later noted, "no responsible 
person in Germany dared admit such a possibility".53 
Nevertheless, even as early as the spring of 1944, SD
agents in the East privately discussed the matter amongst 
themselves,54 and in February 1945, two SD section 
chiefs, Standartenfuhrer Spengler and Obersturmbannfuhrer 
von Kielpinski, came to Ohlendorf with plans for a post­
defeat intelligence service. The Amtschef at first 
turned down the plan, believing that such a "defeatist" 
suggestion would cost him his life, but he eventually 
reconsidered because of the likelihood that the Western 
Allies would consider both him and his senior officers as 
war criminals. Kaltenbrunner would decide neither for 
nor against the project, so Ohlendorf proceeded, 
believing that the network could continue to secretly 
serve any German government serving under Allied 
administration. He claimed in postwar interrogations 
that he had intended to place the network at the disposal 
of the Allies in order to prevent chaos in Germany? this 
may have been true, but Allied intelligence officials 
regarded the plan as "intended ultimately to be an 
effective means of resistance".55
The original plan in March 1945 called for the 
withdrawal of most prominent SD officers from threatened 
areas, but provided for the stay-behind of three 
officials per Abschnitt, plus a number of low-profile
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collaborators or "confidence men" (V-Manner) who were 
reliable but politically unknown. These small contact 
groups, or Nachrichtenkopfe. were to form focal points 
for the surviving intelligence service, the national 
centre of which was supposed to be a secret SD 
headquarters in the Harzgebirge. The movement was 
geographically divided into four sections, a Northern and 
Southern sector, each in turn divided into an Eastern and 
Western district. In addition, there were supposed to be 
numerous sub-divisions with contact points, or 
Anlaufstellen. as the centres of each.56 The whole 
network was to be tied together by a primitive courier 
system.
Needless to say, the organization of the network did 
not proceed according to this well-ordered plan. In a 
staff meeting with the Abschnittsleiters from central 
Germany on 3 April, it became clear to Ohlendorf that "it 
was too late to form a successful underground 
intelligence network and that the Harz offered no real 
concealment facilities for an Intelligence headquarters". 
As US forces advanced toward the Harz, efforts to provide 
SD stay-behind teams with supplies —  including such 
unusual items as mourning clothes and hand organs —  met
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the same response from the RSHA supply service that 
earlier Werwolf requests had inspired, i.e., they were 
flatly refused. Worse yet, almost all the regional SD 
officers sent telegrams to Berlin indicating severe 
difficulties in their tasks and appealing for further 
instructions. Only the head of the Brunswick Abschnitt 
volunteered to stay in his area and serve as a focal 
point for the new intelligence network; however, he was 
quickly taken prisoner by the Americans, and although he 
managed to escape, he was so shaken by the experience 
that he declined to seek further refuge in his own 
Abschnitt. but rather fled to Berlin.57
The same problems with radio equipment that had 
inhibited the organization of regional intelligence 
networks in the western Abschnitte also caused 
difficulties in the broader, long-range program. The 
need for transmitting and receiving sets was addressed by 
Kielpinski, who made a painstaking but futile attempt to 
secure such equipment directly from the RSHA supply 
service. Failing the attainment of radios, the best that 
was hoped for was the relay of intelligence by means of 
basic human contact. Moreover, Ohlendorf was sceptical 
that either couriers or the core-members of the
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Nachrichtenkopfe could be protected by false ID papers —  
"The longer the use of false identity cards was 
considered, the more its futility was appreciated, as it 
was found that it had become extremely difficult to live 
in Germany under a false name". Thus, apart from a few 
"useless remnants" left in place at Dresden, Berlin, 
Brunswick and Bremen, no proper reporting channels were 
ever organized, nor were any reports from the system ever 
received by the SD central staff.58
After their capture in late May —  following the 
break-up of the Donitz regime —  Ohlendorf and his 
subordinates claimed that they had opposed the 
organization of violent underground resistance; indeed 
Ohlendorf maintained that the prospective SD intelligence 
network was supposed to include Nazi resistance groups 
among the objects of its observation.59 This may or may 
not be true, but it is clear that the most senior Nazi 
warlords disliked Ohlendorf —  the SD*s reports on German 
public opinion late in the war had been too realistic for 
easy consumption —  and they therefore by-passed his 
chain of command in organizing a more dependable 
underground intelligence service.
Party hierarchs also disliked Gestapo chief Heinrich
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Muller, the professional Munich policeman who had 
actually fought the Party during the Kampfzeit and was 
therefore long refused Party membership, even several 
years after he had assumed control of the regime's chief 
instrument of coercion. By 1945, Muller's
professionalism had begun to resurface at the expense of 
his late-blooming Nazi zeal, and as a man with roots in 
the soil he tended to see matters more clearly than some 
of the leaders of the Hitler-Himmler stripe, lost in the 
clouds of Nordic mythology and Wagnerian romance. Unable 
to fool himself, Muller contemptuously noted that 
Unternehmen Werwolf was "entirely a forced effort"? that 
the Party was "contaminating itself with this sort of 
thing"? and that any resistance effort would result in 
vicious enemy reprisals.60 Muller and Ohlendorf, 
although they despised one another, were linked by their 
common effort to improve the means of repression by 
constantly monitoring the pulse of the nation? as a 
result, they were the first senior figures to recognize 
the lack of grass-roots appeal for anything approximating 
a Nazi resistance movement.
In view of such "defeatist" sentiments, Himmler by­
passed both men and their staffs, which meant a direct
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approach to the regional offices of the SD and the 
Gestapo in order to construct an underground intelligence 
system supposedly charged with the true spirit of Nazi 
resistance. To do this, the Reichsfuhrer resorted to 
using regional SS-Police officials as organizers, the 
same tactic used during the formation of the Werwolf. In 
this case, the chosen instruments were the Befehlshaber 
der Sicherheitspolizei as well as the Kommissioner der 
Sicherheitspolizei (KdS), the latter a series of 
positions created in the summer of 1944 to oversee the 
joint operational control of the Gestapo and Kripo.61 As 
with the Werwolf, these SS officials were employed 
because of their control over regional offices of the 
secret police, particularly the Gestapo and the SD.
It is not clear whether the system of intelligence 
networks so established comprised a union of local 
organizations, or whether each regional group —  despite 
its similarity to the others —  was actually independent; 
the latter scheme in fact seems more likely, since 
occasionally two or more similar networks functioned in 
the same area. On the other hand, an informer within one 
of these organizations told Allied interrogators in June 
1945 that a central headquarters, located somewhere in
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Europe, controlled all the local secret police resistance 
organizations based in the Gaue.62 Whatever the case, 
the dominant organization in the northwest was "Aktion 
Bundschuh," a name recalling the secret peasant 
organizations established during the 15th century, while 
in the southwest it was Elsa, and in the southeast 
Siarune.
The first Bundschuh-type organization was organized 
in Alsace and Baden in late August 1944, and Allied 
intelligence reports in the fall of 1944 indicated that 
the Gestaoo was then forming resistance networks in south 
Baden. Lest such precautions be judged as "defeatist", 
Gestapo organizers explained that "the General Staff 
expected a possibility [of occupation] but that the 
German forces would soon return".63
This initial effort was followed by a three-page 
order from Himmler to all regional BdS (15 January 1945) 
which outlined the need for an organized information and 
sabotage service in occupied areas.64 Himmler1s order 
was supplemented by further decrees from Kaltenbrunner, 
most of which arrived at the offices of local SS police 
officials in March or early April. These were 
activization orders which called for groups of line-
278
crossers to establish information nets in occupied 
territory; the information from each group was to be 
relayed by pigeons or radio, and once received by German 
officials in unoccupied areas, was to be immediately 
addressed to Berlin. Such orders were to be "executed 
without delay", and the text thereafter burned.65
In April, local formations of the Bundschuh system 
began to take shape in the remaining unoccupied zones of 
Germany. These local groups were dominated either by the 
SD, as in Dresden and Bremen, or by the Gestapo, as in 
Wiirttemburg; there was also limited involvement by the 
SD-Ausland as well as by the Kripo. The Bundschuh was 
especially active in the Bremen area and along the
northern edge of the Liineberg Heath, where it was
organized by the commander of the Hamburg Sipo. while 
Elsa's main base was in Wiirttemberg, where it was
commanded by an ex-Abwehr officer, Hauptsturmfiihrer 
Renndorfer.66 In fact, these were the two main centers 
of activity for the Bundschuh-Elsa-Siarune network.
Recruits for the system were drawn mainly from the 
SD or Gestapo regional offices, but the results were 
usually meagre. SS-Police officers were typically given 
a choice of either joining the Waffen-SS or the
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underground, and it was a measure of the unpopularity of 
the latter that most officers opted for the Waffen-SS. 
The Baden Bundschuh. for instance, could muster only 
fifteen volunteers, and the organization could do only 
marginally better in Munich and Bremen, the former of 
which yielded twenty members and the latter fifty.67 
Elsa, on the other hand, was quickly built up to a 
strength of one hundred and fifty to two hundred 
volunteers, one quarter of whom were female.68
In several areas, a more thoughtful approach was 
made to recruitment, based upon the natural expectation 
that security officials would be the first target of 
Allied round-ups, and that any organizations built upon 
their participation would thereby be fatally weakened. 
In Augsburg the local Gestapo chief made arrangements in 
late March to have recruiters draw-up lists of 
politically inconspicuous individuals who were unmarked 
by close association with the NSDAP, and could thus 
continue to function as Siqrune agents once the area was 
occupied.69 In Dresden, SD and Gestapo officers 
attempted to recruit industrial managers and businessmen 
for participation in Sigrune.70
These organizations evolved so rapidly that the
purpose originally intended —  that of providing 
intelligence for both Wehrmacht and the Werwolf —  was 
soon surpassed by an intention to form the Bundschuh. 
Elsa and Siarune themselves into sabotage groups.71 This 
change of purpose resulted from an almost natural 
extension of the normal activities of the SD, namely the 
collection of information and the direction of German 
public opinion. The SD was familiar with the tactic of 
delivering implicit threats to force opinion in the 
desired direction, but it was realized that in occupied 
areas, mere threats would no longer always suffice. For 
this purpose, Bundschuh and its companion organizations 
made plans not only to collect information and intimidate 
collaborators, but also to punish its opponents through 
murder and the destruction of property.72 Several 
Bundschuh assassins —  seconded from the Gestapo —  were 
captured by the Americans near Bensheim while on their 
way to carry out a mission, and in Freiburg a 
Polizeimaior was actually murdered by a Bundschuh 
operative on charges of failing to cooperate with the 
Werwolf.73
The Bundschuh system was also awarded further 
responsibilities because of the anaemic performance of
Unternehmen Werwolf, and its inability to fulfil its 
supposedly central role in the realm of guerrilla 
warfare. By April, Bundschuh and Elsa organizers had 
been told to initiate their own sabotage actions 
"independent of" —  but in aid of —  Werwolf activities. 
These missions aimed at the impediment of rail traffic, 
the destruction of bridges, and the burning of goods 
confiscated by the Allies, and it is known that in Hesse, 
at least, an eight-man Bundschuh team was actually 
dispatched on such sabotage missions.74 Moreover, 
because of the breakdown of Werwolf in southwest Germany, 
Elsa was given the task of organizing isolated Werwolf 
Gruppen and bands of German soldiers which survived in 
the enemy rear. Members of Elsa were supposed to seize 
command of these so-called "wild groups" and bring them 
under control, although no one except the commander was 
supposed to share knowledge of the greater organization. 
Elsa agents were authorized to use "any methods" 
necessary to bring these guerrilla bands under control, 
and "undesirable members" were to be either expelled or 
shot.75
In order to undertake such missions, agents of the 
Bundschuh network were formed into a command structure
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based upon the Zuge, and advancing upwards to the Gruppe 
and Kommando. the last of which was the basic local unit 
of control. In many areas, Bundschuh-Elsa members were 
formed into three man terror squads aimed at committing 
sabotage, assassinating Burqermeisters. and attacking 
Allied troops. They were also supposed to carry out a 
"vigorous recruiting program", forming focal points for 
the construction of guerrilla bands based upon Wehrmacht 
stragglers or civilians loyal to the Nazi cause.76 In 
Elsdorf, a Gestapo agent with an order to kill west 
German Burqermeisters was actually found within the 
confines of the city, and was suspected of stalking the 
mayor.77
Women in the Bundschuh organizations were either 
formed into special line-crosser and liaison units or 
were attached to the regular Gruppen. Since the women 
were often young and attractive, it was expected that 
they could, "get information that the men could not get", 
as an Allied report delicately stated. The basic intent 
was to use female agents to seduce Allied officers and 
thereafter take note of interesting pillow-talk, 
especially information regarding Allied round-ups of Nazi 
resistance fighters. It was even rumoured that
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secretaries from the SD bureaucracy would be employed for 
the dangerous job of capturing Allied officers to be used 
as hostages.78
To undertake such escapades, agents of the Bundschuh 
system were naturally supplied with arms, supplies and 
false identity papers. The weapons included grenades, 
handguns, small arms and Panzerfauste. and the supplies 
consisted of basic food items, a medical kit, sleeping 
bag, poison suicide tablets, and a supply of saccharin 
intended for barter with locals. These provisions were 
supplemented from supply dumps laid by the SD. The false 
papers included a bogus Kennkarte and 
Ausmustierunaschein. plus various other papers of lesser 
consequence, as well as phoney letters addressed to the 
bearer in his assumed name and address.79 The general 
quality of these documents was very poor? the Kennkarte. 
for instance, violated the standard German practice of 
always showing the left ear of the bearer in the 
accompanying photo, and papers for the Bremen Bundschuh 
were done in the wrong kind of ink, and lacked the proper 
stamp. By May, the Allies had alerted their military 
security forces to look for such defects, the watchword 
being, "The right ear is the Werewolf ear."80
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Ironically, although the Bundschuh and its sister 
organizations were originally intended as intelligence 
nets, they never received radio transmitters,81 largely 
because of the same problems that had simultaneously 
debilitated Ohlendorf's SD intelligence service. In 
place of a radio net contact was maintained by a 
primitive courier system, so that messages were passed on 
verbally or by means of coded letters. Couriers formed 
the sole means of contact between Kommandos and were 
therefore the weak point in the organization —  the Elsa 
group, for instance, was given a fatal blow when one of 
the organization's three main couriers defected to the 
Americans on 3 May, bringing with him detailed 
information on the organization's central command 
structure plus eight of its twenty Kommandos.82
The Bundschuh network also suffered from other 
problems as well as a crude system of communications. 
The very nature of the organization made it ineffective: 
because it was organized so late, everyone knew it would 
fail? because it was presented as an alternative to the 
Waffen-SS, it drew slackers and cowards; and because it 
provided false identity papers to its recruits, it proved 
a handy method of concealment for secret police agents
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who knew they were marked by the occupation regime. In 
short, as noted by an Allied intelligence agency, 
recruits to the Bundschuh-type services regarded these 
groups "as a means of dropping from sight, returning 
home, and becoming civilians again."83 Thus, there were 
numerous reports of Bundschuh members who dutifully 
collected their supplies and false IDs, and then, after 
setting forth on their missions, suddenly realized "that 
they were not doing anyone any good, least of all 
themselves" ; this thought-process was typically concluded 
by a decision to quietly abandon their tasks and return 
home.84
The final point of refuge for much of the detritus 
of the RSHA was the so-called "Alpine Redoubt", which 
despite its elevation was in effect a sink hole which 
sucked-in the numerous odds and ends of the dying regime. 
Kaltenbrunner —  who was placed in charge of the area —  
arrived in late April, along with a miniature army of 
adjutants and aides. He hoped that the Allied fear of an 
Alpine Fortress, which the RSHA had itself sponsored, 
could be used to cajole the enemy into recognizing an 
"independent" Austrian regime backed by the Austrian 
elite of the RSHA, particularly Skorzeny and
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Kaltenbrunner himself.85
After this scheme failed, Kaltenbrunner and several 
aides retreated into the Totesgebirge, near Alt Aussee, 
a retreat which the RSHA chief favoured, even over one 
recommended by Skorzeny, because of the presence of a 
local RSHA cell equipped with a radio. Although 
Kaltenbrunner lacked faith in the prospect of an Alpine 
Maquis, he sought to use the radio to maintain contact 
with regional underground groups throughout Germany, 
which in turn could be used to sustain resistance against 
the Soviets. He also held the mistaken view that the 
local populace would help him survive; in truth, however, 
the very guide who led him to the mountain hut willingly 
provided this information to the American occupation 
forces, and several days after the capitulation the same 
guide led two platoons of US troops who overran 
Kaltenbrunner' s hide-out.86
Since it was hoped that the RSHA could be 
reconstituted in some remote fold of the Alps to serve as 
the coordinating agency for sabotage and guerrilla 
warfare throughout enemy occupied territory,87 other key 
elements of the organizatipn also conglomerated in the 
mountains. The SD-Inland. for instance, sent south a
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number of representatives after the abandonment of the 
projected Harzgebirge redoubt, particularly the two 
officers who had originally suggested the construction of 
an SD underground, von Kielpinski and Spengler. Since 
Ohlendorf himself fled north to Flensburg, mainly as a 
result of Himmler's direct order to do so, Spengler was 
designated as his main representative in the South and 
was supposed to cooperate with Skorzeny in the 
construction of an underground "terror organization".88 
Another notable presence in the Alps was the staff of the 
infamous RSHA Jewish Affairs Bureau, the mass-murder 
directorate whose chief, Adolf Eichmann, was assigned the 
task of forming a partisan force in the Totesgebirge 
based upon rag-tag RSHA elements and Rumanian fascists 
who had retreated into the area.89
Naturally, the central figure in this final RSHA 
effort was Skorzeny, whose commando brigade comprised the 
potential muscle of the Alpine Maouis. Despite his 
aptitude for commando operations, Skorzeny apparently had 
little appreciation for the overall course of the war, 
and only became actively interested in the Alpine Redoubt 
after the collapse of the Rhineland Front: as late as 
February 1945, when Schellenburg held a discussion on the
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need for underground preparations within Amt VI, Skorzeny 
interpreted the suggestion as "defeatist” and immediately 
tattled to Kaltenbrunner.90 By March, however, even the 
most determined Nazi realized that the only hope for a 
final stand was in the Alps, and Skorzeny accepted 
willingly when he was ordered by Kaltenbrunner (31 March 
1945) to transfer his staff into the mountains. After 
several meetings with Feldmarschall Schorner, who 
commanded the adjacent front in Czechoslovakia, it was 
decided to form an Alpine guerrilla movement which was to 
engage in espionage, perform small acts of sabotage, and 
generally keep itself ready to play an active role in the 
impending clash between the Western Allies and the Soviet 
Union, almost certainly on the side of the West. 
According to a participant in these meetings, the 
movement was also supposed to maintain close relations 
with other anti-Soviet groups, particularly those in the 
Ukraine and Poland, thus continuing the usual work of the 
J aadverbande.91
This guerrilla movement began to take shape on 15 
April 1945, when Skorzeny and Kaltenbrunner issued final 
directives calling for the Jaadverbande to gather in the 
Alps under the new title of Schutzkoros Alpenland. The
Friedenthal headquarters company and two hundred and 
fifty men from Mitte had already been transferred into 
the mountains, but the participation of the other 
battalions was problematic: Ost, Nprdwest, the paratroop 
unit and much of Mitte had already been destroyed in 
conventional fighting on the Oder Front, where Skorzeny 
had briefly served as a divisional commander in early 
1945, although a small successor to Ost. called battalion 
Ost II, was probably expected to withdraw into the 
mountains along with Schorner's Army Group. Sudwest, 
meanwhile, was largely deployed on suicidal R-Aufqaben in 
western Germany. Thus, only Siidost was able to pull 
considerable resources into the mountains, although it is 
likely that at least one Sudwest Jaqdkommando also 
succeeded in reaching the Bavarian Alps near Oberstdorf. 
It was also assumed, however, that Alpenland could 
recruit further adherents from the civilian population in 
South Germany.92
Skorzeny also visited local Army and Waffen-SS 
headquarters, attempting to convince the unit commanders 
to join him if their forces withdrew into the highlands. 
A few agreed,93 but before this moraine was effectively 
driven ahead of the Allied advance, ninety percent of the
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military manpower in the mountains was comprised of rear 
echelon troops who had been evacuated into the region. 
A few days before the end of the war, a desperate attempt 
was made to block entrance into the mountains for 
anything except organized combat units, and an attempt 
was also made to send civilian refugees out of the 
mountains and back to their home areas in the enemy 
occupied lowlands:94 both measures, of course, were too 
late to have much practical effect.
Hitler also decided in late April that an effort 
must be made to utilize the rear echelon troops already 
in the Alps, and for this purpose all offices of the 
Wehrmacht not decisively engaged in the war were 
dissolved, and the affected officers were either sent to 
the Front, held for the Fuhrerreserven in the Redoubt, or 
given special discharge papers preparatory to deployment 
as Werwolf e in the enemy rear. In fact, a 
Sonderbeauftragter of the Fuhrerreserven. Oberstleutnant 
Ehrenspenger, was actually appointed to tour the Redoubt 
and choose suitable officers to serve as guerrillas.95 
Skorzeny also recommended the "Axmann Plan" to Hitler, 
whereby HJ recruits were transferred to the mountains and 
given Werwolf training by Jaadverband officers.96 An OSS
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report on 21 April estimated that as a result of all such 
efforts, Skorzeny had collected a hundred thousand troops 
and partisans under his command,97 although this seems a 
considerable over-estimate.
Based upon this uncertain force, a start was 
actually made toward activating the Aloenland 
organization: three months rations were distributed to
a core group of several thousand men; large RSHA 
financial resources were transferred to Skorzeny and 
buried in the hills? a rough radio net was established, 
centered upon a main station called "Brieftaube" ? and a 
massive central supply dump was established in a copper 
mine near Bischofshaven, Austria. This latter
installation was stocked with three quarters of a million 
items of small arms, grenades and ammunition, plus two 
thousand cases of explosives. After the dump's existence 
was eventually revealed to the Allies by Skorzeny, it was 
described as "the most important sabotage discovery so 
far made in the European Theatre".98
No amount of eleventh hour effort, however, was 
sufficient to overcome the debilitating circumstances 
surrounding the ill-fated Redoubt. Actual "Letzi"-type 
positions had been prepared only on the southern and
western edges of the mountains —  facing Italy and 
Switzerland —  and there had been few long-term efforts 
to stockpile supplies or develop essential industries 
within the region. It is true that after the American 
12th Army Group crossed the Rhine, suggestions to fortify 
the northern approaches to the Alps were taken to heart 
at Fiihrer headquarters, but the resulting Hitler 
directive was dated 20 April, only two weeks before the 
final cessation of hostilities." Nevertheless, an OKW 
officer in the area later recalled that grandiose plans 
were still handed down from on high as late as 29 April, 
calling for the construction of underground ammunition 
factories and even aircraft plants.100 Moreover —  as 
noted above —  the Alps were overrun by an influx of 
military and civilian bureaucrats, which the Bavarians 
and Austrians contemptuously called "the northern 
invasion."
Perhaps worst of all, there was no sign of the ten 
or twelve fresh Waffen-SS and Gebirgsiaoer divisions 
which could perhaps have helped defend the passes into 
the mountains. Furthermore, the Wehrmacht was severely 
constrained by Hitler's usual tactic of issuing do-or-die 
orders aimed at defending forward positions rather than
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favouring a voluntary withdrawal to more defensible 
terrain. Thus, most of the German forces in the so- 
called "Alpenvorland" —  both north and south of the 
massif —  were destroyed in the last half of April, 
before they had a chance to retreat: along the northern
edge of the mountains, for instance, two thirds of the 
defence force was wiped out before reaching the Redoubt 
proper, and the remaining three hundred thousand men were 
dispersed to such an extent that they fled into the hills 
as a disorganized rabble.101
These developments and revelations apparently came 
as shock to Skorzeny, who, like many Germans, had 
believed the same SD disinformation which was fed out to 
the Allies but seeped back into Germany itself. 
Everywhere the commando chief was confronted with 
confusion and unpreparedness, and even the supreme 
warlords at the center of his limited universe had seemed 
to mislead him —  "I had imagined from all I had heard in 
Berlin", he later lamented, "that the necessary 
preparations had been completed long before".102
Such disappointments in the final month of the war 
conspired to turn Skorzeny into a most unpleasant 
character, along with the fact that the apparent commando
triumphs of the several previous years had swollen his 
ego to almost unmanageable proportions. Much of the 
confusion Skorzeny saw in the Alps was blamed upon the 
lack of a strong leader for the area,103 and the similar 
lack of a leader for sabotage activities in general: 
after all, Priitzmann was incompetent and —  in any case - 
- had fled north to Schleswig Holstein? the North German 
Schellenburg was not interested in the Redoubt and also 
displayed annoyingly moderate tendencies once the end of 
the war loomed near? Obergruppenfuhrer Wolff, the main SS 
officer in northern Italy, thought that the concept of a 
Redoubt was "madness,”104 and was busily negotiating a 
surrender to the Western Allies? while the garrison 
Commander in the northern Alps, Generalleutnant von 
Hengl, was opposed to guerrilla warfare on the grounds 
that it was pointless, and had even approved a staff 
memorandum to this effect which was sent to Bormann.105 
As for the formal Redoubt commander, General Schorner, he 
was favourable to partisan warfare but was busy 
desperately defending the Bohemian Basin from the Red 
Army.106
The egocentric Skorzeny, of course, sought to step 
into this vacuum and establish himself as the supreme
295
leader of the final guerrilla struggle. First, he 
convinced Kaltenbrunner to fire Schellenburg, whom 
Kaltenbrunner disliked in any case; in early April, 
Skorzeny thus replaced the more urbane and cosmopolitan 
Schellenburg as the overall chief of Amt VI.107 
Schellenburg, in any case, had already been abruptly 
informed by Skorzeny that anyone joining him in the Alps 
"would have to place themselves under his orders; 
everything else was rubbish". Toward the end of April, 
von Hengl was also sacked and replaced by the more pliant 
General Jacksch (although it is not clear that von 
Hengl1 s dismissal was directly attributable to Skorzeny's 
influence) .108
The commando chief, like Prtitzmann, also began to 
adopt the airs of a field marshal, transporting himself 
around in a personal headquarters train and grandly 
barking out orders to all and sundry. Such megalomania 
was a source of amusement to Kaltenbrunner, who nicknamed 
Skorzeny the "Partisan Napoleon",109 although it must also 
be noted that the RSHA leader more than put up with 
Skorzeny's antics and granted him almost carte blanche 
authority toward the end of the war.
Skorzeny's behaviour in the Alps ranged from
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overbearing to brutal. The wives and daughters of Alpine 
farmers, for instance, were thrown into the desperate 
last minute preparation of defence works and munitions 
depots with the usual heavy-handed Nazi methods —  often 
a threat of death for "traitors” who refused to join the 
fight —  and Skorzeny was also given command of an SS- 
Sicherheits Grenadier Battalion which combed the German 
rear for deserters and began to assume an aspect not 
unlike the infamous NKVD "blocking units" of 1941.110 
Such relations with both the military and the civilian 
population were unlikely to encourage the necessary dose 
of enthusiasm and local patriotism needed to sustain 
Alpine guerrillas over any appreciable period.
Moreover, Jacrverbande troops took part in a hostile 
multi-sided struggle over supplies and the use to which 
they would be put: in at least one case, Skorzeny
commandos forcibly commandeered a truck-full of weapons 
on its way to a rival Werwolf guerrilla band,111 while the 
organization's own supply dumps were by no means safe 
from civilian looting. In several cases, Jacrverband 
Sudost dumps were discovered and destroyed by retreating 
Wehrmacht forces.112
It is thus hardly surprising that once the Allies
arrived in the Alpine heartland, the Schutzkorps 
Aloenland was in no position to lead a popular guerrilla 
struggle against the invaders, although they reportedly 
undertook a few operations to prevent Allied looting. On 
8 May, Schutzkorps headquarters at Radstadt was evacuated 
and Skorzeny fled to the surrounding mountains along with 
the faithful Radi and several other SS officers.
According to Skorzeny, the rest of his Aloenland
guerrillas were given strict orders to also hide in the 
mountains and await further instructions, although it is 
apparent that many of his officers obeyed Donitz1 order 
to cease guerrilla activity and that they surrendered at 
the time of the general capitulation.113 It is also 
claimed that during the last days of the war, even
Himmler prohibited anti-Allied activity by Alpine
partisans, and that this order was forwarded south by 
Kaltenbrunner and directly resulted in the collapse of 
Eichmann's guerrilla band in the Totesgebirge.114
A few of the Jaadkommandos. however, remained in the 
mountains for several months beyond the capitulation, 
where they were aided by local farmers? as late as mid­
summer, for instance, American troops in Bad Aussee 
captured an SD officer and nearly forty members of
Alpenland skulking in the surrounding area.115 Another 
such unit showed off its military prowess four days after 
the capitulation by attacking Hungarian forces near 
Badgastein and stealing some of the Hungarian crown 
jewels,116 although the subsequent disposition of this 
treasure caused internal quarrelling within the band. A 
BDM girl who was withdrawn into the mountains to act as 
a servant for one of these units later recalled that most 
of the commandos seemed more concerned with their own 
personal safety than with furthering the Nazi cause, 
although this self-interest was suppressed below a thin 
veneer of continuing fanaticism. Briefly suspended in 
this land of fantasia, the guerrillas spent their days 
planning commando operations and their nights consuming 
stocks of brandy and reading poetry by candlelight. 
"Four weeks after the ceasefire", said the BDM informant, 
"we were still living in our familiar world of military 
procedure and Nazi ideas. The utterly unreal hope that 
we could one day re-establish this world from our 
funkhole protected us from the annihilating realization 
that it had already ceased to exist".117
The most important of these disparate bands was a 
core group of Jaodeinsatz Kroatien, which in mid-April
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was ordered to retreat from its base in Zagreb and act as 
a stay-behind unit in the St. Veit area, where a number 
of small villages remained abnormally sympathetic to 
Naziism and were expected to shelter the unit's men and 
sabotage equipment. Part of the unit surrendered to the 
British on 12 May, but another sub-section —  styled 
Einsatzgruooe Glodnitz, after the name of a local village 
—  survived in nebulous form well beyond the 
capitulation. This unit, for instance, may have been 
related to the "considerable hostile band" noted by 
British troops at Glodnitz in late May, which in turn was 
connected with the escape of one hundred and fifty 
Waffen-SS men from a local concentration area on the 
night of 28/29 May. The Glodnitz band remained true to 
Alpenland1s main goal of preserving itself to oppose an 
expected Soviet or Yugoslav invasion, at least until it 
was smashed by the British in June 1945.118 Even then, 
several key members of the group escaped capture and 
eventually went on to form a new underground group, the 
Widerstandsbeweaunq. which by 1946 had extended its 
tentacles throughout Carinthia.119
As for Skorzeny himself, he spent his last few days 
of freedom hiding in a mountain chalet, where he and Radi
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carefully considered their options. The commando chief 
eventually decided to surrender himself and a group of 
three hundred SD guerrillas, probably because the 
Alpenland unit had been designed to function mainly 
against the Soviets, and since the Western Allies had 
occupied most of the Alps the Korps had become redundant. 
In any case, the headquarters of the eastern component of 
Alpenland —  which would have borne the brunt of partisan 
activity against the Red Army —  had already broken up 
and fled for American lines rather than retreat into the 
mountains as planned. Thus, in mid-May 1945, Skorzeny 
surrendered himself to an American outpost at Annaberg 
and was thereafter sent to imprisonment in Salzburg.120
Even in captivity, however, Skorzeny remained at the 
centre of the Nazi underground. He retained strong 
contacts with a group of scattered Brandenburg and 
Jaadverband members, who coalesced into the so-called 
"Skorzeny Movement", based principally in Bavaria and 
financed at least partly by Alpenland assets recovered 
from numerous secret caches in the Alps. This network 
was mainly a veteran's mutual aid society —  and as such 
was associated with the infamous "ODESSA" —  although it 
also undertook surveillance of the KPD and in one case
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even assumed an anti-American aspect? ie., in Mannheim, 
a former Skorzeny adjutant formed an ODESSA sabotage cell 
which made elaborate plans for the destruction of 
American supply dumps and transportation facilities.
The American CIC launched an investigation of the 
Skorzeny organization in 1946 (Operation Brandy), but 
after Skorzeny's escape from prison two years later, the 
net was "turned" and indirectly went to work for several 
American intelligence agencies. The intermediary in this 
relationship was the indestructible Reinhard Gehlen, who 
in the meantime had succeeded in his own plan to transfer 
his organization to American control.121 Skorzeny 
eventually surfaced in Franco's Spain and remained a 
senior figure in such shadowy postwar Nazi groups as the 
Kameradenschaft and die Soinne.
Several of the RSHA regional resistance networks 
also had postwar histories, although these were brief and 
lacked the relative importance of the "Skorzeny 
Movement". Elsa, for instance, made plans to survive the 
capitulation, and in a meeting of agents on 21 April, the 
Wurttemburg KdS, Obersturmbannfuhrer Tummler, announced 
that the military conflict could last only another two 
weeks, so that preparations were necessary for the
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continuation of an illegal political fight. As with the 
Axmann Werwolf, last minute withdrawals were made from 
Party accounts for the purpose of financing, and Elsa 
members were provided with aliases and cover jobs, and 
then told to remain inert for a period of at least six 
weeks. Of course —  as noted above —  these careful 
plans were ruined by the defection of an Elsa courier on 
3 May, and by the late summer of 1945 the G-2 section of 
the US 7th Army concluded that the group was safely 
"under control".122
A similar group with postwar aspirations was the 
Thuringian Siarune. which had been formed under the 
direction of Gestapo officer Friedrich Fischer during 
March and April 1945. Fischer and several associates 
managed to maintain a loose underground network for 
several weeks beyond the end of the war, based mainly 
around a bakery which served as a central Anlaufstelle in 
Weimar. However, the CIC successfully "turned" several 
Siarune members soon after the American arrival in 
Thuringia, and these double agents participated in a 
sting operation codenamed "King," which soon uncovered 
the entire network. Shortly before US-Soviet territorial 
adjustments placed most of Thuringia under Soviet
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control, the Siarune was smashed by the arrest of forty 
resisters and the capture of an underground ammunition 
dump containing more than twelve hundred pounds of 
dynamite.123
As for Aktion Bundschuh. a few of its cells 
resurfaced during the fall of 1945 and were linked by a 
courier network codenamed "Danube", although it is 
unclear whether this was the actual title of the group or 
was merely the keyword for the investigative operation 
launched by the British and Americans. The CIC arrested 
a number of members in late 1945, although the group 
remained active —  at least in the British Zone —  well 
into the following year. It eschewed acts of violence, 
but concentrated instead upon the penetration of Allied 
MG agencies, thus returning the Bundschuh to its original 
raison d'etre.124
In the final analysis, it is difficult to arrive at 
any single conclusion about the RSHA Resistance Movement, 
mainly because its activities were so diverse. The only 
thread which runs consistently through the entire process 
was the gradual movement of the RSHA away from the 
margins of involvement in diversionist activity toward a 
central role, mainly because the Werwolf could not
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properly manage its hegemony.
On the other hand, the RSHA-Police establishment was 
not particularly well suited for underground activity. 
One member of the Gestapo hinted at the reasons when he 
later told Allied interrogators "that any attempt to make 
active saboteurs out of middle-aged officials of the 
Staoostelle Nurnberg was doomed to failure".125 Despite 
the enormous crimes of the Gestapo and the SD, members of 
these organizations were wrapped in a veil of legality 
and prided themselves as the guardians of order? they 
were therefore not psychologically predisposed to engage 
in activity that could not pass as anything but illegal 
and destabilizing. In any case, the best human material 
was already in the armed forces, and many of the 
remaining Gestapo and SD men who possessed the foresight 
to see their names on an Allied blacklist —  that is, to 
imagine themselves as desperados rather than as lawmen —  
had already joined the Werwolf. The Bundschuh and 
similar networks were a favoured option for only a very 
few.
Skorzeny and his knights-errant presented a 
different problem. They were especially effective, and 
caused a not inconsiderable problem to Germany's foes,
305
particularly by aiding anti-Soviet partisan groups behind 
the Eastern Front. In fact, guerrilla bands armed and 
trained by the Germans not only harassed Red Army lines 
of communication during the war, but in many cases 
continued to fight on for at least several years after 
their German benefactors had perished. Even in the West, 
Jaqdverband Siidwest gave the Allies scattered trouble by 
mining supply routes, ambushing vehicles, and otherwise 
supporting Werwolf activity in the Allied rear.126
It might thus be concluded that if there was a 
natural base for German diversionary resistance, the 
Skorzeny organization comprised such a core. This factor 
applied, however, only as long as the Nazi regime stood 
standing, and the Fiihrer was able to defiantly shake his 
fist at the encroaching enemy powers. After the collapse 
of the regime, Skorzeny and his men meekly presented 
themselves to the Western Allies, except for a few groups 
which held out in the Alps, obviously hoping to play a 
role in any new Western crusade against the East.
At first consideration, an attempt to conduct 
guerrilla warfare in the Alps might have seemed a natural 
course for the Jaqdverbande. particularly since there 
were also numerous Waffen-SS and HJ bands in the
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mountains which could conceivably have been convinced to 
participate.127 Why then, did Skorzeny and his men not 
attempt to struggle on as Alpine guerrillas? It has 
already been noted that the Alpenland Korps was prepared 
mainly for combat against the Soviets, who reached only 
the eastern edge of the group's intended sphere of 
operations, but there were also additional factors of 
perhaps even greater importance.
In the first place, Alpenland had no broad base of 
support among the mountain folk —  not only because of 
Skorzeny's brutal behaviour —  but also because the 
mountaineers shared the assessment of most Germans that 
guerrilla fighting could achieve nothing of consequence 
and would result in reprisals and the indefinite delay of 
reconstruction. In fact, Austrian and Bavarian antifas 
helped the Allies combat Nazi Maouisards —  the 
guerrillas near Oberstdorf, for instance, were mopped by 
the local Heimatschutz128 —  and the Austrian Resistance 
also had a hand in the capture of Kaltenbrunner 
himself.129 The pockets of pro-Nazi opinion which 
continued to exist were not sufficient to balance these 
adverse factors, nor was it expected that partisans could 
replace the value of popular loyalty with the benefits
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extracted by raw intimidation.
Closely related to this sociopolitical failure was 
an equally disastrous ideological failure, which allowed 
doubt and uncertainty to creep into the minds of the 
commandos themselves, mainly because they had no 
sustaining belief to counteract the open contempt of the 
population. As Hugh Trevor-Roper has noted, Naziism 
essentially offered a bargain of World Power or Ruin,130 
and there was little place in this equation for Nazi 
guerrillas, particularly since there was scarce 
preparation for the ideological survival of the movement 
beyond the death of its founder and chief prophet. One 
participant in the Alpenland Macruis later recalled the 
numbing shock and sense of betrayal which came with the 
eventual news of the Fuhrer's suicide, and that the only 
available response of the commandos was to drink 
themselves into an anaesthetized stupor.131 It is true 
that the ideological element is thin in many partisan 
movements, and that personal factors play an important 
role in the membership of a considerable number of 
recruits,132 but ideological considerations are important 
at least in the initial stages of existence, before the 
momentum of expansion sweeps up large numbers of less
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committed members.
Of course, the partisans did have an immediate 
political-military strategy based upon a supposedly 
impending break-down in the alliance between the Soviet 
Union and the Western Allies, but this did not serve as 
a substantial substitute for more realistic material 
inducements to carry on the fight, especially once the 
predicted break down did not occur after a short 
interval. It is true that a few Jaadverband units hung 
on for several months beyond the capitulation —  along 
with scattered SS bands —  but they were rarely able to 
convert the negative impulse to escape capture into a 
positive intent to oppose the occupying powers. Without 
a strong motive for resistance, the last few guerrillas 
abandoned their mountain domiciles when the advent of the 
first cold weather in late 1945 made such a lifestyle 
sufficiently uncomfortable.133
Most important of all, however, there was a crucial 
absence of any means of replenishing supplies and 
manpower. Unlike the anti-Nazi European resistance 
movements of the preceding years, Schutzkorps Alpenland 
had no hope of victory because it had no surviving 
allies, apart from the distant Japanese. Thus, there was
no prospect of friendly supply planes dropping weapons 
and advisors, nor any sympathetic power to make 
inspirational radio broadcasts in order to maintain 
morale. Combined with the absence of local popular 
support and the emergent conservatism of the Tessmann 
enterprise —  the one self-replenishing source of funds 
available to the Alpine Maouis —  the lack of external 
allies was a devastating blow. Once the movement's own 
caches of weapons and financial resources ran short, 
Alpenland would have been totally dependent on the 
precarious necessity of capturing all arms and supplies 
from the enemy. This must have seemed a burdensome 
proposition even for Skorzeny's commando elite? in fact, 
it is possible that such a challenge posed a 
psychological threat to a group in which a sense of 
inherent superiority was based upon skimming the cream of 
Europe's manpower and technology in small arms, resources 
which were no longer available. A final Gotterdammerung 
in the mountains had a certain heroic appeal, but it also 
risked exposing the myth of inherent preeminence, 
particularly since clear signs of disintegration had 
already appeared by the time of the general capitulation.
Skorzeny's first quiet days in the fresh mountain
air seem to have allowed such realizations to unfold — or 
at least some similar pattern of reasoning took sway —  
and his plans for glory as a partisan chief thus began to 
melt away as fast as the receding mountain snows. Ten 
days after the capitulation, "the most dangerous man in 
Europe" emerged from his lofty retreat, safe in the 
assumption that past deeds of daring had not been 
besmirched by a final struggle with little chance of 
either honour or glory.
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The "People's War": The Party and the Werwolf
Aside from RSHA intervention into the Werwolf field, 
there were also some last minute attempts by Party 
chieftains to promote partisan warfare. This trend 
particularly centered upon the efforts of three powerful 
men whose careers had developed within the Party 
bureaucracy and whose bases of power lay within that 
realm: Josef Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin and
Minister of Propaganda, who stood as the only first rate 
intellect in the senior Nazi hierarchy? Martin Bormann, 
the stocky and sinister head of the Party Chancellery, 
who once fought the French as an underground fighter 
during the Ruhr occupation, but had since switched his 
expertise to bureaucratic infighting? and Robert Ley, the 
drunken satyr who had risen from his position as 
Gauleiter of Cologne to become chief of the Deutsch 
Arbeitsfront (DAF). These were the "old Party comrades" 
who remained loyal to Hitler's apparent desire for the 
self-immolation of the Reich, and who during the final 
months huddled together with their master in the gloomy 
Chancellery bunker.
Of course, they can only loosely be considered a
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group because of the vicious rivalry amongst them, 
particularly between Goebbels and Bormann, although even 
this antagonism was dulled in the spring of 1945 because 
of the agreement of both men on the need to buoy up 
German resistance by means of fanatic propaganda.1 
Goebbels and Bormann alike indulged in day dreams about 
the good old days of the Kampfzeit, and hoped to revive 
the Party as a self contained political-fighting unit:2 
the former sought by such means to save the ideological 
aspect of Naziism —  or at least force Germany to undergo 
the passage of the movement amid a rain of revolutionary 
fire and brimstone —  while the latter had the more 
limited goal of saving himself and the basis of his 
bureaucratic power.
These officials fancied having a leftist or 
"popular" orientation which naturally led them toward the 
expedient of a "people's war". The parallels with the 
self-assumed role of the Soviet Communist Party in 1941- 
42 are obvious. It will be recalled, however, that the 
main proponents of such a course throughout the early 
history of the Party had been the SA, and that even after 
the SA's eclipse, it continued to dominate programs such 
as civilian rifle training, which began in 1939. For a
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short period in the spring of 1944 —  when the civilian 
rifle training course was expanded under the title SA - 
Wehrschiessen —  it appeared that the SA might emerge 
from the shadows, but this was only a momentary 
development.3 By the late summer —  with the Soviets and 
Western Allies both hovering over Germany*s frontiers —  
the preparation of domestic resistance was suddenly no 
longer a distant precaution, but a serious business in 
which the major institutions of the Nazi state began to 
involve themselves. It became apparent that the SA had 
never recovered from the blow of the Rohm "putsch", and 
the Storm Troopers helplessly found their former sphere 
of control in adult paramilitary training now poached 
upon by powers of a higher order. One captured SA 
official told the Americans that as a focal point of Nazi 
resistance warfare, "the SA may be considered a dead 
issue".4
With the Wehrmacht on the verge of collapse in 
August and September 1944, various generals began to 
demand civilian labour call-ups in borderland regions —  
for the purpose of constructing defence works —  and they 
also requested the formation of a civilian defence 
militia, perhaps built around the surviving core of the
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SA.5 Hitler accepted the basic plan, but rather than 
allot responsibility to the SA or to the military, he 
turned to the Gauleiters. who by Hitler's order were 
appointed as "Reichsverteidigun^ Kommissars" ("Reich 
Defence Commissioners") . The most energetic Gauleiters 
in the marchlands quickly seized this opportunity and 
established themselves as local warlords? Erich Koch, for 
instance, established a "People's Army" in East Prussia?6 
Franz Hofer aided in the call-up of fifty thousand Alpine 
minutemen, or Standschiitzen. in the Tyrol?7 while in the 
eastern Ruhrgebeit, Albert Hoffmann established a 
"Freikorps Sauerland", as a regional formation of Home 
Guards.8
In the early fall such regional organizations were 
incorporated into a new national militia coordinated by 
the Party Chancellery, although the Standschiitzen and 
Freikorps Sauerland retained a limited autonomy within 
the larger organization.9 Helmuth Auerbach suggests that 
both the Werwolf and the new militia, the Volkssturm, 
were actually mirror images of the same program,10 with 
the Volkssturm serving as the component of the "people's 
war" at the front, and the Werwolf as its expression in 
the enemy rear. It is certainly true —  in theory at
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least —  that both the Werwolf and the Volkssturm were 
supposed to combine Party and SS efforts, with the Party 
handling the political and ideological side of matters, 
and the SS the military side. This new "peopled war" 
was also launched with a great deal of blustery 
propaganda, which hinted at the possibility of fighting 
behind Allied lines but rarely stated this threat 
directly because of the '’defeatist” implications of such 
declarations.11
At the time of its establishment, there was some 
doubt about whether members of the Volkssturm were 
responsible merely for service on the German side of the 
front, or were also expected to act as franc tireurs and 
partisans in the enemy rear. Although the Volkssturm was 
based upon a secret Fiihrer decree of 6 September 1944 
(and a formal decree issued three weeks later),12 it was 
introduced to the public in a speech by Himmler on 18 
October. Not incidentally, the speech was given in East 
Prussia, where Volkssturm units first became operational, 
and it also commemorated the anniversary of the 1813 
Battle of Nations, which was fought partly by the 
Prussian Landsturm. Himmler continually returned to the 
inspiration of the Landsturm. but he also made reference
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to a revival of the Werwolf bands active during the 
Thirty Years War —  "Even in territory which [the enemy] 
believes they have conquered, the German will to resist 
will again and again flare-up in their rear, and like 
Werwolfe. death-defying volunteers will injure the enemy 
and cut his lifelines".13
This statement naturally created considerable alarm 
among both friend and foe: "Hitler Rallies Guerrillas",
ran the banner headline in Stars and Stripes. and at 
SHAEF, Allied officers hinted that unmarked 
Volkssturmmanner operating in the Allied rear would not 
be protected by the Hague Rules of War. On the same day 
that the Volkssturm was announced, SHAEF G-5 released the 
legal outline for Allied military government, which 
contained a well-publicized authorization for firing 
squads to deal with German civilians blocking the 
progress of Allied armies.14
Thus facing this almost insurmountable barrier to 
the construction of the Volkssturm. most Nazi 
propagandists immediately began to reverse the signal 
sent out in Himmler's address. Both domestic and 
international propaganda heavily stressed that the 
militia would not be a partisan movement. "The
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Volkssturm11 said the 12 Uhr Blatt. ”is no casual heap of 
poorly armed civilians, but a highly disciplined army of 
soldiers. It will not fight with flails or ARP axes, nor 
in secret and cowardly ambushes, but with weapons of 
modern war, and fearlessly, as true soldiers do..." The 
same message was conveyed in local newspapers and 
journals, and also in an important address to foreign 
journalists by the military propagandist Sundermann, made 
on the same day as Himmler's speech. To strengthen the 
claim of such irregular formations to proper treatment, 
the Germans were also careful to apply the Hague 
Convention to members of the AK captured in the Warsaw 
Uprising.15
SHAEF G-2 decided in late October that it had 
originally misinterpreted the Volkssturm. and a week 
later SHAEF CoS, General W.B. Smith, issued a directive 
noting that Volkssturm units would be given appropriate 
treatment under the Hague Rules of War, provided they 
were commanded by a responsible officer, bore a 
recognizable emblem, and carried their weapons openly.16 
British Intelligence had already figured out that 
Himmler's reference to Werwolfe probably did not apply to 
the main body of the Volkssturm. and on the last day of
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October, the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office told 
the House of Commons that, "No substantial distinction 
can be drawn between the position in international law of 
the Volkssturm and of the Local Defence Volunteers when 
they were formed in 1940...they are entitled to be 
treated as legal combatants".17 The Soviets, however, 
were unbound by any similar sense of restraint, perhaps 
because they had earlier employed their own militia units 
as guerrilla bands, and thus naturally expected that the 
Germans would do the same? in any case, they routinely 
massacred captured Volkssturmmanner on the assumption 
that they were partisans.18
Was, in fact, the Volkssturm meant to have a 
guerrilla character? Directives from the Party 
Chancellery clearly show that the organization was 
regarded mainly as a means of stopping armoured thrusts 
by the enemy, and that it was intended to operate 
strictly within the bounds outlined in the Hague 
Convention? in fact, Bormann even forwarded to the 
Gauleiters summaries of the Hague rules in order to guide 
the proper formation and training of local Volkssturm 
units.19 In actual practice, there were two types of 
Volkssturm detachments: Einsatzbataillonen. which were
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mobile and were used as a tactical reserve for frontline 
service? and Standbataillonen. which were locally-raised 
levies intended for the defence of the hinterland, 
particularly against tank breakthroughs or air- and 
seaborne landings, and also served to protect German 
lines of communication.20
Of course, the Volkssturm had its own "Spahtruppe” 
(reconnaissance units) which ran patrols behind the 
enemy's frontlines,21 and it is also possible that 
according to the preferences of the local Gau- and 
Kreisleiters. whole Standbataillonen were trained for 
partisan warfare22 —  it is known, for instance, that 
certain training courses for the Standschutzen in March 
and April 1945 were in fact training programs in sabotage 
intended to produce full-fledged Werwplfe.23 It is also 
true that the Volkssturm had definite associations with 
the Werwolf, particularly through the limited passage of 
personnel from the former to the latter,24 and in Gau 
Lower Danube, there was an especially blurred distinction 
between the two groups, mainly because both functioned 
under a single commander, Obersturmbannfuhrer Fahrion.25 
Arno Rose suggests that while the great majority of 
Volkssturmmanner did not consider themselves guerrillas
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or terrorists, there were a few who identified with the 
Werwolf, and that this minority occasionally became 
involved in deeds that had little to do with the proper 
concerns of a conventional militia.26
For several months immediately after Himmler's 
Volkssturm speech, however, the Party tended to keep its 
focus away from the SS-dominated Werwolf and upon the 
Volkssturm. where the Party was actually gaining 
influence at the expense of the SS.27 It will be 
recalled, for instance, that the Gauleiters had been 
given important tasks relative to Werwolf recruitment, 
but that this allotment of responsibility had failed 
because of the tendency of Party bosses to direct 
resources toward the Volkssturm. The Gauleiters had also 
been given extensive local control of Werwolf propaganda 
(with guiding principles drafted by the Propaganda 
Ministry) , and it was expected that the resulting 
material would be airdropped into enemy territory or shot 
in by means of leaflet shelling. Once again, almost 
nothing was done in this sphere aside from the air-drop 
a few miniature copies of Volkischer Beobachter. and the 
re-publication of Lon's Per Werwolf, which was mandatory 
reading both for members of the SS guerrilla organization
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and for so-called "worthy men" of the Volkssturm.28
It is true that the master SS propagandist Gunther 
D'Alguen was attached to Prutzmann's staff to handle 
propaganda matters, and that in October 1944, D'Alquen 
published an article on the likelihood of Nazi partisan 
warfare in his popular SS journal, Das Schwarze Korps.29 
However, D'Alquen was subsequently incapacitated by 
scarlet fever for the winter of 1944-45, and was in 
hospital from the beginning of November until March.30 
During this period, the Werwolf was thus left without 
much propaganda punch, although this actually pleased 
some of the secretive SS officers running the 
organization, who saw its role as a diversionary force 
better served by secrecy than by open publicity.
There were also some more basic problems inhibiting 
Werwolf propaganda. In the first place, consideration of 
guerrilla warfare would have broken the Nazi taboo on 
admitting the possible loss of considerable stretches of 
territory, and also presumed that the Wehrmacht was no 
longer capable of defending the Reich. Such admissions 
seemed especially inappropriate during a period when the 
fronts in both East and West had solidified and the Army 
and Waffen-SS were in fact preparing a major counter­
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attack aimed at splitting American and British forces. 
During the period of panic in September 1944 certain 
German sources had hinted at the possibility of partisan 
warfare —  as noted above —  but even during this period 
assurances of the Wehrmacht1 s capability to defend German 
frontiers easily overwhelmed any suggestions of guerrilla 
fighting occasionally heard or seen in the domestic 
media.31 Little or nothing was said about partisan 
warfare against the Soviets.
A further difficulty was caused by German evacuation 
policy, according to which the bulk of the loyal 
citizenry was supposed to leave threatened areas in 
advance of the enemy's arrival. Although such directives 
were frequently flaunted in western Germany, Party and 
propaganda agencies could hardly report about extensive 
resistance activities in areas that were supposed to be 
evacuated, and the best they could do was suggest that 
German civilians would have readily ambushed the invaders 
had they been asked to do so.32
Yet another problem for the Nazis lay in the fact 
that the limited scale of resistance actually underway in 
the occupied zones was carried out principally by 
teenagers. Although press and radio occasionally
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admitted this, Nazi opinion-makers probably feared that 
widespread knowledge of such a children's war would 
alienate the increasingly irritable home population in 
unoccupied areas, and as late as March 1945 reports of 
sabotage by teenage HJ members were attributed by DNB to 
"systemic" Allied black propaganda.33
By the beginning of 1945, however, the factors which 
had oriented the Party away from the Werwolf in favour of 
the Volkssturm had begun to erode. In the first place, 
the much-heralded Volkssturm proved both incapable and 
vastly unpopular. When committed at the front, it 
performed so poorly that arrangements were made in 
January to keep Volkssturm battalions constantly 
stiffened by Army and Waffen-SS troops, lest they 
collapse and create holes in the front.34 Moreover, the 
compulsory mass call-up to the organization caused 
tremendous resentment, not only because of the demands 
caused by part-time training, but also because the 
formation of Einsatzbataillonen as a mobile reserve was 
felt a betrayal of the assurance that the Volkssturm was 
strictly a measure for local defence.35 Most important 
of all, people naturally realized that civilians with 
pick-up weapons would be slaughtered attempting to
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succeed where the Wehrmacht had already failed? Himmler's 
comparison of the Volkssturm to the 1813 
"Freiheitskampfer" was rejected as totally unrealistic.36 
Many Germans were further convinced by Himmler's 
inaugural speech that Volkssturmmanner were in effect 
partisans —  notwithstanding Allied assurances of 
protection under the Hague Convention —  and this 
unsettling suspicion also caused a continual erosion of 
morale.37
Another problem concerned the stubborn presence of 
the Anglo-American forces, who refused to be pushed back 
from their narrow beachheads on German soil. There were 
disturbing signs of timidity and collaboration by the few 
Rhinelanders under this enemy's thumb, so that despite 
the psychological restrains, German propagandists 
eventually had to admit the need to punish collaborators, 
even if this could be done only in fiction rather than 
actual fact. For this purpose, propaganda policy was 
altered to allow for the introduction of an alleged 
organization called the "Racher Deutscher Ehre". or 
"Avengers of German Honour", which was supposed to combat 
collaborationism by executing the sentences of Vehme 
courts. Throughout the first several months of 1945,
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various Rhenish newspapers carried harrowing reports 
about the killing of "dishonourable” Germans, beginning 
with an Aachen merchant allegedly executed in early 
December 1944. The increasing activity of the Racher. 
said the Nazis, "made the Americans extremely nervous", 
and "had stiffened the secret resistance of the 
nationally-minded population".38 The Allies, however, 
were doubtful that any such killings actually occurred? 
SHAEF*s Psychological Warfare Division noted that, "No 
evidence has been received to suggest that the stories 
are true", and an American CIC unit characterized the 
Racher as a "product... of fancy and fanatical 
imagination".39
By February 1945, the problems posed by the occupied 
territories had multiplied tenfold, since the Western 
Allies had further expanded their toe-holds in the 
Rhineland and the Soviets had also captured large 
stretches of territory in the wake of their massive 
Winter Offensive. Party leaders therefore began to take 
a second look at the Werwolf movement, which the SS was 
now accused of unconscionably neglecting.40 Several 
Bormann minions produced proposals for initiating 
partisan warfare, particularly Hauptbereichsleiter Hans
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Dotzler, a Bavarian poultry farmer and Party official who 
suddenly bloomed into an expert on guerrilla warfare 
along the Eastern Front, Bormann passed one of Dotzler*s 
memoranda on to Himmler, who, in turn, gave the document 
to Prutzmann and ordered the Werwolf leader to report to 
Bormann and provide the Party chief with full details 
about his Sonderauftrag (special assignment),41
By March 1945, Bormann had waded deep into the 
Werwolf morass. Gauleiters in immediately threatened 
areas were supplied with false identity papers and 
ordered to go underground in order to help in organizing 
guerrilla groups, and Party officials were also ordered 
to give up any state or civic posts that might be held 
concurrently with their Party positions. This latter 
measure freed Party bureaucrats for possible underground 
work and also created a class of "surrender officials” 
who were specifically set up by the Nazis for the purpose 
of later knocking them down, either with propaganda, 
threats, or Werwolf assassination teams. Bormann also 
began to warm to the idea of an Alpine Redoubt: a
memorandum to the Fiihrer suggesting the construction of 
an Alpine fortress had already been submitted in November 
1944 by the Tyrolean Gauleiter. Hofer, but it lay
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gathering dust for four months until Bormann*s opinions 
on the matter had shifted and he tardily forwarded the 
document to Hitler.42
Even more importantly, Dotzler was appointed to head 
a Werwolf political directorate, which made plans for the 
re-establishment of secret Party cells and the spread of 
underground propaganda. According to Kurt Tauber, the 
desperados of Dienstelle Priitzmann made big plans for 
Dotzler*s office even as the Third Reich disintigrated 
and they themselves fled toward the Alpine Redoubt. 
Siebel and company reportedly saw the Dotzler bureau as 
the directing force in an eventual political revival of 
Naziism, perhaps under the camouflage of a religious 
movement with a Christian-Communist orientation.43
After Bormann*s meeting with Priitzmann —  at which 
the latter presumably complained about the non-compliance 
of the Gauleiters in aiding Werwolf activities —  Bormann 
also issued a circular to the Gauleiters strictly 
ordering them to appoint a W-Beauftracrter responsible for 
recruitment, and thence to forward the names to Dotzler's 
office at the Party Chancellery? the immediate posting of 
such officials, said Bormann, "was of great importance 
for this highly significant task'*.44 The effort to
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encourage the aid of Party bosses in Werwolf-related 
matters had heretofore fallen upon Prutzmann, Ley, and 
the chief of the Party Hauotpersonalamt. Marrenbach,45 
but none of these figures could ensure the kind of 
compliance which Bormann could rightly demand.
It is not unreasonable to surmise that Bormann *s 
increased commitment to Werwolf activism during this 
period ensured a reciprocal extension of his influence 
within the organization, particularly since the 
conversion of Werwolf into a strong-arm unit for 
enforcing "scorched earth” decrees and assassinating 
"defeatists” bears the unmistakable imprint of his 
influence. It is notable, for instance, that some of the 
Werwolf murders in the Braunschweig area were actually 
committed by a Kreisleituna "Rollkommando” (a term with 
Vehmisch connotations dating back to the early 1920s), 
and that the posting of threatening Werwolf placards in 
Wuppertal was done by Kreisleituna functionaries who had 
taken it upon themselves to organize the local Werwolf.46 
Several senior German leaders who first came into contact 
with the Werwolf in March and April 1945 even believed 
that the organization was directly under Bormann's 
command and later testified to this effect at the
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Nuremberg Trials.47
The Party also interested itself in repairing the 
unpreparedness of the SS by encouraging resistance in 
territories already overrun (despite Bormann's stern 
rebuke to Himmler "that at the moment of deep enemy 
breakthroughs it is already too late"48) . A meeting was 
held in February between Bormann's deputy, 
Oberbefehlsleiter Friedrichs, and Goebbels' main 
underling, Staatssekretar Naumann, at which such matters 
were discussed. A suggestion to air-drop sabotage 
instructions and propaganda into Soviet-occupied areas 
was rejected on the assumption that the Soviets would 
react with massive reprisals, and that the measure would 
therefore be counter-productive. Rather, it was decided 
to exploit the apparatus of Unternehmen Skoroion. a top 
secret operation for spreading Vlasovite and pro-UPA 
propaganda which was originally launched by D'Alquen's 
"Kurt Eggers" Standarte in Poland during the summer of 
1944. The Skoroion operation apparently had some sort of 
line-crossing capability, and Naumann supposedly 
established liaison with the ubiquitous Skorzeny, who had 
since assumed control of the Skorpion enterprise? a call 
was subsequently issued for volunteer wireless
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transmitters who were "urgently required for special 
employment" with the "Kurt Eggers" unit.49 It is likely 
that the construction of a mobile transmitter to control 
Werwolf Gruppen was also discussed at the Friedrichs- 
Naumann meeting, and shortly afterwards Naumann forwarded 
instructions to another Goebbels deputy, Hans Fritsche, 
directing the development of plans for a secret mobile 
station.50
Goebbels' interest in the Werwolf lay mainly in its 
potential in the West, which was perhaps natural since 
the Propaganda Minister was a native Rhinelander. It was 
on this front that the policy of systemic evacuation had 
broken down during February —  a development which was 
never paralleled in the East —  and Bormann had soon 
recommended formally terminating the process because of 
the confusion it created in the interior. In fact, the 
Reichsleiter had openly advised Gauleiters in the West 
that German civilians left in the wake of the enemy 
advance were no longer to be regarded unfavourably.51 
One of the main factors inhibiting a guerrilla propaganda 
campaign had thus disappeared.
There was also an obvious need for a propaganda jolt 
to bring western Germans back into line, since most of
the population which remained in the Allied rear had been 
unwilling to either confront the enemy advance or to show 
hostility to Allied troops once they arrived. Moreover, 
the Party had given an embarrassingly poor account of 
itself, its functionaries often being the first to flee 
towns threatened by the enemy.52 Goebbels, however, did 
not lose faith in the fortitude of his countrymen, 
believing that they had shown courage under aerial 
bombing, but that this devastating campaign had shattered 
them both physically and mentally, a condition worsened 
by the experience of seeing the Wehrmacht routed. In 
retrospect, it must be noted that Goebbels possessed an 
amazingly optimistic faith in both the loyalty of Germans 
to the Nazi cause and in their capacity to maintain a 
fanatical antagonism toward the occupying powers; "The 
people need only a good sleep and release from the 
scourge of the air war to come to themselves again ... I 
am of the opinion that slowly the partisan war will start 
in West Germany. There are already a number of signs of 
it".53
Goebbels believed that the key to such a turn of 
events was the anticipated food shortage, and that if 
such a factor did not cause a rebellion before the loss
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of the remaining sections of unoccupied territory, it
would surely do so afterward. The Western Allies, he
surmised, would unwisely attempt a dual-track policy of
enforced starvation side-by-side with democratization:
Should the enemy in their blind hate 
really allow themselves to be led in 
such a direction, leaving the 
defeated German people hungry in a 
world of plenty, indeed possibly for 
months and years, then they would
never know what hit them. In
Germany, they will not lure the dog
out from behind the stove with
democracy alone. And if democratic 
theory in practice denotes hunger, 
they will see how the emaciated and 
apparently dull Germans bear hunger 
placards through their bombed 
cities, and how they unreservedly 
throw themselves into the arms of 
political radicalism. Where
Communism cannot reap the fruit of 
radicalization —  and its chance of 
success in Germany is not very great 
after all the wrongs and horrors 
which the Bolsheviks have caused in 
our eastern provinces —  a Neo- 
National Socialism will be born, 
pure and honest, uncompromising and 
strong from the collapse and the 
following misery as emergence from a 
purgatory.54
As a spark to ignite this conflagration, Goebbels 
hoped to win control of Unternehmen Werwolf, and then re­
orient it in a more radical direction, an initiative 
which also fit with Goebbels1 general effort to get 
almost all matters of domestic policy under his own
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control. He approached Hitler with this suggestion in 
late March 1945, and was rewarded with the transfer of 
initiative for Werwolf propaganda away from the 
Gauleiters and toward the Propaganda Ministry. Although 
he had presumably asked for more, Goebbels was pleased 
with this partial victory, which at least gave him a toe­
hold from which to further expand his grip —  in early 
April he noted that he still had plans "to get the 
organization of the Werwolf movement into my own hands", 
although he now admitted this must be done gradually. 
"Not only do I think myself suited to do it", he noted, 
"but I believe the Werwolf must be led with spirit and 
enthusiasm".55
Goebbels* intervention into Werwolf affairs 
naturally created an open rivalry between himself and 
Prutzmann, particularly since the latter was not a party 
to the new arrangements allowing the Propaganda Ministry 
to conduct a Werwolf publicity campaign. Goebbels felt 
that Unternehmen Werwolf was a failure, and that 
Prutzmann was proceeding far too hesitantly. Prutzmann, 
in defence, argued that the population of occupied 
districts was apathetic and openly opposed to the Nazi 
Party, which made it necessary to proceed slowly in the
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organization of partisan warfare.56 In light of such a 
position, it is hardly surprising that Prutzmann became 
enraged when the Propaganda Ministry proceeded to 
surround the Werwolf with a radical and spirited 
propaganda campaign that did not reflect his views nor 
had been previously submitted for the review of his 
office. Such an approach, he told Gauleiter Kaufmann, 
was "wrong, dangerous and stupid", and caused "grave 
dissentions" between himself and the Goebbels Ministry.57
Several days after the propaganda campaign had 
begun, Prutzmann burst into Goebbels1 office and openly 
confronted him, claiming that his guerrillas needed to 
operate with a certain modicum of secrecy.58 Goebbels 
totally rejected such a view: "We do not intend to hide
our light under a bushel and do secret service work", he 
noted in his diary. "On the contrary, the enemy should 
know precisely what we are planning and doing".59 
Moreover, the Propaganda Ministry took a particularly 
broad view of the Werwolf: according to a memorandum
circulated by Naumann on 4 April, the full activization 
of the movement would convert all"activist fighters" into 
Werwolfe. both in occupied areas and in unoccupied 
Germany as well.60
The main subject of the Goebbels-Priitzmann battle 
was Werwolf Sender, a radio station which Goebbels began 
to assemble in March 1945, possibly with Bormann*s 
backing.61 This was the final development of the idea 
for a mobile transmitter —  which was first muted in 
February —  and after a considerable rush, it began to 
broadcast on Easter Sunday, 1 April (when the symbol of 
rebirth and the symbol of lunacy appropriately fell upon 
the same date) . In the afternoon, the Home Service 
broadcast an "important bulletin" which had supposedly 
just been received: "In the German territories of the
West which are occupied by the enemy, a German Freedom 
Movement has come into existence..." Thereafter, a 
steady stream of melodramatic reports about the new 
movement sought to build up excitement, until finally it 
was announced that the Werwolf possessed its own
transmitter behind enemy lines and that an "effort" would 
be made to pick up their inaugural proclamation. This 
was achieved and the proclamation was broadcast at peak 
listening time, between 19.00 and 20.00 hours.
Thereafter, it was announced that Werwolf Sender would
broadcast nightly at 19.00 on 1339 m., the old
Deutschlandsender wavelength.62
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A Wehrmacht Signals expert later pointed out that 
Goebbels had actually botched the proclamation, since it 
appealed for listeners in both the West and the East, but 
mentioned only one secret behind-the-lines transmitter —  
the clever listener would have immediately realized that 
to reach listeners on both fronts, the station was 
probably in the mid-section of the country and had to be 
using broadcasting facilities of considerable output.63 
In truth, the transmitter was located at the old 
Deutschlandsender station at Konigswusterhausen, 
southeast of Berlin, but the idea of a secret station on 
enemy occupied soil was apparently regarded as a 
necessary ingredient if the proceedings were to develop 
any decent sense of conspiratorial romance.
To provide an organizational structure for the new 
station, a special branch called the Werwolf Referat was 
reportedly organized within the Propaganda Department of 
the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.64 
The radio station itself was placed in the hands of Horst 
Slesina, who was transferred from his post as chief of 
the regional Propaganda Office in Westmark. He was 
chosen for the position because of his adroit 
understanding of the situation in western Germany —
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where Werwolf Sender's main efforts were directed —  and 
because he had made a considerable effort on the Saar 
Front to rouse civilian resistance to the invading Allied 
armies.65 Slesina, however, remained something of a 
junior manager, since both Goebbels and Naumann took 
great interest in the day-to-day affairs of the station, 
as well as regularly writing propaganda copy for its 
announcers.66
Another bureaucratic adjustment was the dismissal of 
Goebbels1 other Staatssekretar. Reich Press Chief Otto 
Dietrich, mainly because he had not shown sufficient zeal 
for this latest propaganda development —  "With men like 
Dr. Dietrich", Goebbels told the Fuhrer, "how am I 
supposed to conduct propaganda, such as that for the 
Werwolf movement at present, which must be of an 
extraordinarily radical nature". Dietrich had
particularly angered both Goebbels and Hitler by his 
dilution of Goebbels1 strongly worded announcement on the 
shooting of the Oberburaermeister of Aachen, especially 
since he attempted to delete mention of a fictional Vehme 
trial which was supposed to have condemned the mayor to 
death.67 It is notable, however, that with the Press 
Department in an uproar, Goebbels failed in his intention
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to launch a Werwolf newspaper, which was projected to 
serve as a natural media partner for the radio station.
For the three weeks after its establishment, Werwolf 
Sender engaged in two chief operations, amid playing 
lively pop music: one was issuing threats, and the other
was reporting on various acts of sabotage supposedly 
committed by the Werwolf movement. Propaganda against 
native collaborators did not go into great detail, but 
rather confined itself to general threats and the naming 
of lists of individuals under condemnation. Special 
invective was directed toward German officers in the 
Soviet-sponsored Freies Deutschland movement who were 
reportedly dropped behind German lines in the last weeks 
of the war —  "Upon discovery of such an officer", said 
Werwolf Sender, "it is the duty of every German citizen 
to tear him apart".68 As for the enemy, the main targets 
of abuse were General George Patton and the U.S. 
financier and presidential advisor Bernard Baruch, who 
visited occupied Germany in mid-April; Baruch in 
particular, was portrayed as an archtypical 
representative of sinister, behind-the-scenes Jewish 
influences, and since he was in fact a veteran of the 
American delegation to Versailles and a key supporter of
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the Morgenthau Plan, he merited repeated Werwolf death 
threats while in Europe.69
Werwolf Sender's other main activity was to provide 
reports on Werwolf successes in inflicting damage upon 
Allied forces. Most of the reports broadcast by Werwolf 
Sender were quite fantastic: on 4 April, for instance,
they claimed to have captured the Secretary of the 
"American Extermination Commission", an Allied 
Einsatzaruppe allegedly based in Koblenz, while three 
weeks later "Werwolf Commandos" were reported to have 
blown up part of the Leuna Synthetic Petroleum Works near 
Leipzig, an announcement that must have seemed strange to 
listeners in the Leuna area, where it was well known that 
most of the plant had already been flattened by Allied 
bombers.70
In truth, the Propaganda Ministry admitted in mid- 
April that —  "We know little or nothing of what is 
happening in these [occupied] areas", and Goebbels was 
the first to admit, at least privately, that Werwolf 
Sender1s output was not actually the news, but "the news 
as it should be". In fact, the Propaganda Minister 
personally dictated many of the station*s fictional 
reports, and when he lost inspiration he would wander the
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corridors of his office, calling out for ideas from his 
assistants.71 Needless to say Goebbels and his aides 
received no help from Dienstelle Prutzmann —  although 
that office prepared its own internal reports documenting 
local successes by Werwolf Gruppen —  and one Werwolf 
official disapprovingly noted in mid-April "That the 
heroics extolled over the Werwolf radio net were either 
pure fiction or the accomplishments of small scattered 
remnants of troops who had no connection with the 
Prutzmann program".72
The purpose of broadcasting largely fictional 
reports was to create the impression that the Werwolf was 
widespread, or at least had extensive reach, thus 
building the proper psychological climate for a real 
terrorist campaign. It also gave sympathetic listeners 
in the occupied territories implicit instructions on the 
kinds of activities they might employ in order to disrupt 
Allied forces. In fact, Werwolf Sender even broadcast 
blunt indications of what could be done —  "set up 
barriers and traps on roads, remove place names and 
signposts... remove minefield markings... take note of 
the location of the enemy's ammunition and petrol dumps, 
food stocks and other material. Whenever there is an
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opportunity —  and such opportunities must be brought 
about by every possible means —  the enemy's dumps and 
stores must be destroyed". Such instructions formed a 
large part of the Werwolf "Sixteen Commandments" 
broadcast on 7 April. It was admittedly inconvenient 
that the enemy could listen in and take the necessary 
counter-measures, but Goebbels had already indicated —  
both to Prutzmann and in his diary —  that his flights of 
fancy would remain unaltered by such minor 
embarrassments.73 In truth, of course, the public airing 
of sabotage instructions was actually an indication of 
extreme weakness? such a measure would have been 
unnecessary but for the rapidity of the Allied advance 
into Germany and Prutzmann's inability to get his own 
agency ready to fully meet this contingency.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Werwolf 
Sender was the highly ideological nature of its 
propaganda output, which both recalled the revolutionary 
roots of National Socialism as well as recent political 
and social trends within the Nazi state. Goebbels 
repeatedly pointed out that Werwolf Sender represented a 
return to the essential features of National Socialism, 
and would play an extremist role similar to the newspaper
Per Anar iff "in the good old days of our struggle". Even 
the notorious early Nazi rabble-rouser Julius Streicher, 
whose pathological behaviour had caused his dismissal as 
Gauleiter of Franconia in 1940, was recalled from the 
wilderness in order to deliver short Werwolf diatribes, 
although Werwolf Sender apparently ceased broadcasting 
before the world was treated to a glimpse of this 
political come-back. Streicher's presence was not 
missed, however, since Goebbels himself wrote much wild­
eyed copy for the station, which proudly took no account 
"of regular methods of conducting war or of wartime 
foreign policy", and thus —  in terms of radicalism —  
far surpassed the regular propaganda in which Goebbels* 
authorship was openly acknowledged. This was a great 
psychological release for the Propaganda Minister who, 
after being muzzled since 1934, was finally able to vent 
his own brand of leftist radicalism —  "It is really 
refreshing", he said, "for once to be able to talk as one 
used to do during our struggle period". It is 
interesting to note that by April 1945, Goebbels liked to 
place himself in the same category as Stennes, Strasser, 
and Rohm, except that he was loyal to the Fiihrer. and 
they supposedly were not.74
In line with Goebbels' opinions, Werwolf Sender 
found the war almost immaterial compared with the fact 
that a pan-European, anti-bourgeois revolution was 
underway, and it revived the old SA heresy about the need 
for "permanent revolution”, a matter that had cost Rohm 
his head in 1934.75 Goebbels also believed that in the 
course of such a revolutionary struggle, the methods of 
"bourgeois" warfare should be totally abandoned, and it 
was mainly through the intervention of such "moderates" 
as Himmler and Goring that his call for a unilateral 
abrogation of the Geneva Convention went unheeded. 
Werwolf Sender provided a handy forum for such views, 
however, and declared on its opening day of broadcasting 
that Werwolfe would happily disregard the rules of war.76 
However, such heady revolutionary declarations were too 
extreme even for the Werwolf's target audience, and on 5 
April the station was forced to broadcast a lengthy 
apologia, in which the disavowal of the rules of war was 
attributed to enemy propaganda and met by the argument 
that it was the Allies who had broken international law 
by unleashing a war of aggression and conducting aerial 
bombing —  the Werwolf, it said, was "rising to 
reinstitute the violated law".77
From the very beginning, Werwolf Sender was designed 
to appeal to "the unflinching pertinacious political 
minority which has always formed the steel tip of the 
popular leaden lance”. This vanguard was believed to 
consist of about ten percent of the German population, 
but was thought capable of carrying the majority in the 
direction which it led,78 a concept which has since 
become a general article of faith among revolutionaries. 
In order to build an attitude of tolerance for Werwolf 
activities beyond the activist minority, however, Werwolf 
Sender also took the views of the population-at-large 
into consideration. Despite publicly divorcing itself 
from "stuffy public opinion”, Werwolf Sender displayed a 
surprising willingness to recognize and even pardon the 
war-weariness of the western German population —  "We 
Werwolfe blame no one for being tired. This weariness 
will pass. No one can do more than his strength allows". 
An early broadcast from the station openly admitted that 
pressuring civilians to join the Werwolf would be 
useless, but indicated that, "There will come a time when 
all will join us, including those who have been tired out 
by war and the murderous bombing".79
In order to further make itself palatable to the
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general populace, Werwolf Sender could hardly portray its 
followers as the cutting edge of the National Socialist 
revolution —  Nazi popularity was, after all, in serious 
decline —  but it rather sought to portray Werwolfe as 
local vigilantes protecting civilians from the wanton 
cruelty of Allied soldiers. In Cologne, for instance, a 
Werwolf was said to have distinguished himself by 
attacking an American soldier who had pushed an old woman 
with his gun barrel, and dozens of similar stories were 
told. Werwolf Sender also claimed that guerrillas stole 
food from Allied depots in order to foil the enemy 
"starvation campaign".80
Goebbels also injected into Werwolf Sender his 
repugnance of the western Gauleiters. whose corruption 
and parochialism had generally impeded his effort to 
concentrate domestic power around himself, especially 
after his appointment as General Plenipotentiary for 
Total War in July 1944. However, this anti-establishment 
tendency arose not only from Goebbels' own particular 
obsession, but was probably inevitable given the 
situation in which the Nazi state now found itself: 
Werwolf Sender, for instance, closely followed the 
example of the Fascist Republican Party in Italy, when,
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in the wake of the 1943 Armistice, it re-established its
credentials as a radical movement and condemned the Party
"bosses" who had sacrificed their patriotism for wealth,
rank, and a life of comfort.81 Werwolf Sender also
proclaimed its intention to "suffer no careerists, no
job-hunters, no doddering place holders, no bosses, for
they put their own ends before the common good".82 The
station's program of 13 April was especially critical of
Party bosses and corrupt Burgermeisters:
In the good old times they made use 
of their social position to grow 
rich at the expense of the people.
For years they have been preaching a 
Spartan life without living it.
Their own positions were more 
important to them than a moral life.
Most of them have never come near a 
real fight in this war? they have
never felt the war to the same
extent as the masses of the
people...They are lazy and out only 
for personal power.83
In private conversation 'with his aides, Goebbels went
even a step further, claiming that the rising tide of
chaos brought about by the Werwolf and enemy occupation
was a blessing in disguise: the fire of National
Socialism, he said, had "threatened to smother under the
slag of the 'bosses regime' in the Third Reich. The
storm wind of enemy rule will rekindle it to a new
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heat”.84
Werwolf propaganda was also remarkable for avoiding 
the name of the Fuhrer. as if this supreme "boss” was 
considered a liability rather than an asset. When Hitler 
was mentioned, as on his birthday on 20 April, he was 
presented as a "revolutionary Socialist", whose
"historical achievement is to have freed Socialism from 
all surrounding propaganda, lies, distortions, and 
misinterpretations and to have led it to victory". Even 
this occasion was used as yet another chance to attack 
those "bourgeois souls" who "loudly proclaimed [Hitler's] 
name" because "they feared socialism".85 Only during the 
last few hours of its existence, when the Fuhrer was 
besieged in Berlin, did Werwolf Sender present him as the 
heroic figure so common in Nazi propaganda: "Hitler", it
was noted, "did not flee to South Germany... He stands in 
Berlin and with him are all those whom he has found 
worthy to fight beside him". The "bosses", "reactionary 
elements", "cowards" and other "impeding elements" had 
all been sent away, so that "only the uncompromising 
revolutionary fighters have remained" —  led, of course, 
by Gauleiter Goebbels, "the Fuhrer's trusted friend".86
Because of such rhetoric, it is hardly surprising
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that the Werwolf was formally disavowed by the Party 
establishment, which portrayed it as a spontaneous 
movement of freedom fighters about which little was 
known. Perhaps the Party leadership felt that such a 
disclaimer would automatically absolve it of blame for 
guerrilla activity;87 after all, it was hardly eager to 
accept blame for a propaganda movement which was openly 
hostile to many Party officials as well as to the enemy 
powers. Even the most devout Nazis also had considerable 
doubts on the whole principle of partisan fighting, since 
they, like almost all Germans, feared Allied reprisals 
and an indefinite prolongation of confusion. It is 
perhaps a measure of Werwolf Sender's distinctiveness —  
and its contrast to the Nazi establishment —  that the 
term "neo-Nazi" was first coined in April 1945 as a 
description of its output.88
Werwolf Sender was certainly a harbinger of future 
trends —  most of the distinctive features of postwar 
Eurofascism were already apparent in its broadcasts —  
but it was also a product of radicalizing currents which 
arose in the several years before it was born, 
particularly the leftward turn of Naziism and the revival 
of revolutionary sentiments reminiscent of the 1933-34
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period. After the July 1944 Putsch, National Socialists 
increasingly saw themselves as the spearhead of a 
"people*s war" against not only Jewry, Bolshevism and 
western plutocracy, but also against the surviving forces 
of reaction and defeatism at home —  forces which, 
incidentally, might be expected to reveal their treachery 
by collaborating with the enemy powers once they had 
crossed the German frontier.
Another radicalizing trend was the class levelling 
caused by bombing, rationing, and ground warfare, all of 
which destroyed the material goods forming the background 
of bourgeois society. Goebbels and company could barely 
contain their joy arising from this process of 
"proletarianization", which had begun in the Great War 
and was advanced by the erosive inter-war years of 
inflation and depression. This destruction of the 
bourgeois way of life created new legions of propertyless 
outcasts and casualties of society, exactly the kind of 
people who formed the bed-rock support of Naziism before 
the Junkers and industrialists had hitched on to the 
rising star. In the 1930s, National Socialism had 
diluted itself by appealing to a middle class which still 
existed but felt threatened, mainly at the upper level by
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Communism, and at the petite bourgeois level by Jewish 
economic competition. Werwolf Sender, on the other hand, 
sought to build a new base among those dispossessed by 
the bombs of "Anglo-American plutocracy", while at the 
same time not totally neglecting the danger to Germany's 
"culture" posed by Russian "barbarism".89
The rhetoric to stimulate the desired anti-bourgeois
impulses reached well beyond the boundaries of socialist
radicalism and into the realm of nihilism:
Together with the monuments of 
culture rsaid Werwolf Sender!. there 
also crumble the last obstacles 
separating us from the fulfilment of 
our revolutionary task. Now that 
everything is in ruins we are forced 
to rebuild Europe. In the past 
private possessions tied us to 
bourgeois morality and mentality; 
these possessions have gone now and 
with them all our bourgeois 
restraint. Far from killing all 
Europeans, the bombs have only 
smashed the prison walls which held 
them captive... In trying to destroy 
Europe's future, the enemy has only 
succeeded in smashing the past and 
with it everything old and outward 
has gone. The crumbling of the 
facade of tradition has only 
revealed the inception of a new 
revolution, and all who are strong 
and healthy realize their task, 
which is that of a revolutionary.90 <
Thus was revealed what Hugh Trevor-Roper called "the
authentic voice of Naziism uninhibited" —  "The doctrine
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of purposeless but gleeful destruction of life and 
property and all those values of civilization which the 
German Nazi, though he sometimes tries painfully to 
imitate them, fundamentally envies and detests”.91 
Hermann Rauschning's "Revolution of Nihilism” was thus 
brought full circle.
A second main element of Werwolf Sender propaganda 
was its romantic adventurism, specifically designed for 
teenage boys and girls. The station gave considerable 
attention to the adventure stories of Karl May, a 19th 
century literary hack whose novels about the old American 
West were eagerly consumed by several generations of 
German boys. Such adolescent romanticism, brought to 
life, had inspired the Wandervoael organizations of the 
late Imperial period, and since the beginning of the war, 
had motivated the independently-minded Edelweiss Piraten 
groups which fought the HJ and whose members lived a 
vaguely anarchistic life based on love of adventure. 
These groups —  and a much larger number of teenagers 
acting alone or in small gangs —  were responsible for 
the steep rise in juvenile delinquency in Germany after 
1940, and for the general increase in misbehaviour and 
rudeness among German youth. Such problems became worse
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as teenagers were increasingly drawn further away from 
the influence of the family, and even the school, as they 
were drafted into war industries or employed as Flak 
auxiliaries.92
Werwolf Sender sought to convert these problems 
from liabilities into assets by using the spirit of 
teenage rebellion against the new authority figures in 
the western occupied zones? the followers of Werwolf 
Sender were, in effect, Nazified Edelweiss Piraten.93 
This appeal to teenage romanticism was especially 
apparent in the symbols which Werwolf Sender provided for 
the resistance movement, and even in its story for the 
origin of the Werwolf name, which it claimed was derived 
from the "wild men" of German mythology, "who clad in the 
skins of animals bound from the darkness of the woods 
with the utmost fury upon everything living".94 The 
Werwolf emblem was the Wolfsangel, which was variously 
explained as either the curve of a werewolf fang, or the 
hinge of a wolf's trap, a symbol which during the Thirty 
Years War was carved into trees where foreign soldiers 
were hanged.95 Werwolf Sender also provided the movement 
with its own theme song, appropriately sung by "Werwolf 
Lily":
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I am so savage; I am filled with 
rage,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo
Lily the werewolf is my name,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo,
I bite, I eat, I am not tame,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo,
My Werwolf teeth bite the enemy, 
and then he's done and then he's gone,
Hoo, Hoo, Hoo.96
This, then, was the sorry stuff with which Werwolf Sender
sought to inspire a new generation of German heroes.
Surprising as it may seem, however, Werwolf Sender 
did make some impact on young minds already oriented 
toward Nazi ideology. Within the rapidly shrinking 
limits of the unoccupied Reich, a wave of new adolescent 
recruits reportedly stepped forward to volunteer for 
Unternehmen Werwolf.97 and throughout the occupied 
western zones a variety of local resistance gangs were 
inspired —  in theme at least —  by the Goebbels 
publicity campaign; few of these groups had any formal 
contact with the Prtitzmann program. Such spontaneous 
Werwolf groups remained active as late as 1947, 
conducting minor sabotage and propaganda against the 
occupation forces and harassing the workings of the 
KPD.98
When not preaching to the converted, however, 
Werwolf Sender had much less effect, which even the
station itself admitted: "Only a small minority”, they
noted, "refuses to be intimidated and accepts the 
challenge”. The remainder not only found the Werwolf 
broadcasts absurd,99 but deeply resented the danger posed 
to the general population by such a call to arms.
Moreover, much of the listenership was permeated by an 
abhorrence of guerrilla fighting which Werwolf Sender —  
despite its best efforts to portray Werwolfe as self-
defence vigilantes —  could not erode. Most Germans,
after all, had been taught since the Prussian experience 
with French franc-tireurs in 1870-71 that partisan
warfare was dishonourable, and Nazi propaganda since 1940 
had certainly reinforced this indoctrination, 
particularly by equating guerrilla fighters with bandits 
and criminals.100 An extrapolation of such attitudes 
toward their own guerrilla warriors was almost 
inevitable, at least to some extent, so that in 1945 it 
was not uncommon to find Germans who believed that 
Werwolfe should suffer the same fate as other partisan- 
bandits, ie., they should be flogged, imprisoned, or 
shot. One Rhinelander told American officers that the 
Allies need not worry themselves with inflicting such 
punishments —  "We'll take care of that".101
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The end for Werwolf Sender came with the final 
Soviet advance upon Berlin, which prompted a last minute 
shift of focus away from the West, and toward the 
advancing nemesis in the East. On 23 April, Werwolf 
Sender announced that Hitler and Goebbels were remaining 
in Berlin, and that they would be defended by the best 
surviving forces at Hitler's disposal, even if these had 
to be withdrawn from the western Front? sixteen divisions 
were said to be already marching toward the threatened 
capital and were soon expected. "Herewith", said the 
station, "the Reich testifies to its resolve to defend 
Berlin at all costs". Moreover, Werwolf Sender noted 
that even if the city were lost, "the Werwolfe in it will 
never be overcome...We shall fight until the Reich 
capital is once again the capital of freedom". Such 
declarations were supported with a ringing affirmation 
that, "the main enemy now lay in the east".102
After this final release of bombast, Werwolf Sender 
» ceased broadcasting because its transmitter was overrun 
by the Red Army, and only a week later Goebbels committed 
suicide in the Chancellery bunker, shortly after his 
appointment as Chancellor of the Reich. In the interim 
between these two events, little more was heard of the
Werwolf in any of the Reich*s remaining media services, 
a policy apparently dictated by the need to rebuild 
bridges to the Western Allies and recruit them in the 
anti-Communist crusade. In any case, the most powerful 
transmitter yet in Nazi territory was kept out of the 
hands of fanatics by the shrewd actions of Gauleiter 
Kaufmann, who on 27 April sent a special Volkssturm 
company to occupy Hamburg Sender and thus prevent it from 
becoming a replacement for the Konigswiisterhausen 
station.103
In late April, however, units of the Luftwaffe Radio 
Interception Service were also given instructions to 
split up into small groups and infiltrate Allied lines in 
order to set up auxiliary stations and "supplement 
Werwolf activity", and it is likely that members of the 
SS Interception Service and the Gestapo Wireless Service 
were given similar tasks. Little came of these plans to 
establish truly clandestine propaganda networks, although 
one such Werwolf unit of about a dozen men was reported 
in the Andreasberg-Westharz district (April 1945),104 and 
few underground Nazi transmitters were sporadically 
active during the immediate postwar period.105
Before concluding, mention must also be made of the
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third major figure in the Party triumvirate, Dr. Robert 
Ley. During the period when Bormann and Goebbels were 
attempting to strengthen the Werwolf —  or at least bend 
it toward their own particular purposes —  Ley was 
consumed by the problems posed by the failure of the 
Volkssturm. particularly the question of whether the 
Party was still capable of effective mass action. Ley 
was firmly convinced that despite all appearances, the 
Party was still a credible agent of revolutionary zeal, 
and as proof he touched upon the idea of a national, 
Party-based Freikorps. which would presumably show the 
fiery spirit that had recently been lacking in German 
defence efforts.106 Following numerous precedents in 
naming a Freikorps after its leader, Ley decided to apply 
the name of the Fuhrer himself as the unit's designation.
Ley was a strange figure to head an "elite" para­
military organization. In fact, he was an even more 
unlikely guerrilla chief than Bormann, who, incidentally, 
kept well away from the Freikorps project because he was 
convinced that Ley had neither the temperament nor the 
prestige to lead it. Ley, unlike Bormann, was not a 
former member of the post-WWI Freikorps, nor was he 
especially capable in organizational matters. Rather, he
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was best known as a drunkard and inveterate womanizer, 
and he was not particularly successful even at the 
latter, since his thick composition and stocky, low-slung 
build gave him a brutal and neanderthal appearance. He 
bore no exciting experiences in his past, but was by 
profession a chemist who had left a job at IG Farben to 
become a full-time member of the NSDAP, thereafter rising 
stolidly through the ranks of the movement. 
Ideologically, he sympathized with the radical wing of 
the Party, and yet his capacity as a chief Party 
organizer led him to a close association with the corrupt 
and over-bureaucratized Party hierarchy.107
Finally, it is also worth noting that in the last 
months of the war, Ley's inherent instability made him 
the proverbial loose cannon on the ship of state. 
Goebbels noted in his diary in late March 1945 that Ley, 
"has become somewhat hysterical... He is pretty well 
knocked-out and thoroughly rattled by recent 
developments, particularly in the west". The diary 
jottings of another senior Propaganda Ministry official 
were less delicately phrased: "As usual, Ley has had a
clownish brainwave which he is trying to sell all over 
the place. He has cast himself for the part of last
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minute saviour. Everybody, even Goebbels, is laughing at 
this repulsive idiot".108
The inspiration for the Freikorps apparently came to 
Ley in a sudden flash in late March, while on a tour of 
Vienna and eastern Austria. Since he was a man whose 
passion for an idea burned intensely bright, if usually 
only for a short period, he immediately rushed back to 
Berlin and demanded to see Hitler. Ushered into the 
Fuhrer1 s presence, Ley suggested enthusiastically that an 
elite volunteer corps could be formed from National 
Socialist officials who had fled from occupied territory 
and were therefore ready for further employment. "I can 
promise you at least forty thousand fanatical fighters, 
mein Fuhrer. They can hold the Upper Rhine and passes 
through the Black Forest. You can rely on that."
Hitler, at first, did not seem overly impressed, but 
he gradually warmed to the idea —  in fact, two days 
after Ley had suggested the formation of the Freikorps. 
Hitler was already heard to babble that if the gaps in 
the Western Front could be plugged for the' immediate 
future, "The Adolf Hitler Freikorps can then slowly make 
its appearance". As a man of intuition, Hitler 
apparently began to feel that Ley's radical enthusiasm
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was more inspiring than any practical difficulties 
involved in either the basic scheme or in Ley's 
suggestion of himself to run it —  Ley, he said, was "a 
real fanatic who, within certain limitations, can be 
useful for tasks requiring fanaticism”.109
Ley argued that the purpose of Freikorps Adolf 
Hitler (FAH) was to ambush tank spearheads with 
Panzerfauste. a task which he had once expected of the 
Volkssturm.110 but which that organization rarely 
performed effectively. During the last year of the war, 
the menace of tank breakthroughs had become increasingly 
severe, although it was hoped that once these occurred on 
German soil they could at least be combatted by a 
concerned civilian population. In late 1944, military 
and political authorities formed a "Panzerabwehr 
Organisation” from various elements of replacement troops 
and Volkssturm. and in 1945 regular civilians were also 
inducted into the early warning system of the 
organization.111 Although the FAH did not wholly replace 
the Panzerabwehr. it definitely comprised a Party 
initiative to consolidate efforts in this direction —  in 
fact, several Wehrmacht Panzeriaad units in Western 
Germany were formally subordinated to Freikorps authority
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(although they remained under the operational control of 
the Army).112 Not surprisingly, the Freikorps also 
underwent a rapid transition to guerrilla activity 
similar to that which affected the Army in April 1945, as 
combat against enemy tank spearheads naturally 
degenerated into partisan warfare.
The purpose and constitution of the FAH was made 
clear in a trio of documents signed on 28 March and 
published several days later. The first of these was a 
Fuhrer Directive which decreed the creation of the 
movement, and ordered that it should be formed of 
volunteers from the Party, the Volkssturm. and the 
Wehrmacht. This was no ordinary comb-out of extraneous 
personnel, but a plain effort to rob these organizations 
of their best people in order to create an elite band of 
tank destroyers and partisans. The Volkssturm. military 
and business concerns were under compulsion to release 
volunteers of eighteen years and older who wished to 
enlist in the Freikorps, a measure which angered even 
hardened Nazis.113 Supporters of the Volkssturm felt that 
their organization, in particular, would lose what little 
backbone it possessed.114
A second inaugural document consisted of an
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hysterical appeal by Ley which attempted to derogate the
very doctrine of armoured movement and concentrated
superiority which had earlier formed the basis of the
German Blitzkrieg;
A small number of enemy tank packs 
are engaged in utilising critical 
situations at the front to break 
into the Reich. In fact they are 
nothing but a bogey. We have men 
and arms to annihilate them and the 
small groups of infantry which 
follow without remainder. It is 
only a question of our will and our 
readiness to act. You, my old Party 
comrades, have already once before 
achieved victory as a minority in 
numbers but fanatics of our nation 
in faithful self-sacrifice and 
energy... Volunteers, come forward!
To the merciless annihilation of 
these intruders into our country.
They must and will never be allowed 
to rest. Invisible and therefore 
hard to catch, we shall continually 
attack and annihilate them.
Ley also outlined the organizational structure of the
Freikorps. noting that like the Volkssturm. detachments
would be led by the Gauleiters and set up by the
Kreisleiters and Ortsaruppenleiters.115
A third document was distributed by Goebbels, who 
overcame his own original opposition to the Freikorps as 
soon as he heard of the Fuhrer1s approval? thereafter, he
received Ley for a visit and negotiated with him for
control of Freikorps propaganda.116 Goebbels* text dealt 
with further organizational matters, particularly the 
fact that volunteers would be employed full-time by the 
FAH, regardless of the importance of their civilian jobs. 
He also noted that Freikorps volunteers were expected to 
supply their own field kit and clothes —  preferably of 
military cut and colour —  plus three days worth of 
rations. Their transport was to be accomplished not by 
railway, but by bicycle, which were provided by the 
recruits themselves or were drawn from a communal stock. 
Finally, Goebbels noted that each Gau was supposed to 
contribute one hundred men, although this may have only 
been an initial allotment117 —  in his diary, the 
Propaganda Minister mentioned that the Gauleiters were 
actually capable of contributing ten thousand "activists'* 
to the movement.118
Although Party officials were not particularly 
pleased about such a fuss over the Easter holiday,119 
formation of the Korps proceeded apace in the next 
several weeks. An organizational staff and main supply 
depot was established at Heuberg, in Swabia, and an 
operational staff was also set up and based in Berlin.120 
Recruits were drawn mainly from Ley's own organization,
the DAF,121 although volunteers also reported from the HJ, 
the SA, and the Gau staffs. According to Allied 
intelligence reports, the new organization also depended 
heavily upon the cadres of the Politische Staffeln. which 
were para-military goon squads formed by Ley in 1943 in 
order to give the local Kreisleiters a counter-weight to 
the Gestapo.122 Drawn from such incongruous elements, 
approximately three thousand volunteers reported in early 
April to military training grounds scattered throughout 
Germany, mainly at points between the Rhine and the 
Elbe.123 As James Lucas notes, the mental image presented 
by this congregation is a sad one: hundreds of middle-
aged cyclists pedalling sedately through the German 
countryside, dressed in sensible clothes and provided by 
their wives with packed lunches, few of them with any 
realistic idea of what lay ahead.124 It was certainly a 
far cry from the marching legions of young Aryan supermen 
who had once been the only fit material for Nazi "elite" 
units*
As Lucas suggests, many of the Freikorps volunteers 
were middle-aged bureaucrats, although their ranks were 
nearly matched by a number of over-excited teenaged boys. 
It is also true that nearly fifteen percent of the
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organization's total membership was composed of girls and 
women (one of whom was Lore Ley, daughter of the 
Freikorps chief himself).125 When this mixed assembly 
reached the various training grounds, Wehrmacht and SS 
instructors found that they were not generally the type 
of trainees who easily responded to the tasks put before 
them, although they were still forced to race through an 
extremely restricted training schedule —  at most, 
preparation for combat consisted of two weeks training. 
The brief courses which the instructors had time to 
present emphasized tank-busting techniques, plus such 
guerrilla tactics as laying booby-traps and learning how 
to blow up sabotage targets with high explosives. 
Females were given the same training course as men, 
although less intensive, and were expected to take part 
in combat if necessary.126
Toward the end of the Freikorps' formative stage, 
the organizers became increasingly reconciled to the fact 
that FAH members would probably engage in partisan 
warfare, if only because the field for conventional anti­
tank warfare was rapidly diminishing. In response, 
secret arms caches were laid, false identity papers were 
forged, and cadres were given alternate missions, such as
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terrorizing collaborators, in case their frontline 
positions were overrun.127 Deep in the Alpine Redoubt 
(near Admont) , Ley even ordered the establishment of a 
special training camp —  designated as a Werwolf facility 
—  at which one hundred and thirty-five guerrilla- 
trainees were given instruction in partisan warfare, and 
subsequently formed into sabotage "Schwarme11 of twenty- 
five men each.128
When Ley began Freikorps Adolf Hitler, he worried 
about adequate armament for the troops, and in late March 
he told Hitler that OKW would have to make eighty 
thousand sub-machine guns available. Ley thereafter 
bounced from one authority to another in search of arms, 
until he finally arrived at the office of General 
Juttner, head of the Heereswaffenamt (or Army Ordnance) . 
Once conducted along the right channel, however, Ley was 
treated like a king, his needs being given precedence 
even over those of the Wehrmacht. An Oberleutnant from 
the Heereswaffenamt was attached to his staff, and his 
FAH partisans were given access to the best remaining 
small arms in the Reich, including sub-machine guns and 
rifles with telescopic sights. Hitler himself was 
induced to pressure one of Speer's section chiefs to make
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twenty thousand Panzerfauste available to the new 
organization, and as noted earlier, it is also likely 
that stocks of poison gas were issued.129
In mid and late April, Freikorps units were actually 
deployed at the Front, especially at a number of points 
in southwest Germany, and in Berlin? in the Czech 
Protectorate, a special formation, "Freikorps Bohmen", 
was also in the process of formation and deployment. 
Freikorpsmanner faced the enemy in Wehrmacht camouflage 
uniforms and peaked caps, although instructions 
stipulated that this uniform was to be quickly discarded 
in case of a switch-over to partisan activities, and it 
is known that female FAH members often carried out 
reconnaissance missions in civilian clothes. Freikorps 
troops fought alongside the Wehrmacht, and were usually 
deployed as one hundred man Gau contingents, although 
these groups were sub-divided into eight-to-ten man 
operational units, obviously prepatory to their 
conversion into partisan cells. Intelligence reports and 
divisional histories of the Western Allied armies bear no 
reports of encounters with the Freikorps Adolf Hitler, 
although this may result largely from the fact that FAH 
contingents could easily be mistaken as Volkssturm or
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Wehrmacht scratch units. Two thousand FAH members in 
Berlin fought alongside the Waffen-SS in the desperate 
last ditch defence of the central Government section, and 
Ley later testified that these formations were almost 
completely wiped out.130
In Southwestern Germany, the FAH was also deployed 
against the so-called "inner enemy", particularly 
Bavarian separatists who rose in revolt at the end of 
April 1945. After the withdrawal of some six hundred 
Freikorps members from the collapsing front in Baden, a 
para-political task force was formed called "Gruppe 
Hans," so named because the regional chief of the FAH was 
the writer Hans Zoberlein. Members of "Gruppe Hans" 
served in special execution squads code-named "Werwolf 
Oberbavern". who specialized in terrorizing "defeatists" 
and in breaking up the ranks of Bavarian particularists 
who re-emerged from the shadows as the Allies approached. 
On 28 April, drunken squads of "Werwolf Oberbavern" 
reacted to separatist demonstrations in the town of 
Penzberg by launching a savage raid upon the community, 
which resulted in at least fifteen dead and in a hard- 
fought shoot-out on the outskirts of town. Southern 
Bavaria was also flooded with "Werwolf Oberbavern"
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handbills, which showed the Wolfsanael and warned, "Our 
vengeance is death!”131
As the end steadily approached, Ley like so many 
German guerrilla leaders —  failed to immolate himself in 
a final furioso, but rather sought to melt into the 
background. Ultra intercepts show that he was still busy 
establishing Gau contingents of the FAH as late as 24 
April,132 but he then declined to join his "elite” units 
in a final fight? rather he fled to the Redoubt, 
supposedly to join in a last ditch effort by a more 
credible military force, the SS Sixth Panzer Army. No 
such action occurred —  Ley claimed that Sepp Dietrich's 
wife convinced him of the futility of this intention133 - 
- and in May the Freikoros chief was discovered near 
Berchtesgaden by American troops? hardly the picture of 
a dangerous desperado, Ley was captured and taken into 
custody in his pyjamas and slippers. Five months later, 
shortly before the opening of the Nuremberg Trials, he 
brought his tortured existence to an end with an ugly 
suicide in his prison cell.
Meanwhile, most Freikoros detachments were 
dispersed, including the Werwolf Schwarme at Admont, and 
members were prohibited from killing Allied officers.134
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As was the case with the Werwolf, a few units outlived 
the desertion of their chief and attempted to maintain a 
shadowy post-capitulation existence, although they were 
by no means intended for such a role. For instance, one 
FAH unit led by Hauptmann Keller —  and composed mainly 
of Politische Staffel hoodlums —  fled into the Alps in 
Voralberg, obviously with the intention of forming a 
guerrilla band.135 Several other Freikoros cells in 
Bavaria also survived the end of the war, and thereafter 
occupied themselves with the task of composing 
threatening letters and pamphlets? as a reprisal against 
denazification proceedings, for example, they threatened 
to lift the ban on assassinations that had been imposed 
in May 1945.136 FAH remnants also functioned in British 
and French occupied areas, and French authorities charged 
in 1946 that an organization of two thousand Freikoros 
members existed in southwest Germany, still under the 
direction of Zoberlein.137
Jn the final analysis, however, neither the 
Freikoros nor its postwar shadow were ever effective. 
Locally, of course, it was perhaps of some significance 
when organized by an effective Gauleiter or when 
commanded in combat by an adroit SS officer.138 A few of
the post-capitulation Freikoros remnants, in particular, 
were dominated by former officers and NCOs of the SS, 
which represented the take-over: of a body which was 
originally a product of the Party*s political side, 
especially the DAF. Considered in its original form, 
however, the FAH was doomed to failure simply because it 
was established by the most inefficient and corrupt
segment of the Nazi Party. Moreover, the concept itself 
was fatally flawed? it was intended to replace the
Volkssturm *with a kind of elite, Party-based super- 
Vo Iks sturm .it *hnd yet most of the elite were already in the 
armed forces or were dead, leaving only boys and middle 
aged officials to serve as Freikoros cannon fodder. Any 
fit human material between these extremes usually 
consisted of professional slackers who had previously 
used every possible dodge to escape active service and
were thus not likely to set an example of courage in the
field.
An Allied intelligence summary from late April 1945 
probably touched upon the essence of the Freikoros in 
surmising that it grew forth from the small-minded 
rivalry between the Party proper and the SS, which had 
already organized the Werwolf. "It is difficult to
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believe”, said the report, "that, its formation was not 
due to the sudden belated realisation of the Party 
'bosses* that the direction of the,Werewolves; hadgotten 
into the hands of people who were hostile rather than
friendly to the established Party hierarchy. The
"Freikorps Adolf Hitler' is nothing but the quasi­
military organization of all these 'bosses', from the
local Ortsaruppenleiter at the bottom to the fat drunken 
Reichsleiter Ley at the top, whom the Werewolves 
disown".139 While only a few misguided zealots were 
willing to fight ;on for the Nazi revolution, even fewer 
were ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Party 
hacks and local political kingpins who hardly represented 
the idealistic side of the movement.
The Freikoros was not the only Nazi resistance 
movement which disintegrated while its leaders fled for 
safety or dickered with the enemy? in fact, certain Party 
chieftains showed a pronounced tendency to sacrifice the 
Werwolf in a last minute bid to preserve themselves or 
save some small measure of their power. Bormann himself 
may serve as the prime example: on 2 May 1945 —  with
the Red Army only several blocks away —  he reached a 
last minute deal with Goebbels* deputy Fritsche, in which
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the capitulation of the Berlins garrison was vhrieflyr 
delayed in order to facilitate* his (Bormann's) own.? 
personal! attempt to flee the' government .Quarter*1 *a*nd*• 
break-out of the encircled capital? Bormann, in return,*^ ** ■;
agreed to Fritsche's contention that further guerrilla* .<*:,• , :
warfare was senseless and issued an order to dissolve the *: >; * ^
Werwolf, which was his last act as a public official.14? %
Bormann himself had presumably dispatched . ■■Vehme* *.■'■<** * ?
assassination teams for acts which paled in comparison to i.-v. 
this ultimate betrayal of the Werwolf spirit.
Eve^\Goebbels# who was willing to throw both himself ; - 4.V iSr.® 
and his family upon the funeral pyre of the regime, made :--~
little ef fort during his‘final days to maintain Werwolf I T : v:4
hostility against the West. Goebbels, however, was much 
more than. ,a glorified appartchik of the Bormann or Ley ; 
type? rather, he was the archetypical revolutionary; 
rabble rouser —  much more effective at undermining; ;* • . ;
authority than in exercising it. As Joachim Fest notes,; .
Goebbels'^power rebounded exactly during the period when*;* . 
the - position . of 'the Third Reich became critical ^ 
precisely because no one was more, psychologically adepts ' 
at fighting a desperate battle of survival? only thenv . 
could his brutal demagogy and revolutionary passions* -be^it* 1; ^
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unleashed without fear of causing offence. ”We have 
burnt our bridges behind us," he said in 1943. 11We are
forced to proceed to extremes and therefore resolved to 
proceed to extremes."141
Goebbels, moreover, was the only senior Nazi leader 
fully cognizant of the need for a political and 
ideological foundation for partisan warfare? in fact, he 
shared much of the spirit of the Marxist and anti­
colonial revolutionary warfare which was waged so 
intensely in the years after 1945. While Anglo-American 
statesmen and soldiers had worried about unleashing the 
chaos of guerrilla fighting, Goebbels thought more like 
Mao Tse-Tung, who exploited partisan warfare not only as 
a diversionary tactic, but as a means of bonding a 
revolutionary Party to the people it claimed to 
represent. The Werwolf, in Goebbels' view, emerged as a 
means of changing society, and as a true movement rather 
than a mere organization. It was in this sense that 
Werwolf Sender obviously sought to set the tone for post­
capitulation resistance,142 despite the absence of any 
explicit admission to this effect.
It has already been shown that Goebbels' propaganda 
struck the right note for a small minority amongst the
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Party*s dwindling constituency, but for most Germans it 
lacked any appeal. The anti-materialist and anti- 
establishmentarian themes were more suited to a mature 
materialist society beginning to tire of consumerism than 
to a people who had just grown accustomed to the benefits 
of the industrial and agricultural revolutions, only then 
to promptly lose them. The bombed-out refugee who had 
once enjoyed a warm hearth and a comfortable bed was 
hardly likely to find ideological satisfaction sleeping 
in the cold, eating turnip soup, or —  worst of all —  
risking violent reprisals for the purpose of further 
prolonging the violence which had already brought ruin 
upon his country. Mass resistance is based upon the 
calculation by a significant segment of the population 
that present conditions are certainly no worse than the 
risks entailed by resistance (the latter, of course, 
gains added attractiveness by idealistic expectations of 
a better life after the expulsion of the invader) . These 
assumptions did not exist in the occupied Reich —  at 
least not in the West —  nor was any amount of nihilistic 
bombast able to compensate for this lacking, or even to 
cause a deterioration of conditions to such a degree that 
the resistance equation would take effect.
It is true that the first bare cupboard years of 
enemy occupation caused a spiritual yearning in many 
Germans —  particularly in light of the vacuum which 
followed the bankruptcy of National Socialism —  but this 
longing was filled largely by religion rather than 
ideology. In any case, the first signs of economic 
recovery in 1948 encouraged Western Germans to embrace 
materialism more strongly than ever, and they were joined 
by literally millions of compatriots from the East who 
obviously wished to live in the same environment. The 
revolutionary crises of confidence in material things 
which Werwolf Sender sought to create only occurred in 
the 1960s, and in turn created the impetus for the 
radical terrorist groups of the following decade.
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Conclusion: Consequences and Significance of the
Werwolf
A great deal of ground has been covered in this 
work, but from this mass of material a few primary 
conclusions arise. Perhaps the most basic of these 
points is the very existence in 1944-45 of a significant 
Werwolf organization, which comprised one of the chief 
initiatives of the dying Nazi Reich, and which was 
intended to harass the invading Allied and Soviet armies 
to such a degree that the Nazi regime could save some 
semblance of its power and authority.
Moreover, the Werwolf and its sister groups were 
sporadically active, particularly if we accept Goebbels1 
expanded definition of the movement; ie., that any German 
who committed an act of resistance —  even if solely on 
his/her own initiative —  was in fact a Werwolf. We now 
know, for instance, that civilian franc tireurs 
occasionally fired at Allied troops? that by-passed 
groups of soldiers and SS men harassed Allied supply 
lines (and were occasionally stiffened by special stay- 
behind sabotage teams); that scores of German 
"defeatists” and collaborators were liquidated by Werwolf
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assassins; that Werwolfe and SS stay-behind units 
attempted to disrupt the Soviet rear behind the Eastern 
Front? and that minor sabotage and terrorism continued 
for several years after the end of the war. In addition, 
we now know that the Germans attempted to support 
Volksdeutsch and non-German guerrilla resistance and that 
they had some success in this endeavour on the Eastern 
Front, where nationalist partisans actively disrupted 
Soviet lines of supply —  in fact, the war did not wholly 
peter out in Eastern Europe until the late 1940s.
The final toll of such violence is unknown, but must 
certainly extend into the thousands, even if we do not 
strictly include the damage done by nationalist guerrilla 
groups allied to the Germans. In addition to persons 
killed directly as a result of Werwolf activity, the toll 
must also include many hundreds who died in reprisal 
killings or in anti-partisan razzias such as that which 
occurred at Aussig-an-der-Elbe in late July 1945. A 
final total of at least a thousand dead ranks the Werwolf 
as a final drop in the torrent of blood spilt during 
World War Two, but it is more significant if considered 
in its own right as an example of recent partisan warfare 
and terrorism in Europe.
While a considerable degree of Nazi partisan warfare 
must be granted, however, the final note on the Werwolf 
must address why it failed in its objectives. The most 
obvious determinants of this failure appear repeatedly 
throughout this study and comprise the debilitating 
structural faults in the movement. Recall, for instance, 
the absence of strong leadership; the lack of independent 
access to weapons and personnel by the Prutzmann agency; 
and the general employment of policemen who were often 
burdened with an overly legalistic attitude toward 
guerrilla tactics. There was also a bitter competition 
between rival agencies, and as the Werwolf decision­
making loop grew larger, Prutzmann*s control 
correspondingly diminished: the military took over
Werwolf Gruppen for use in tactical or reconnaissance 
missions; Bormann expanded the Werwolf as a domestic 
terror force; and Goebbels established a propaganda 
channel which launched a call to arms mainly aimed at 
teenagers.
Perhaps worst of all, Prutzmann and Skorzeny alike 
were stuck in a frame of thought outlined by Clausewitz 
more than a century before, which considered guerrilla 
warfare strictly as an adjunct to regular military
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operations. Only at the last desperate minute was 
guerrilla warfare given consideration as a post­
capitulation, revolutionary sort of tactic, and even 
these hasty plans were mere wisps of smoke which 
disappeared during the final scramble for safety —  only 
Axmann had the verve to actually carry through an attempt 
to bring the Werwolf into the post-capitulation period. 
Among the most senior echelon of the Nazi leadership, it 
was Goebbels alone who perceived the vast revolutionary 
possibilities of partisan warfare, although he lacked 
either the time or the means to shape such a movement.
Evidence of such chaos and confusion within the Nazi 
regime adds extra weight to the so-called "structuralist" 
or "functionalist" school of historiography, which 
regards the Third Reich as a "polycracy" of competing 
centres of power, and which portrays the Fiihrer as a 
figure strangely remote from the day-to-day operations of 
the civil and Party bureaucracies.1 The Werwolf, in 
fact, was the penultimate act in the bureaucratic anarchy 
that resulted in the black night of lawlessness and self- 
destruction so aptly described by Hans Mommsen. On the 
other hand, one would doubt that even the staunchest 
advocates of a Hitler-centered, "programmatic"
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historiography would deny that Hitler's position had 
drastically weakened by 1944-45, and that any "program" 
advocated by the dictator had already failed, thus 
allowing the bureaucratic factions within the regime to 
spiral into a whirlwind of confusion and barbarism.
Another basic problem —  and one of even greater 
impact —  was that the Werwolf enjoyed no public support 
beyond a fringe element usually estimated at ten to 
fifteen percent of the population.2 In fact, most 
Germans were eager to point out Nazi saboteurs to the 
occupation authorities, since failure to eliminate this 
danger in a quick and efficient fashion seemed to promise 
reprisals as a consequence. In fact, the entire Werwolf 
program was based on a faulty premise, at least in 
western Germany, where the Allies were the only potential 
force standing in the way of Soviet occupation? the 
average German could hardly have relished the prospect of 
a continual Soviet push westwards should Allied forces 
slow up the pace of their advance in order to deal with 
harassments in the rear. Since considerable public 
support has traditionally been regarded as a necessary 
prerequisite for large-scale guerrilla warfare —  a point 
repeatedly made in the Werwolf instruction manual itself
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—  the Werwolf must be regarded as a misbegotten effort.
Aside from the psychological complications of the 
basic Werwolf strategy in the west, five main factors 
contributed to the widespread disillusionment with 
Werwolf warfare:
First, the Werwolf was irrevocably associated with 
the National Socialist Party —  despite propaganda 
efforts to prevent this association —  and by 1945 
National Socialism was discredited in the eyes of most 
Germans. The Nazis, as Edward Peterson notes, were a 
populist party dependent upon success, and in this sense 
they could not sustain the terrible failure which they 
had incurred.3 It is clearly evident that the collapse 
of the Third Reich gave rise to a reassertion of the 
centuries old German tradition of aversion to politics, 
rather than to a wave of final loyalty to either the 
Party or the Fuhrer: MAlles voruber. alles vorbei"
became the motto of the common man.4
Given these circumstances, the best chance of 
success for the Werwolf would have been to convert itself 
into a strictly patriotic rally against the occupiers or 
to portray itself as a self-defence mechanism. Both 
strategies were in fact applied —  usually without much
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effect —  although it is perhaps significant that the 
Soviets and French, the least benevolent of the 
conquerors, probably also experienced the most trouble. 
It is also interesting to note that Nazi efforts to stir 
up a spirit of vengeance based upon the Allied Luftkrieg 
almost totally backfired: the majority of the populace
in heavily bombed areas felt that their own Governments 
failure to clear the skies of the Reich was inexcusable 
and they staunchly refused to become cannon fodder for 
resistance efforts.5
Second, Germany's moment of defeat was much worse 
than that of such countries as France or Yugoslavia, in 
the sense that partisans in those nations had foreign 
sources of supply, and a justified hope for eventual 
victory. Even in these cases, it is significant that 
resistance was minimal until well after the entry of the 
USSR and the United States into the war. Alternately, 
Nazi guerrillas had no foreign supply bases,6 nor were 
they able to preserve the so-called "National Redoubt" as 
a base area (another prerequisite of successful partisan 
warfare). Considering that most Werwolfe assumed on 
Clausewitzian grounds that guerrillas alone were 
incapable of defeating a regular military force, they
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were left with no belief in the possibility of eventual 
victory. The only flicker of hope for Naziism's mere 
survival was a clash between the Western Allies and the 
Soviet Union, and the continued existence of the movement 
even amidst the flames of such a conflict seemed 
unlikely. The desperation of this situation was realized 
by the bulk of the population and made the Werwolf seem 
an entirely hopeless effort.
Third, the German people were too tired, both 
physically and psychologically, to respond to Werwolf 
appeals, a factor which even Werwolf Sender was forced to 
acknowledge. People who worked ten hours per day; who 
spent almost all their spare time in food queues; and who 
suffered under a constant barrage of aerial bombardment, 
could hardly have been expected to oppose the final end 
of the conflict which had created these conditions in the 
first place. "The war-weary population", said one German 
general, "will prove to be a poor breeding ground for 
guerrilla activities of any kind other than of 
irresponsible and sporadic nature".7
Similarly, in the post-capitulation period, the 
average German was too concerned with the immediate 
survival of himself and his family to find time to engage
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in resistance activities —  foraging and Black Market 
operations necessarily consumed spare time. In fact, 
British intelligence reports noted in early 1947 that 
resistance to Allied rule was a reasonable expectation 
but for the factors of cold and hunger that largely 
governed German behaviour?8 one is reminded of the maxim 
that revolutions are made not by the desperate, but by 
the marginally well-off. On the other hand, it is 
certainly no coincidence that the spirit of Nazi 
underground resistance flourished most among children and 
teenagers, the segment of the population least affected 
by the demands of war, and —  in the postwar period —  
the only social group with spare time to fill.
Fourth, there was a great fear of enemy reprisals 
against anyone harbouring resisters,9 and even in Soviet- 
occupied territory, where deep hatred of the conqueror 
created a considerable psychological basis for guerrilla 
warfare, the intense savagery of the occupation troops 
largely paralysed the populace and sapped any capacity 
for vigorous activity.10 A few supporters of the Werwolf 
had believed that harsh enemy reprisals would actually 
help the movement by driving uncommitted Germans into the 
Nazi camp,11 but in truth, fear of retaliation produced
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the opposite effect: captured Werwolfe told Allied
interrogators they often had as much difficulty evading 
German civilians as in dodging Allied troops, and many 
Germans were sorely tempted to attack or disarm Werwolfe 
in order to prevent any possible disturbances.12 Werwolf 
supply dumps were also plundered or betrayed to the 
occupation authorities,13 and the written report of one 
SS guerrilla band —  in noting such plunderings —  said 
that the opposition of the local population generally 
made partisan operations most difficult: "The civilians 
are glad the war is over for them. They pander to the 
Americans in the most revolting way and bar their doors 
to German soldiers still willing to fight".14
Certainly this widespread fear of the Kleinkrieg 
was not without reason, since the invading powers 
generally adopted draconian reassures to crush partisan 
resistance —  measures which, in a few extreme cases, led 
to unfortunate incidents that might rightly be described 
as atrocities. Resistance by guerrillas or civilian 
gunmen resulted in the whole or partial destruction of a 
number of captured towns in reprisal, most notably 
Jarmin, Naumberg, and Koch, all on the Eastern Front,15 
Sogel and Freisoythe, which were destroyed by the
Canadians,16 and Marbach, which was partially sacked and 
destroyed by French and Morrocan soldiers?17 General 
Patton's personal war diary reveals that several towns 
near the Thuringian Forest were "removed” by the US Third 
Army due to sniping and the ambush of an American staff 
car.18 Other towns were forcibly evacuated or hostages 
were taken and sometimes shot?19 in at least three cases 
—  Arnsberg,20 Freudenstadt,21 and Memel22 —  the entire 
male populations of newly-occupied communities were 
locked up in concentration compounds for a limited 
period. Invasion troops also had orders to summarily 
execute any resisters in civilian clothes who hid weapons 
or fired on the occupation forces,23 and throughout 1945 
scores of Germans were executed on such grounds.24 
Moreover, Soviet troops were instructed to regard as a 
partisan anyone found in the woods and to treat such 
persons accordingly? as well, all civilians caught aiding 
Army and SS stragglers were executed and their homes 
burned down.25
Reprisals against German and Volksdeutsch resisters 
in Eastern Europe were especially harsh, the Soviets 
having set an unfortunate precedent by the mass expulsion 
of Volksdeutschen along the Middle Volga (August 1941)26
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and in Transylvania and the Banat (January 1945),27 in 
both cases on grounds of pro-German resistance activity. 
Thereafter, the Russians regularly conducted mass "labour 
drafts" among Germanic populations in newly occupied 
areas, and it was even suggested by a captured Soviet 
officer that there were plans to disperse all the 
Germanic settlement areas in Eastern Europe because of 
the threat of partisan warfare.28 As late as 1946, 
outbreaks of resistance in the Soviet Zone were routinely 
answered by the large-scale round-up and deportation of 
teenagers in the affected area (much to the embarrassment 
of the Soviets when news of such operations leaked out to 
the West) .29
Pro-Soviet regimes in several central European 
countries also exploited resistance by ethnic Germans in 
order to uproot entire towns and villages in mass 
expulsions,30 and in a number of cases, large groups of 
hostages were shot as a reprisal for alleged resistance 
activity:31 in the Yugoslavian Banat, for instance, one 
hundred and seventy-five Volksdeutschen were executed in 
March 1945 because a Soviet officer had been killed by a 
civilian sniper.32 Such measures unfortunately remind one 
of the Nazis own tactics in Eastern Europe, where anti­
partisan operations were designed to achieve genocide as 
well as physically eliminating active partisans. The 
worst single instance of this self-righteous policy of 
vengeance occurred in the Sudeten town of Aussig-an-der- 
Elbe, where an ammunition dump was blown up by alleged 
"Werwolf sabotage" in the mid-summer of 1945, and where 
a large number of innocent Sudeten-German townspeople 
were subsequently beaten and killed in a wild razzia by 
Czech security forces —  the final number of deaths 
arising from this pogrom have estimated at anywhere 
between four hundred and two thousand.33 It is little 
wonder, therefore, that a Czech labour unionist who 
toured the Sudetenland in mid-1945 reported that despite 
numerous reports of sabotage, most of the Germanic 
population was in a zombie-like state and seemed to lack 
the psychological capabilities for any effective 
resistance.34
A fifth and final factor mitigating against 
resistance was that the social and political climate of 
the unified Reich had conditioned several successive 
generations of Germans to regard partisan warfare as an 
illegitimate tactic. Werwolf propaganda desperately 
sought to reverse this belief by appealing to strong
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traditions of German "popular" warfare, but given the 
short time in which Werwolf Sender could influence 
opinion, it is hardly surprising that little was 
accomplished. In the final analysis, most Germans 
retained almost as much contempt for their own guerrilla 
fighters as for the "bandits" and "Reds" who had harassed 
the Wehrmacht. It would be incorrect to conclude, 
however, that Germans were somehow unsuited for partisan 
warfare on racial or long-term cultural grounds.
Finally, one must add that lack of popular support 
also doomed many of the foreign resistance movements 
sponsored by the Jaqdverbande and FAK units, although the 
Germans achieved considerable results in Rumania, and 
also succeeded in urging several independent resistance 
groups, such as UPA and the Chetniks, toward a program of 
cooperation with German forces. There was certainly no 
reservoir of pro-German sentiment in Eastern Europe, but 
there was a great wave of anti-Communist feeling which 
the Germans were able to exploit. A corresponding 
attempt to seed guerrilla warfare in liberated western 
Europe failed almost completely —  particularly in France 
and the Low Countries —  but the fact that the Germans 
still pushed forward with such matters is hardly
446
surprising; recall, for instance, the strange euphoria 
that had overcome England in the summer of 1940, when it 
was hoped that undercover exploits and a call to 
rebellion in Europe could reverse the vast material 
resources then pitted against embattled Britain.
Examination of the German side of the story does 
not, of course, tell the entire tale. No one can have 
read this account without wondering about the reactions 
of the Allies and Soviets, and it is perhaps proper to 
offer a few final observations on this matter before 
closing. In short, it might be concluded that the threat 
of Nazi partisan warfare had a generally unhealthy effect 
on broad issues of policy among the occupying powers. 
General Eisenhower, for instance, considered the Germans 
a warlike race who would never surrender, and he 
suggested that the German Army would break down into 
individual centers of resistance —  possibly anchored in 
an Alpine Redoubt —  rather than capitulate.35 Based on 
such expectations, he contributed substantially to the 
hardening of American occupation policy in the late 
summer and fall of 1944: in August, he encouraged
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's quest for a so-called 
"hard Peace",36 and soon after he also asked for the
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revision of a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff
which had made Allied forces initially responsible for
the maintenance of regular public services and utilities
in occupied Germany:
... it may well be that the German 
Army as a whole will never actually 
surrender and that we shall enter 
the country finding no central 
German authority in control, with 
the situation chaotic, probably 
guerrilla fighting and possibly even 
civil war in certain districts ...
If conditions in Germany turn out to 
be as described it will be utterly 
impossible effectively to control or 
save the economic structure of the 
country .. and we feel we should not 
assume the responsibility for its 
support and control.37
The pragmatic British were mortified by such a
suggestion,38 but the American War Department naturally
took considerable account of the Supreme Commander's
opinions and for some time was quite amenable to
suggestions from the Treasury that occupation policy
should be more draconian in nature.39
The eventual outcome of these changes in policy was 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (for US forces 
only) , the SHAEF Occupation Directive of 9 November 1944, 
and the much-revised Handbook for Military Government in
Germany. a final version of which was published in
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December 1944.40 Such documents called for harsh
denazification guidelines, non-fraternization between 
Allied troops and German civilians, and the schooling and 
re-education of German youth —  all measures which were 
intended to safeguard the immediate security of the 
occupation forces, as well as laying the groundwork for 
a long-term solution of "the German Problem."41
When Allied forces arrived in Germany they brought 
with them an immense system of rules and regulations 
which governed the day-to-day existence of Germans well 
into the summer of 1945, and in some cases much longer. 
German life, for instance, was regulated by a curfew and 
by strict travel restrictions (which damaged agricultural 
production) ?42 all meetings of more than five persons 
were banned (which effectively eliminated all political 
activity);43 Germans had to surrender hunting rifles and 
ceremonial arms (which meant that farmers could not 
protect crops from wild animals);44 German mail services 
and news media were closed and when re-opened were 
subject to strict censorship (which suffocated freedom of 
communication and expression) ;45 and German children were 
prohibited from forming Boy Scout Troops46 or clubs 
engaged in so-called "militaristic" sports47 (which put
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the onus on ill-equipped Allied troops to entertain and 
remould German youth).48 In addition, German POWs were 
held by the victorious powers for several years after the 
conclusion of the war —  in contravention of 
international law49 —  and in 1945 several hundred 
thousand suspect Nazis were locked away in internment 
camps.50
These anti-partisan measures certainly contributed 
to the successful suppression of underground activity, 
but at a considerable price: treating the German nation
as a uniformly hostile entity also undermined the 
confidence of anti-Nazi Germans, and it created a vast 
gulf between the occupation forces and the German people 
during a brief period of profound psychological and 
social dislocation, when German society might otherwise 
have been most open to new influences. Revolutionary 
committees, or "antifas," were broken up, and the first 
major anti-Nazi demonstration in postwar Germany —  a 
rally in Cologne for home-coming concentration camp 
prisoners (20 May 1945) —  was dispersed by Allied
military police who fired above the heads of the 
demonstrators.51
Such incidents occurred not from a conscious fear of
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the Left, as is sometimes suggested,52 but from a zealous 
application of measures specifically meant to smother 
Nazi opposition. Allied security mania, for instance, 
was evident in an American intelligence summary from the 
summer of 1945, which noted that even seemingly 
legitimate political movements could be a cloak for 
subversives, or in a British directive which warned that, 
"It is . . . necessary to ensure that [Naziism's] place is 
not taken by other more disguised anti-democratic, 
reactionary, and militarist movements.1,53 The final 
results of such a fear were soon obvious: the postwar
premier of Schleswig-Holstein, Herr Steltzer, noted in 
December 1946 that Allied expectations of Werwolf 
resistance had led to an attempt at bureaucratic over­
control, and had thus resulted in a reign of debilitating 
inefficiency. Once this "vast apparatus" was in place, 
claimed Steltzer, it became an end in itself and worked 
"so negatively" that it crushed any hope of a German 
recovery and generally convinced Germans that it was an 
instrument for the "annihilation or enslavement" of the 
country.54
The first security measures to be rescinded were 
strict travel and curfew limits, which damaged the German
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economy, but it was only after the Potsdam Conference in 
the mid-summer of 1945 that a general thaw began, first 
in the removal of bans on political activity,55 and then 
in the cancellation of formal non-fraternization rules.56 
Even then, the various Allied security agencies continued 
to zealously ferret out underground plots and to 
generally cast aspersions upon German "national 
character," and numerous restrictions upon German society 
remained in place. As late as 1948-49, the American 
Civil Liberties Union complained that restrictive 
licensing and censorship regulations were still imposed 
upon western Germans.57 However, it might also be noted 
that fear of guerrilla warfare had at least one positive 
implication: as early as June 1945, it was realized that
food would necessarily have to be imported into Germany 
in order to prevent starvation and the resultant 
breakdown in law and order, particularly since it was 
suspected that many of the arms and sabotage caches lain 
by Nazi commandos were not yet uncovered. "If they're 
hungry this winter," said one Allied officer, "they'll 
dig up the guns and start shooting."58
Fear of Nazi guerrilla warfare also influenced 
Allied military strategy during the final months of the
war. As the Allies advanced into Germany, General 
Eisenhower specifically instructed that no towns be left 
unoccupied and that no pockets be left in the Allied 
rear, a policy which naturally complemented the broad 
front strategy and avoided the kind of mistakes made by 
the Germans themselves in Russia and Yugoslavia —  
mistakes which had eventually yielded large scale 
guerrilla resistance. Rather than reaching geographic 
targets, Eisenhower constantly emphasized the destruction 
of the German Wehrmacht and the Nazi capability for 
resistance. Thus, the Allies rarely ignored by-passed 
straggler/guerrilla bands, but constantly employed troops 
to double back and eliminate these dangers.59 Several 
counter-insurgency combat manuals were also published,60 
and troops were trained in the methods necessary for 
suffocating guerrilla resistance.61 In March 1945, an 
entire Army, the 15th, was activated as a garrison force 
in the Rhineland, specifically for the purpose of 
blocking possible efforts at sabotage by bands of Germans 
on the western bank of the river.62
Eisenhower's decisions to eliminate the Alpine 
Redoubt and the Ruhr Pocket rather than to drive upon 
Berlin comprised a natural culmination to the broad front
strategy and the desire to eliminate any pockets of 
possible partisan resistance. The last minute switch of 
emphasis away from Berlin and toward Berchtesgaden was a 
particularly difficult choice, and was certainly 
influenced by the flood of low grade intelligence which 
had been surging into SHAEF since 1943 and which told of 
extensive preparations for German guerrilla warfare, 
possibly based upon strongholds in an Alpine base area.63 
There was some tendency to disregard these reports as 
deliberate SD disinformation,64 but many highly competent 
intelligence authorities took the available intelligence 
at face value —  Colonel Dick White, for instance, noted 
in February 1945 that, "Not enough weight is given to the 
many reports of a probable Nazi last stand in the 
Bavarian Alps.,|65 During this same period SHAEF received 
the first Ultra intelligence about German intentions to 
transfer important aircraft manufacturing facilities into 
the mountains,66 and in early March came the first Ultra 
confirmations of the German withdrawal of military 
headquarters into the Alps and of the attempts to 
establish a widespread Werwolf guerrilla movement.67 
Aerial reconnaissance showed the construction of bunkers 
in the Berchtesgaden area.68
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Around this same period, the SHAEF Joint 
Intelligence Committee warned that if the Alps were not 
rapidly occupied "guerrilla or dissident movements will 
gain ground and the Nazis may be able to put into effect 
some of their plans for establishing subversive 
organizations in Germany and other countries.” The 
conclusion was obvious: "We should... be prepared to
undertake operations in Southern Germany in order to 
overcome rapidly any organised resistance by the German 
Armed Forces or by guerrilla movements which may have 
retreated to the inner zone and to this redoubt."69
Based upon such advice, Eisenhower and Bradley 
decided in mid-March to shift the focus of Allied 
operations away from a northern drive toward Berlin, in 
favour of a push into central Germany in order to cut 
Germany in two by linking up with the Soviets —  in the 
bargain, the Allies would also get the Thuringian 
industrial complex, which was the center of German small 
arms production and was thought to play an important role 
in the manufacture of weapons for Nazi guerrilla warfare. 
A second step was then to destroy Nazi forces in southern 
Germany before they could withdraw into the National 
Redoubt.70
It has often been argued, of course, that 
Eisenhower's central and southern drives resulted from a 
faulty strategy which over-emphasized the threat of an 
Alpine Redoubt and underemphasized the political value of 
Berlin. However, given the fact that within several 
weeks of Eisenhower's decision, numerous German partisan 
bands had actually congregated in the Allied rear? given 
the fact that the Werwolf and the Jaadverbande actually 
did attempt to turn the mountains into a guerrilla 
stronghold? and given the fact that Hitler decided only 
on 22 April to stay in Berlin and forego the tremendous 
option of personally rallying his troops in the 
mountains,71 Eisenhower's decision was perhaps not 
totally misguided after all. Moreover, the actual 
inadequacy of preparations in the Alps should not obscure 
the fact that the Germans had a consistent record of 
muddling through such disabilities and achieving more 
with less, particularly when given a breathing space in 
which to recoup. In their postwar memoirs, both 
Eisenhower and his intelligence chief, General Kenneth 
Strong, recalled that the Nazi guerrilla movement was a 
real threat which may well have posed a considerable 
danger to the Allied forces had it not been speedily
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neutralized.72
It is likely that Soviet strategy and occupation 
policy was also influenced by the Werwolf danger, 
although the outline of this story is not nearly so clear 
as in the West. We do know, however, that like the 
Western Allies, the Soviets were exercised by the 
possibility of a guerrilla stronghold in the Alps (or in 
East Prussia) j73 that like the Western Allies, the 
Soviets were deeply suspicious of Germans claiming 
socialist or democratic leanings and therefore broke-up 
local antifas on the suspicion that they were penetrated 
by Nazis?74 and that like the Western Allies, the Soviets 
maintained stringent security measures,75 and even added 
an extra element by the deployment of full-scale NKVD 
divisions organized to maintain security in the rear.76
Although the evidence is thin, it appears that the 
development of Soviet policy in Germany was a mirror 
image of the same process in the West. First came a 
reactive policy designed partly to crush Nazi underground 
resistance, although this policy was much more dependent 
on the indigenous population than was its Western 
counterpart. Once the Werwolf failed to bloom into a 
major threat to the occupation forces, this improvised
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policy was gradually replaced by an ideological attempt 
to mould the Germans in the image of their occupiers, as 
also occurred in the West.
During the early part of 1945, Soviet policy in 
Germany was clearly disorganized, short-term, and 
exploitative. The dominant figures were Georgi Malenkov, 
whose Reparations Committee sought to deindustrialize 
Germany as quickly as possible,77 and Ilya Ehrenburg, 
whose blood-curdling hate propaganda helped whip millions 
of troops into a frenzy of pillage and rape. Aside from 
these destructive forces, official Soviet policy was 
based upon a "liberation" of the German people,78 and the 
final destruction of fascism through the continued unity 
of the Grand Alliance. German Communist cadres were 
trained to aid the occupation forces, but were told not 
to expect the establishment of socialism? rather, their 
task was to "democratize" the German people and to 
construct an anti-fascist, democratic mass organization, 
the ultimate purpose of which was "to convince [the 
population] that the extermination of Naziism is in the 
interest of the German people, and that therefore all 
honest Germans must help with the tracking and 
elimination of war criminals, fascist terrorists, and
458
saboteurs" (5 April 1945).79 Soviet propaganda appealed 
to Germans for help in eliminating Nazi resisters, and 
threats to kill hostages in retaliation for Nazi 
terrorism were carefully funnelled through newly- 
appointed German civil officials in order to keep such 
declarations one step removed from Soviet Military 
Authorities.80
When several German Communist special teams were 
actually sent into eastern Germany in early May 1945, 
they aided in liquidation of secret Nazi resistance 
cells, and reportedly attempted to prevent "excesses" in 
German-Soviet relations. In fact, the Berlin team was 
encouraged by Marshal Zhukov to be even more vigilant in 
such matters, and its chief, Walter Ulbricht, testily 
replied that it was Soviet Intelligence which was failing 
to hold Nazi activists even after they had been 
identified and apprehended. "In the Ulbricht group," 
noted one member, "we greatly overestimated the influence 
of the Nazis."81
By June, however, the contours of Soviet and German 
Communist policy had begun to change. The head of the 
Berlin Werwolf had recently been captured, and although 
there had been scattered sniping, arson attacks, and
guerrilla warfare, there had been no major outbreaks of 
rebellion, the possible exception being an uprising in 
the Berlin district of Charlottenburg. Not surprisingly, 
it was at this point that Communist policy showed signs 
of turning away from a solely reactive, security­
conscious position, and toward a more ideologically 
oriented policy: the KPD was officially refounded, a
Communist press was established, and directives from 
Moscow ordered an acceleration of leftist policies such 
as land reform. Although this change was clothed as part 
of a general democratic revival, in which major bourgeois 
parties were also allowed to reorganize, the real shift 
in policy was impossible to ignore: the monolithic anti­
fascist movement, which had earlier been posited as a 
weapon against the Nazi underground, was now being 
replaced before it even appeared, mainly by a 
reestablished Communist Party.82 There were also other 
external manifestations of a much-heralded Communist 
revival —  the so-called Zhdanovschina —  within the 
Soviet Union: for instance, Malenkov's powerful
Reparations Committee was progressively weakened by 
opposition from the Party, the military, and the 
Commissariate of Foreign Trade.83 Moreover, Political
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Officers attached to the Army had made a desperate effort 
to stop looting and rape by Red Army troops, and in April 
1945, Ehrenburg's nationalist hate propaganda was 
publicly denounced by a senior Party official.84
With Soviet patronage assured, German Communists 
were subsequently able to seize the commanding heights of 
the expanding Eastern Zone bureaucracy. Together with 
Soviet security agencies, they gradually combined the 
process of wiping out the surviving Nazi opposition with 
the act of emasculating all legitimate contenders for 
power. It is rarely possible, as Isaac Deutscher notes, 
to separate these two processes and determine when the 
authorities were acting on valid concerns for Red Army 
lines of communication and the suppression of fascism, 
and when they were settling accounts with non-Nazi 
parties and groups which they were only too eager to 
suppress.85 Within a relatively short period of time, 
however, Communist-dominated police agencies began to 
cast an increasingly wide net which turned up alleged 
links between the armed underground and legitimate 
bourgeois political groupings, or at least "demonstrated" 
bourgeois tolerance of Nazi activity.86 Occasional 
terrorist attacks —  such as the attempted assassination
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President of the Thuringian Diet, or the bombing of a 
Socialist Unity Party headguarters in Halle —  were 
fabricated into elaborate conspiracies and thus seized as 
opportunities to cajole the various Lander Diets into 
passing so-called "Laws for the Protection of 
Democracy."87 Notably, the exploitation of such sporadic 
terrorist incidents as an excuse for authoritarian crack­
downs is a familiar tradition both in the history of the 
Soviet Union (ie., the Purge of the Old Bolsheviks, 
1935), and in the history of Germany as well (ie., the 
Karlsbad Decrees, 1819; the Anti-Socialist Laws, 1878? 
and the Enabling Act, 1933) . In such an atmosphere, 
elections eventually became little better than stage- 
managed shams, and the opposition parties were either 
neutralized or —  in the case of the Socialists —  
annexed and communized by the KPD.
The full significance of this turn of events in the 
Soviet Zone was that it represented merely one instance 
of the general pattern of affairs in Eastern Europe —  
allowing, of course, for regional variations. Throughout 
the so-called "Soviet security zone," Communist parties 
were uniformly placed in charge of police apparatus by 
the Soviets, and were thus encouraged to push themselves
forward as the guardians of law and order. In the 
process of crushing pro-German underground groups —  many 
of which had been organized or at least belatedly 
supported by the Jaadverbande and FAK units —  the 
Communists helped lay the groundwork for their own 
dictatorships.88 The classic case was Rumania, where 
guerrillas trained and supported by the Jaadverb ande 
succeeded in early 1945 in creating considerable 
confusion deep in the Soviet rear? with a major German 
counter-offensive looming upon the adjacent front in 
Hungary, the Soviets willingly replaced the moderate 
Rumanian coalition government with a strongly pro-Soviet 
regime, claiming that the Rumanians were otherwise unable 
or unwilling to protect Soviet lines of communication.89 
Together with the Soviet secret police, this Rumanian 
puppet regime subsequently wiped out all opposition, 
fascist and democratic alike.
Seen in dialectical terms, it might thus be 
concluded that it was the antithesis to the Werwolf and 
to Werwolf-type groups which gave the Nazi guerrilla 
movement its historical significance: the Werwolf had an
impact not because it succeeded, but merely because it 
existed. As a diversion, it drew Allied troops away from
Berlin —  only to allow the capital to fall to the 
Soviets —  and it also momentarily diverted the occupying 
powers from the long term task of imposing their own 
social beliefs and value systems upon Germany, After a 
brief interim, when it quickly became clear that the 
occupation forces would not have to function under a 
continuous state of siege, the occupying powers got back 
to the work of achieving their own long term goals within 
the truncated Reich. The reactive influence of the 
Werwolf threat thus dates mainly to a few months in the 
spring and early summer of 1945, the so-called "Stunde 
Null," although the significance of this brief period for 
the overall history of the occupation should not be 
underestimated. Only a profoundly Whiggish approach to 
historiography would deny that the lost periods and 
failed movements of history have no influence upon the 
continuity of events.
Of course, considered solely on the merits of its 
success in prompting a guerrilla war, the Werwolf was a 
movement which achieved a few limited successes, but 
which otherwise stands as a classic example of the 
Kleinkriea gone wrong. One is especially reminded of 
another partisan levy raised in a lost cause, the French
franc tireurs of 1870-71, particularly in the sense that 
both movements caused much more damage to their own 
people than to the enemy. The obvious willingness of the 
Hitler regime to subject its people to this final trial 
is perhaps the ultimate indictment of the Nazi system? 
Hitler was in fact heard to groan that because Germany 
had lost a war of extermination, the welfare of the 
surviving population was no longer a matter of 
consequence.90 "Homo homini lupus est" —  man is indeed 
wolf to his fellow man.
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Chart # i: Unternehmen Zeppelin, early 1944
Amt VI, Gruppe VI C 
Location: Berlin
H a u p t k o m m a n d o  Nord
A b t . A b t . Ab t .
"A" "B" "C"
o p e r . a d m . i n t .
&
train.
tr ainin g
s ch ools
Spe cia l 
Units :
U d a r n a j a  Bgd
So nder- 
lager "L" 
L o c a t i o n : 
Blamau
A u s s e n k o m m a n d o s  I - V
H a u p t k o m m a n d o  Sud
A b t . A b t . A b t .
«i A if »B « "C"
o p e r . a d m . i n t .
&
t r a i n .
training
schools
Special 
Units : —
C o s s a c k s , 
A r m e n i a n s , 
T u r k o m a n s , 
etc.
A u s s e n k o m m a n d o s  I - IV
Ne b e n k o m m a n d o s N e b e n k o m m a n d o s
Source: CSDIC (WEA) BAOR "Final Report on Dr. Gehhardt Willy 
Teich" FR #31, 21 Jan. 1946, ETO MIS- Y-S ect. CSDIC/
WEA Final I n t e r r o g a t i o n  Re po rts 1945-1947, RG 332, NA.
Chart #2! Dienstelle Priitzmann
OKW Liaison 
L t . U n g e r  —
Pe r s o n n e l  
M a t t e r s :
Stubaf .
Kotthau s
R e i c h s f u h r e r -SS 
He i n r i c h  Hi m m l e r  
( O p e r atio na l A b w e h r )
Ge neral  In s p e k t e u r
fur S p e z i a l a b w e h r  -----
0 / Gruf . Hans Priitzmann
Chef des Stabe s 
Staf. T s c h i e r s k y  
(later Brgf. 
O p l a n d e r )
Deputy (to 
Priitzmann) : 
Gilt. Juppe 
(April 1945) 
I
Adj u t a n t s : 
Stubaf. Kamm 
S t u b a f . 
M u l l e r - W e s t
Training
Brgf.
Siebel
Adi utant
Obit.
Sulle
S i g n a l s : 
H p t m . d . 
Pol.
Sc hw ei zer
M e d i c a l : 
Dr. Hiihn
Female W: 
Frau Maisch
Source: C S D I C / W E A  BAOR "Second In terim  Report on SS Obergruf.
Karl G u t e n b e r g e r ", IR #34, 1 Nov. 1945, OSS 123190, NA.
Chart #3: HSSPfs in the Greater Reich, Autumn 1944
W e h r kreis
I (Nordost)
II (Ostsee)
III (Spree)
IV (Elbe)
V (Siidwest)
VI (West)
VII (Su'd)
VIII (Siidost)
IX (Fulda-
Werra)
X (Nordsee)
HSSPf
O/Gruf. Georg 
Ebrecht (later 
replaced by 
Prutzmann)
0/Gruf. Emil 
Mazew
O/Gruf. August 
Heissmeyer
Gruf. Rudolf 
von Alvensleben
O/Gruf. Otto 
Hoffmann
Gruf. Karl 
Gutenberger
O/Gruf. Karl 
von Eberstein
O/Gruf. Heinrich 
Schmauser
O/Gruf. Josias, 
Erbprinz zu 
Waldeck und 
Pyrmont
Gruf. Georg von 
Bassewitz-Behr
He a d q u a r t e r s
Konigsberg
Stettin
Berlin
Dresden
Stuttgart
Dusseldorf
Munich
Breslau
Kassel
Hamburg
Extent of 
Influence
East Prussia, 
Merael
Mecklenberg,
Pomerania
Brandenburg,
Altmark,
Neumark
Saxony,
Thuringia,
Northwest
Sudetenland
Wurttemberg, 
Baden, Alsace
Westphalia, 
Rhineland, 
Eastern 
Belgium
Southern
Bavaria
Silesia,
Sudetenland
Hessen,
Western
Thuringia
Frisia,
Schleswig
Chart # 3  (cont.): HSSPfs in the Greater Reich
XI (Mitte) Gruf. Hermann 
Hofle (later 
replaced by 
Querner)
Hanover Hanover Prov., 
Brunswick, 
Anhalt
XII (Rhein-
Westmark)
Gruf. Jurgen 
Stroop
Wiesbaden Southwest Hesse, 
Eifel, Palatinate, 
Saar, Lorraine
XIII (Main) Gruf. Benno 
Martin
Nuremberg Northern Bavaria, 
Western Bohemia
XVII (Donau) 0/Gruf. Rudolf 
Querner (later 
replaced by 
Schimana)
Vienna Northern Austria,
Southern
Sudetenland
XVIII (Alpen- 
land)
Gruf. Erwin 
Rosener
Salzburg Southern Austria, 
Northern Slovenia
XX (Weichsel) Gruf. Fritz 
Katzmann
Danzig Polish Corridor, 
Danzig,
Western East 
Prussia
XXI (Warthe) Brgf. Heinz 
Reinefarth
Posen Western Poland
General-
Gouvernement
(Ost)
O/Gruf. Wilhelm 
Koppe
Cracow Central and 
Southern Poland
Bohemia-
Moravia
0/Gruf. Karl 
Frank
Prague Central Bohemia, 
Moravia
Bialystok (under Brgf. Otto 
Wkr. Nordost) Hellwig
Bialystok Northeast Poland
Source: "Liste der H o c hs ten und Ho he ren SS- und Polizeif(ihrer 
sowei der SS- und Polizeifiihrer", 20 Oct. 1944, NS 19/ 
1637, BA.
Chart #4; The SS-Police Command Structure
Rei ch M i n i s t r y  - 
of the In te rior
Chef d. D e u t s c h e n  
Polizei
Reichsfiihrung-SS 
H. Hi mm le r
H. Himmler Hi m mle r
Chef der O r d n ung s- Chef der S i c h e r h e i t s -
Polizei Po li zei und des SD
A. Wu n n e n b e r g E. K a l t e n b r u n n e r
R e g ular Police 
H a u ptamt (ORPO)
R e i c h s s i c h e r h e i t s -
Haupt am t (RSHA)
Hoherer SS u
P o l i z e i f u h r e r
(H S S P f )
Hoher e B e f e h l s h a b e r  of B e f e h l s h a b e r  or
P o l i z e i -
Beh or den
the Regular 
Police (BdO)
In spekt eu r der 
S i c h e r h e i t s p o l i z e i  
u. des SD (BdS or IdS)
Nat io nal
Police
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
Local Police 
A u t h or it ies
Reg io nal Kripo, Gestapo, 
and SD Offic es
Source: Fi nding Guide to the Re cords of the Reich Leader of 
the SS and Chief of G e rm an Police, German M i l it ar y 
Records, NA.
Chart # 5: An Example  of Re gi o n a l  W e r w o l f  O r g a n i z a t i o n  —
The We rw ol f Staff of HSSPf G u t e n b e r g e r  (Wehrkrei s VI)
D i e n s t e l l e  Priitzmann
HSSPf West
Karl G u t e n b e r g e r
Werwolf B e a u f t r a g t e r  
SS-Standf. Raddatz
Liason with
and O r g a n i z a t i o n ---------- Army Group "B
Obstlt. Ne in ha us
Exe c u t i v e  T r a ining
and Army Group
Werwolf 
Train in g  
S c h o o l s :
Lu b bec ke  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  P e r s on nel
and Sc hloss  Ostuf. Haase Ma t t e r s  
Hiilcrath Hptm.
Hansen
Training 
Officer 
U/Stuf .
Wenzel
Werwolf
Gruppen
Source: C S D I C / W E A  BAOR "Second I n t er im Report on SS- Ober gruf.
Karl Gutenb er ger", IR #34, 1 Nov. 1945, OSS 123190, NA.
Medical  Tr a n s p o r t
Dr. O s ter - Hptm. 
meyer Schroder
Chart # 6: The SS-Jagdverbande
Schools:
Neustrelitz
Friedenthal
Seehof
Kuhhof
Heinrichsberg 
Harzgebirge (Sig. Sch.) 
Kloster Tiefenthal 
Kileschnowitz
Central Staff ----
Commander:
Ostubaf. Skorzeny 
CoS: Stubaf. von 
Folkersam (later 
O/Stubaf. Walter) 
Location: 
Sachsenhausen
Flusskampf-
schvimmer
Location:
Vienna
Dienstelle
2000
Location:
Vienna
SS-Fallschirm- 
’ jagerbataillon 
800
Kampfgeschvader 200 
Location: Gatow
I------
Jagdverband
Siidost
Signal
Unit
Supply
Unit
Jagdverband
Ost
Jagdverband
Mitte
Jagdverband
Nordwest
Jagdverband
Slidwest
Location:
Krems
Commander:
0/Stubaf.
Benesch
Composition:
Volksdeutsch,
Hungarian,
Rumanian,
Slovakian,
Bulgarian
Location:
Hohensalzach
Commander:
Stubaf. Auch
Composition:
Volksdeutsch,
Ukrainian,
Finnish,
Polish,
Russian
Location: 
Friedenthal 
Commander: 
S/Stuf. 
Fucker 
Composition: 
German 
Volunteers
Location:
Neustrelitz
Commander:
H/Stuf. Heuer
Composition:
Flemish,
Dutch,
Danish
Location:
K. Tiefenthal 
Commander: 
H/Stuf. Gerlach 
Composition: 
Belgian,
French,
Italian
Sources: "Cl News Sheet" #24, 27 June 1945, Ap pend ix  "C", W0 
205/997, PRO; and Mil. Int. Serv ice in Au stria "1st 
D e t ailed I n t e r r o g a t i o n  Repor t - W. Girg", 22 Jan. 1946, 
OSS XL 41372, NA.
Chart # 7: Kampfgeschwader 200
O b e r k o m m a n d o  der 
Luf twaf f e
Luf tflo11e 
Reich
RSHA Abwehr
(until
summer
1944)
J a g d v e r b a n d e  
Central  Staff 
(O/Stubaf. Skorzeny)
KG 200 HQ 
C o m m a n d e r :
Ob er st  Heigl 
(later Obers t 
Baumbach, then 
Ma jo r von Hernier) 
Location: Gatow
No. 1 
Group
No. 2 
Group
No. 1 Staffel No. 2 St af fel  No. 3 Staffel No. 4 Staffel
Long Di st ance Short Range
O u t s t a t i o n s
Training Technical
 1------ 1
"Olga" "C arm en "  "Toska" "Klara"
Source: James Lucas, K o m ma nd o (New York: St. M a r t i n fs, 1985), 
p . 285.
W/T Unit
Jagdverband Siidwest HQ 
Commander: H/Stuf. Gerlach 
Location: Tiefenthal
Kampfschule
Army and Waffen-SS —  
Intelligence Officers
Jagdeinsatz
Nord
Jagdkommandos:
- Stein
-Pavel
-Weissenberger 
(later Weissen­
berger II)
- Berndt
-Well 
(later trans­
ferred to 
Jagdverband 
Nordwest)
Jagdeinsatz
Slid
Jagdkommandos:
-Haase
-Hossfeld
-Perner
Dutch Resistance 
Movement (later 
under Jagdverband 
Nordwest)
-HSSPf West 
(Wehrkreise XII) 
(Werwolf)
Unternehmen Reic 
(French Fascist 
Resistance Movement)
Jagdeinsatz
Italien
Jagdkommandos:
-Meyer
-Fischer
-Stiegler
-Kieswetter
-Solder
istadt
Gruppe
Spanien
(Roland)
Unternehmen Moretti 
(North Italian Fascist 
Resistance Movement)
Source: U S FET In ter r o g a t i o n  Ce nte r "I nte r m e d i a t e  I n t e r r o g a t i o n  
Report #9 - H. Gerlach", 11 Aug. 1945, OSS XL 13744,
RG 226, NA.
Chart # 9 : An Example of a G e r m a n - O r g a n i z e d  R e s i s t a n c e  M o v emen t 
—  The "Central Of fice for the Ak tio n in Ruman ia "
Rumanian "National 
Government"
Central Office 
for the Aktion 
in Rumania 
Location: Vienna
Training Schools 
(Intelligence, 
Communications, 
Special Service)
German Volksgruppe 
in Rumania
SD
Army Intelligence
Subsidiary Office 
for the Aktion 
in Rumania 
Location: Budapest
Front Intelligence Front Recruitment Aktionsgruppe
Group Group in Rumania
Intelligence Recruitment Organization
Source: " O r g a n i s a t i o n s t a n d  der N a t i o n a l e n  R u m a n i s c h e n  Reg ie rung 
nach 6 w o c hige r T at igkeit ",  NS 19/2155, BA.
Chart #10: The Volkssturm
Reichsfiihrer-SS and 
Befehlshaber des 
Ersatzheeres 
H. Himmler
Leiter der Partei
Kanzlei ^ Bormann
training
equipment,
military
matters
administrative, 
political 
matters
Chef der SS- 
Hauptamt 
O/Gruf. Berger
Beauftragter 
flir Bevaffnung 
und Ausrustung 
des Deutschen 
Volkssturm
Staf. Purucker
Supplies
Chef des SA
Stabschef
Schepmann
Rifle
Training
Korpsleiter 
des NSKK
Korpsleiter
Kraus
Mechanical
Training
German 
Red Cross
Hauptf. 
Dr. Hoth
Medical
Corps
Reichsleiter DAF 
Dr. Ley 
Inspection Tours
Gauleiters and 
teichsverteidungskommissars
Source: "Bez e i c h n u n g  der D i e n s t e l l e n  des Deu t s c h e n  Volkssturras 
Re c o r d s  of the NSDAP, Mic r o c o p y  #T-81, Roll 94, frames 
10 7830- 107832, NA.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
The primary source material collected for this study tends to 
fall into four basic categories: 1) ori gi nal Ge rman doc um en ts  
pertainin g to the W e r w o l f ; 2) Allied i n t e l l i g e n c e  summaries, many 
of which are based upon interrog ations of cap tu red Germans, or 
upon the broadcasts of Werwolf S e n d e r ; 3) s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  i n t e r ­
rog at ion reports; and 4) reminiscence s of events during the dying 
days of the Third Reich, either gathered in the Ost D o k ume nt e 
C o l l ec ti on at the B u n d e s a r c h i v , or included wi thi n publish ed  memoirs.
O ri gi nal Werwolf material is, of course, the most valuable 
type of source, and also, unfortunately, the most rare. In this 
entire study, only several cited documents act ua lly o r i g inated at 
D ie ns telle Priitzmann, most of them versi ons of the Febr ua ry 1945 
order inst ruc ting various mil ita ry com ma nds to pr ovide perso nnel 
for the Werwolf course at Heere ss ch ule II. A note to D i e n stelle  
Priitzmann con cerning the mining of Gorin g' s east Ge rman estate is 
also cited, but aside from a few such documents, very few c o m m u n i ­
ca tions either to or from the Werwolf Co mm and are a v a i l a b l e  in the 
a r c h i v e s .
Most of the remaining German  mat er ia l com pr ises military,  SS, 
or Nazi Party records touching upon the r e l a t i o n s h i p  of these groups 
with the W e r w o l f , or upon their own d e v e lo pm ent of s o - c all ed  
"W e r w o l f ” operations. Such Party records are in the Germ a n  arc hiv es 
in Koblenz, while the SS and military m a t erial  is a v a i l a b l e  both 
in Germany and on National Archives micr ofilm. Also in cl ud ed withi n 
this sphere are several dozen Ultra i n t e rc ep ts  —  G e r m a n  radio 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  monitored and decoded by the Allies —  a l t ho ug h the 
su rv ivin g texts of these me ss ag es are u n f o r t u n a t e l y  not in the 
o rig inal German wording, but are para ph ra sed sum marie s prepared 
by Allied intellig ence analysts. These too are a v a i l a b l e  on m i c r o ­
film. I also made some use of published diaries, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Goebbels* daily scribblings, which co mpri se  one of the chief 
so urces on Werwolf Sender and on Party policy  vis-a-vi s the g u e r ­
rillas .
Such original German material, viewed in isolation, would have 
been very difficult to mold into any sort of c o m p r e h e n s i b l e  n a r r a ­
tive. The glue which holds this study together is t h e refor e 
derived from the second and third cate g o r i e s  of sources, namely 
Allied intelligence  records and in te rr o g a t i o n  sum maries. This sort 
of i n f o r ma tion is not, of course, with out  its lim ita tions . Allied 
i n t e l li gence reports dated prior to April 1945 are al most wo r t h l e s s  
as rel ia bl e sources on the Werw olf  beca use they are based largely 
on he ar say  or upon agent rep orts of du bi ous relia bility. One 
major problem, for instance, was that du ring this pe riod the SD 
de lib e r a t e l y  disseminated fearsom e repo rts about the Alpine Redoubt 
in order to panic the Allies into n e g o t i a t i o n s  with Berlin, and 
these st or ies  frequently turned up in Allied i n t e l l i g e n c e  summaries. 
Such ma t e r i a l  has second hand value, however, as an i n d icator  of
1the sort of exp ectat io ns and fears that Allied pla nn in g was based 
u p o n .
After late March, captured We rwolfe and, oc ca sionally, c a p ­
tured documents, co nt ributed to a radical im pr o v e m e n t  in the 
caliber  of Allied reports. By 9 April, for instance, SHAEF 
could already produce a study called "The SS G u e r r i l l a  Movement", 
wh ic h was a fairly accura te appreciat ion of the entire  Werwolf 
organization. The quality of such reports inc re ased steadily over 
the next year, al though one must keep in mind that the in for mation 
pr ov id ed by captur ed Germans was still fi ltered th ro ug h the p r e ­
j u d i c e s  and perce pt ions of the Allied i n t e l l i g e n c e  off ic ers who 
au t h o r e d  these reports. The History of the Co unt er  I nt ellige nc e  
C o r p s , also much used in this study, is simila r both in its scope 
and its limitations. The documents w h ich most re duce this evalua- 
tory intervent io n are clear-cut i nt errogat io n s u m m arie s of such 
regio na l Werwolf and Jagdve rband leaders as Karl Gute nbe rger,
Ernst Wagner, or Hans Gerlach, although even these doc um ents are 
outline summaries of the interrogations, rather than word for word 
t r a n s c r i p t s .
It is also im por tan t to note that after the b e g in ning of 
April 1945, the exi st ence of the Werwolf became public kno wl edge  
because of the a c t i vi ti es of the Konigswiisterhausen transmitter, 
and that the best existing record of these b r o a d c a s t s  is in Allied 
mo ni t o r i n g  reports. The P W E 1s ev al uations  of W e rw olf S e n d e r ’s 
output, presented in "German Pro pagan da  and the G e r m a n " , are 
extensive, detailed, and include a c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount of quoted 
m a t e r i a l .
Although most of these Allied i n t e l lig en ce report s and i n t e r ­
ro ga ti on summaries are widely scattere d t h r o ugh ou t various War 
Office, FO, OSS, and State and War De pa r t m e n t  files, two particular 
cl us te rs of inf orm at ion are worthy of note. One is a thick file 
designa te d "Werewolf Acti vitie s Vol. I", which is an American 
General Staff dossier formerly stored in Fort Meade as part of 
the Inve st igatory  Records Re pository (IRR), and pr esently available 
in the Modern Mi litary  Records section of the Nat io nal Archives.
This file includes numerous first rate reports ga th er ed from a 
n u mber  of subsidiary sources. A so mewhat si milar consol id ated  
file, 7P 125, sits in the French Mi li tary Ar chi ve s in Vincennes, 
and cover s the morale  of the civil po pu lation in the French 
O c c u p a t i o n  Zone, including detailed in fo r m a t i o n  on all sorts of 
Nazi resistanc e groups active in sout h w e s t e r n  Ge rma ny  and Voralberg.
Although i n t e l ligen ce  summar ies and i n t e r r o g a t i o n  reports 
p r o v i d e  the basic sup er s t r u c t u r e  for this study, val ua bl e s u p p l e ­
m e n t a r y  material was also gather ed from a fourth type of basic 
source, ie., the r e m i n i s c e n c e s  of various Germans. T h o usa nd s of 
short reports writ ten in the late 1940s and 1950s by eastern German 
r e f u g e e s  are collected in the Ost Do ku mente file at the B u n d e s a r c h i v , 
most of which endlessly  repeat the savage H o r rors  e x p e ri en ced by these 
p e ople  at the hands of the Soviets and their allies. Several of 
these reports, however, also detail the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of Werwolf
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  or the presence of Ge rman  g u e r r i l l a s  in enemy- 
o c c up ied territory, altho ugh it must be r e c o g n i z e d  that there was 
a na t u r a l  tendency for the authors to d e e m p h a s i z e  anything which 
made their collective mistre atment seem at all warranted. It is 
also cle ar from these reports that the Soviets, Poles, and Czechs 
j u s t i f i e d  much  of their own brutality thr ough an alleged desire 
to stamp out the W e r w o l f .
Aside from the Ost D o k u m e n t e , seve ral oth er  pub lished memoirs 
were also consulted, particularly wo rks  by Skorzeny . An important 
second hand memoir was Mo czarski 's C o n v e r s a t i o n s  with an E x e c u t i o n e r , 
whi ch  de t a i l e d  the jail cell c onf es sions of J u r g e n  Stroop, former 
HSSPf and Werw olf overlord. These c o n v e r s a t i o n s ,  as recorded by 
St r o o p ' s  fe ll ow  prisoner, Moczarsci, c o m p l e m e n t  Stroop's i n te rr o­
gation r e c ords in the National Archives.
Finally, brief ment ion  must be made of s e c o n d a r y  source m a t e ­
rial w h i c h  proved a valuable asset to my re sea rch . German- langu age 
works by Arno Rose and Hellmuth Au e r b a c h  c o m p r i s e  the only existing 
st ud ie s cover i n g  the Werw olf movemen t as a whole, and the only 
so ur ce s toward  which I could compare my own findings,  while 
C h a rles W h i t i n g ' s  H i t l e r ’s Werew ol ves is the d e f i n i t i v e  study of 
U n t e r n e h m e n  K a r n i v a l , the as sas s i n a t i o n  of the O b e r b u r g e r m e i s t e r  
of Aachen. Books by E.H. Coo kridge and James Lu cas also contain 
va l u a b l e  c h a pt er s on the W e r w o l f , p a r t i c u l a r l y  Lucas' K o m m a n d o .
A large nu mb er of Allied unit h i s tories were  also consulted, a 
few of w h i c h  yielded important i n f o rma ti on on in di v i d u a l  incidents 
of G e r m a n  gu er rilla activity.
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